A changing battlefield: Five takeaways from Israel's war with Iran, two weeks in

It all began two weeks ago with a jaw-dropping attack on Iran’s senior leadership meeting in Tehran.

Two weeks into the war with Iran, as Israelis continue to dash daily for shelter from Iranian missiles, the military picture is rapidly evolving, even as some broader patterns have emerged. Here are five:

Perhaps the most important takeaway is how dramatically Israel’s strategic mindset has shifted since the Hamas attack of October 7.

October 7 shattered that worldview.

The massacre exposed the dangers of allowing hostile forces to accumulate capabilities just across Israel’s borders while assuming deterrence would hold. The lesson drawn across much of Israel’s political and security establishment was stark: threats allowed to mature do not remain theoretical.

That realization now shapes the current war.

In effect, Israel has moved from managing threats to dismantling them. The calculation today is that waiting carries greater danger than acting – even if acting means putting your own population on a war footing for weeks at a time.

One of the least discussed but most consequential realities of the current war is something that is not happening.

Two weeks into the conflict with Iran, Hezbollah has entered the fighting forcefully from Lebanon, launching rocket and drone attacks that have opened a major northern front.

But two other pillars of Iran’s regional network – Hamas in Gaza and the Houthis in Yemen – have so far played no military role.

The reasons, however, are vastly different: Hamas because it can’t; the Houthis because they don’t want to.

Start with Gaza.

If Hamas still possessed the military capabilities it held before October 7 – thousands upon thousands of rockets, underground rocket-manufacturing capacity, and a functioning command structure capable of coordinating sustained fire – Israel today would be facing a far more complicated battlefield.

Instead of confronting Iran and Hezbollah simultaneously, it would be fighting on three fronts.

Air defenses would be stretched thinner, the IDF would be forced to conduct major operations inside Gaza, and southern Israel – not only the North – would once again be living under constant rocket fire.

That scenario would dramatically increase the military, economic, and psychological strain on the country.

But Hamas’s ability to play that role has largely been taken out of the equation. The organization still exists, and Gaza remains unstable. But Hamas can no longer fire rockets into Israel and, as such, can no longer shape the battlefield the way it once did.

The Houthis, however, are a different story.

Unlike Hamas, they do retain some ability to attack Israel and American interests. Yet they have chosen not to do so.

Their restraint seems a mix of deterrence and calculation. Years of Israeli, American, and British strikes have degraded their missile and drone capabilities, as well as parts of their command-and-control network. Launching attacks now could invite devastating retaliation — potentially targeting their leadership and their stronghold in Sanaa.

At the same time, the Houthis are still fighting their own war in Yemen and appear reluctant to expend valuable military assets in a regional confrontation that does not directly determine their survival.

Analysts also believe Iran itself may be carefully managing the tempo of proxy escalation, encouraging some allies to act while keeping others in reserve.

The result is that two key components of Iran’s regional network have largely stayed out of the fighting.

For Israel, that absence is strategically significant. Had all three fronts – Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen – erupted simultaneously alongside direct Iranian attacks, the war would look very different today.

Another striking feature of the war so far has been the White House’s mixed messaging.

On some days, US President Donald Trump suggests the conflict is nearing its end. He has spoken about the war being largely complete and hinted that a conclusion could come quickly.

At other moments, his rhetoric goes in the opposite direction. He has spoken about continuing the campaign until Iran is decisively defeated and about unconditional surrender.

At first glance, the two messages appear irreconcilable. One suggests imminent closure. The other implies a campaign that could continue for some time.

Yet the contradiction may not be as confusing as it initially seems.

Trump is operating on multiple stages simultaneously. One stage is the battlefield; the other is the global economy.

The possibility of a prolonged war has made markets jittery, particularly because of the impact on global oil supplies and shipping routes. Even the perception that the conflict could escalate dramatically has immediate consequences for energy prices.

Signals that the war might soon end help calm those fears. At the same time, the military campaign itself continues.

