No one knows what is coming regarding Iran after the Wednesday night meeting between the US President and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, not even Donald Trump himself, the man who will decide the fate of the region.
Those who want Washington to target Tehran are excited that a second US aircraft carrier may be on its way to the region, but that could also just be more playing for leverage.
In any event, two pretty stark most likely scenarios are coming into contrast.
What are the two scenarios for US strikes on Iran?
In one scenario, the US goes to war with Iran.
That war will likely be split into two phases.
Phase I will be where Trump tries to achieve at least his minimal goals, without losing too much American blood (soldiers) and treasure (naval ships, bases, and aircraft).
This will probably at minimum include striking nuclear sites where Iran has undertaken new activities and excavations, and where it still has some useful assets.
To be clear, Iran has been and remains around two years from being able to develop a nuclear weapon since Israel and the US struck it in June 2025.
However, it still has assets that could help it progress forward, and these assets could be further depleted.
Its ballistic missile apparatus was reduced by only about 50% in June 2025, and, unlike the nuclear program, where little has been rebuilt, much of what was struck has been replaced.
If the Islamic Republic's ballistic missile supply were reduced from 2500 pre-June 2025 to around 1200-1500, it is now back up to 1800-2000 and on its way back to 2500 or more.
These missiles and their launchers are harder to hit than the nuclear program because there are far more of them, and they are more widely dispersed.
Striking these two items would be a minimal goal, and it would be difficult to achieve by force what the US may not be able to achieve through diplomacy.
In the process of attacking these items, the US (and Israel if it chose to participate) would likely hammer Iran's anti-aircraft defenses and some of its top leaders, maybe even Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
But at this stage, it would not be clear whether the US truly could or would want to completely replace the current regime of the Islamic Republic, even if the messaging might imply that.
The reason is that the regime will not be completely removed in 12 days and likely not for several weeks or maybe longer, unless and until some Iranian generals defect.
Also, toppling not just Khamenei but the entire regime, which has several million hardcore supporters, will not be possible if the Iranian protesters are too afraid to rise up again after 5,000-30,000 of them were slaughtered by the regime over January 8-9.
Further, how many US soldiers will be killed and how many US assets destroyed by Iran at this point?
Trump's analysis of whether the conditions are ripe to push for a bigger change in Iran will be a critical moment between Phase I and Phase II.
If Iran is weakened enough, protesters emerge, and few Americans and US assets have been harmed, he may go to Phase II and try for a bigger change and a longer campaign.
If not, he may end at this point without having really helped the Iranian protesters and try to declare victory.
Although Israel would like the ayatollahs toppled, hammering the nuclear program some more and the ballistic missile program a lot more would achieve Israel's main goals of threat reduction.
But all of that is just one scenario based on the idea that the Iranians will not offer Trump enough in diplomacy, making him feel compelled to attack.
Could Iran strike deal with Trump?
In the second scenario, Tehran offers Trump enough on the nuclear program to claim a historic victory, and possibly some other symbolic victories regarding the ballistic missile issue or regarding amnesty or freeing some protesters.
How satisfied would Israel be?
It depends.
If the remaining nuclear sites are dealt with, if the 400 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium and the 20% enriched uranium are dealt with, if Iran commits to an extended complete uranium enrichment freeze, and if there are serious and effective inspections, beyond the limited IAEA inspections under the 2015 nuclear deal, of the Islamic Republic's compliance, Israel would be thrilled.
If one or more of those pieces are missing, Jerusalem would need to remain on guard.
No one believes that Iran would limit its ballistic missiles to Netanyahu's 300-kilometer range.
But that kind of limit is unnecessary as well.
Ballistic missiles need a range of 1,000 to 1,500 kilometers to reach Israel, so the cutoff can be much higher than 300 kilometers.
Next, Tehran has had ballistic missiles for around 30 years, and Israel still exists, and with the Arrow defense system at an 86% shoot down rate.
So the problem is not Iran having any ballistic missiles; Israel's defense establishment has been worried about Iran jumping from the 2,500 level and Iran producing a couple of hundred in a day, to 6,000, 8,000, or 10,000 total.
If Trump can get Iran to freeze its missile production at the current 2,000 or so point, officially or unofficially, the ayatollahs will remain a threat, but will not be an existential one.
If there is no ballistic missile ceiling, Israel will need to maintain the right to strike separately if necessary, even if Trump reaches a deal.
There are still multiple scenarios in play. But the endgame, and what moves Israel would demand or need to take, are becoming clearer.