India has deployed in recent months at least a dozen naval vessels to the Red Sea to ensure maritime security in the region, marking the region’s largest deployment of naval assets to date. Reportedly, the force has investigated over 250 vessels in the last two months to mitigate the threat of piracy in the region.
After some six years of absence, the piracy threat off the coast of Somalia made a comeback to the region after the Houthis began targeting vessels at the entrance of the Red Sea, claiming that the attacks were executed to support the Palestinians in the Israel-Hamas war which started on October 7.
“Houthis and piracy are disconnected. But pirates are trying to use this opportunity as the West’s efforts are focused on the Red Sea,” a navy official told Reuters.
According to the report, officials say that since December 1, the Indian Navy has documented at least 17 incidents involving hijacking, attempted hijacking, and suspicious approaches. Indian officials said it deployed two frontline warships in the Gulf of Aden. It maintains a fleet of at least ten northern and western Arabian Sea warships, accompanied by surveillance aircraft.
India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar explained the reason for the massive deployment on Tuesday. “We will not be considered a responsible country when bad things are happening in the surrounding country ... when bad things are happening in the surrounding country, and we say, ‘I have got nothing to do with this,’” he said at a public event.
Albert Vidal, research analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, told The Media Line that India’s large deployments should not come as a surprise as the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Arabian Sea are now a primary area of interest for the Indian Navy, as per the Indian Maritime Security Strategy 2015.
Dr. Ramu C.M., a Berlin-based energy and international politics consultant, adds that with the move, “India is seeking to augment its role as a security provider in the Indian Ocean region.”
He told The Media Line that this is evidenced by the recent large-scale exercise in the Arabian Sea, featuring intricate maneuvers and overseeing the deployment of a large squadron of jet fighters and UAVs.
C.M. also recalled how the Indian Navy promptly addressed a distress call from a Marshall Islands-flagged vessel, underscoring its commitment to safeguarding the maritime shipping lanes.
By engaging in counter-piracy operations, Vidal said, “India can kill two birds with one stone: It helps ensure the safety of its seafarers while contributing to regional maritime security, without taking the risks that come with directly confronting the Houthis,” while pointing out that Indian nationals are among the largest community of seafarers worldwide, with about 240,000 according to some estimates.
Vidal sees the different deployments in the Red Sea as “an interesting division of labor,” while the US, UK, France, and other players are invested in the Red Sea and Bab el Mandeb to defend ships against Houthi attacks, India is focused in providing reassurance against piracy.
Since January 11, mainly American and British forces have targeted the Houthis in a bid to mitigate their attacks against vessels sailing in the region. The strikes are part of Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG), initiated in December 2023 as a military operation led by the United States and supported by a multinational coalition. Its primary objective is to address and counter Houthi-led attacks on shipping in the Red Sea.
C.M. notes that India continues to refrain from taking up an active combatant role like the US and UK, rationalized by its decision not to join the US-led OPG.
He notes that New Delhi is instead engaging in diplomatic talks with Iran, which he adds is possibly the only country with a direct backchannel with the Houthis. He explains that India is also improving surveillance in the region and providing protective escorts to its container ships.
India's diplomatic strategy
“Despite India’s growing security partnerships with both Israel and the US, it has diplomatically taken a neutral de-escalatory stance on the Israel-Hamas conflict, in line with its historical position on the Israel-Palestine issue. This reiterates its traditional pragmatic geopolitical posturing in the Middle East,” C.M. added.
Vidal listed additional reasons for India not engaging in the OPG. First, he notes that the coalition comprises members of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), of which India is not a full member. New Delhi, however, joined CMF as an associate partner in 2022.
“India may perceive it would have more to lose by joining OPG, as it would antagonize the Houthis and attract unwanted attention to its own shipping,” Vidal adds.
Third, he notes that current American and British have not changed the Houthi objectives. “India seems to be taking a different approach by engaging Iran diplomatically, with foreign minister Jaishankar visiting Iran in mid-January to discuss such issues,” he said.
Lastly, Vidal asserts that India’s core interests appear not to be directly threatened now, with its Russian oil imports continuing to go through the Red Sea. In addition, India’s decision not to join OPG aligns with its commitment to strategic autonomy.
However, India does have an economic interest in safeguarding vessels in the Red Sea.
As far as India is concerned, said C.M., “threats in the southern Red Sea include possible targeted attacks on ships that could harm India’s trade interests through the Suez Canal, which includes, among other things, exports to Europe as well as its voluminous discounted oil imports from Russia.”
Vidal adds that this route accounts for 50% of its exports and 30% of its imports. The current disruptions, he says, “Mean higher freight and logistics costs for Indian consumers and exporters, as well as shipment delays, which will likely impact agricultural commodities and other perishable goods.”