The opening of the Strait of Hormuz is now becoming a key part of the war with Iran. Whereas initially, the war was about Iran’s nuclear and missile threat, the response of the regime has led to new challenges.
In essence, the Islamic Republic has been playing a bit of chess in the region, seeking to move the war’s frontline to Iraq and the Strait of Hormuz.
This means that to counter the Iranian chess move, the United States may need to fight to get vessels moving again, to ensure that the world’s oil markets stabilize.
This campaign may primarily fall more heavily on Washington’s shoulders than on Israel’s because the Israeli part of the campaign has been focused on other targets in Iran, such as the key leadership.
In addition, US Marines are moving to the region, and the US may consult with Gulf partners about what comes next.
There is a corollary here. US partners and allies in the Gulf want the Iranian threat to the Strait to end. Therefore, securing freedom of navigation is important.
The US has already taken out around 100 Islamic Republic of Iran Navy and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy vessels. The destruction of Iran’s navy is one of the operations the US has highlighted in the three weeks of war.
US Central Command said on March 18 that it had begun targeting new sites. “Hours ago, US forces successfully employed multiple 5,000-pound [2,268 kg.] deep penetrator munitions on hardened Iranian missile sites along Iran’s coastline near the Strait of Hormuz.
The Iranian anti-ship cruise missiles in these sites posed a risk to international shipping in the strait,” CENTCOM said.
Alma details US effort to secure freedom of navigation
Meanwhile, the Alma Research and Education Center – founded by Lt.-Col. (res.) Sarit Zehavi and often focused on Israel’s security challenges in northern Israel – has also put out details about the efforts to secure freedom of navigation.
Its report notes that “four key sites of the IRGC Navy have been heavily hit with airstrikes within the past week. Targeting these four inland sites resulted in the destruction of weapons, attack boats, ammunition, and senior IRGC naval operatives.”
Concerning the sites targeted: First, “IRGC Navy Headquarters in Tehran. On 16 March 2026, the IDF announced the dismantling of the IRGC Navy’s headquarters in the Doshan Tappeh district of Tehran.”
Second, the “IRGC’s Missile Command infrastructure. On 16 March 2026, US CENTCOM Commander Adm. Brad Cooper announced the destruction of eight buildings used to produce light and heavyweight torpedoes “at the Yazd military depot.”
Third, the IRGC “Navy’s Ammunition Command HQ in Malusjan.”
The Alma report says that photos “show large explosions rising from inside the base on 17 March 2026.”
Lastly, the IRGC Navy’s Shahid Athari-Nejad Barracks in the 7th Tactical Air Base in Shiraz: “11 storage buildings for fast attack vessels and other threats were damaged by airstrikes shown in Sentinel-2 imagery.”
This is important as it illustrates that key targets are being struck in order to degrade the Iranian regime’s abilities to close the straits and affect vessel traffic.
Many countries and companies will still be wary of sending ships through the narrow passage. They know that even one drone attack can be deadly and catastrophic.
Back in 2019, Iran used mines to attack ships in the Gulf of Oman off the coast of the United Arab Emirates; it also attacked two ships transiting the straits.
The Iran-backed Houthis did the same in 2023 and 2024. In addition, Iran used drones, likely flown from near Chabahar, to carry out a deadly attack on the Mercer Street ship in 2021. This is indicative of the challenge.
The Iranian drones have a range of around 2,000 kilometers. The Iranian regime could fly them from anywhere on the country’s long coast to attack ships. Iran’s coastline on the Indian Ocean is some 1,000 km. long, while its Persian Gulf coast is another 1,300 km. This is a huge area in which to hide drones, rockets, and other weapons.
The Islamic Republic has been able to smuggle drones in trucks. Iranian-backed militias have often chosen Kia’s Bongo trucks to smuggle rockets, including the 107mm and 122mm.
Drones of the Shahed 136 type and others can also be hidden in shipping containers.
Iran has so many places to hide these weapons that it may be difficult to stop the threat. It also has many small IRGC fast-boats, which are essentially small speed boats, that it can also use to enable such attacks.