Seen in this light, Trump’s messaging is serving two purposes: reassuring markets and allies that escalation will not spiral indefinitely, while simultaneously maintaining pressure on Iran through ongoing military operations.

In other words, the rhetoric suggesting a quick end is aimed less at Tehran than at traders, investors, and governments worried about economic fallout. All the while, the bombs keep falling.

Another key takeaway so far is the contrast between how the war is playing out politically in Israel and in the US.

Israel entered this conflict once again deeply divided – over the fallout from October 7, haredi draft exemptions, and the courts. In other words, the same old arguments.

Yet the war has largely suspended those divisions.

According to a recent Israel Democracy Institute poll, roughly 82% of Israelis support the campaign, including a thundering 93% of Jewish Israelis. In Israel, that level of consensus is extraordinary.

The explanation lies in how Israelis perceive the stakes. Israelis have heard Khamenei’s threats over the last three decades, seen his military buildup, and felt personally the blows from the terrorist proxies he armed and financed.

For Israelis, the Iranian threat is real, immediate, and existential. Removing it, therefore, transcends political divisions.

Across the ocean, the picture looks very different.

In the US, public opinion over the war is far more divided. Polling shows support hovering around 40%, breaking sharply along partisan lines. Americans who back Trump largely support the campaign; those who oppose him generally do not.

The war has not unified those two camps; rather, it has only accentuated the polarization.

While Israelis broadly see the war as a matter of national survival, many Americans view it as just another distant Middle Eastern conflict whose goals are unclear – and one that could show up at the gas pump.

That gap in perception has been compounded by the administration’s failure to successfully frame the confrontation with Iran as directly and immediately tied to American security interests.

The result is a political dynamic in which Israelis are largely united around the war, while Americans remain deeply divided over it – a divergence that could become increasingly significant if it begins to affect Washington’s staying power in the war.

The manner in which Iran has expanded the battlefield by firing at its Gulf neighbors – and beyond – reveals much about its strategic calculations.

At first glance, Tehran’s missile launches toward Israel might seem like the central front of the conflict. Those attacks are, of course, highly disruptive to daily life and to the country’s economy. And Iran knows it. Tehran is showing that it can reach Israel directly, that it can impose disruption, and that it can keep Israeli society on edge.

But Iran also knows that these missiles are not going to defeat Israel or force it to sue for a ceasefire. In that sense, the fire directed at Israel is largely symbolic – serious, but symbolic.

The attacks aimed at the UAE – which has absorbed more missiles and drones than Israel – as well as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and other targets in the Gulf, are far more strategic.

Those attacks – beyond targeting American diplomatic and military assets – have hit airports, oil infrastructure, hotels, and other civilian economic sites.

The choice of targets reveals a clear logic.

The Gulf is the world’s most sensitive energy corridor. Disruption there reverberates immediately through oil markets, shipping lanes, insurance costs, and global supply chains.

Tehran’s calculation is that economic instability in the Gulf will not only alarm those countries but also governments in Europe and Asia whose economies depend on energy flows from the region.

As markets are rattled and oil prices surge, pressure could mount internationally on Trump to end the war.

And that strategy is not fantastical.

Consider these words on Tuesday from German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who understands what the war is about and supports its aims. Still, with oil prices rising, he said:

“The United States and Israel have been waging war against Iran for over a week. We share many of their goals. But with each day of the war, more questions arise. We are particularly concerned that there appears to be no common plan for bringing this war to a swift and convincing conclusion.”

Iran is triggering economic chaos in hopes that outside powers will pressure Washington to stop.

Iran is gambling that widening the conflict economically will translate into diplomatic leverage. But those same attacks could also deepen the sense of shared vulnerability among Gulf states already wary of Tehran’s ambitions.

That dynamic could produce new alignments in the region. Still, it would be premature to assume that this will automatically lead to sweeping diplomatic breakthroughs such as normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Even if Iran emerges weakened from the war, Riyadh and other Gulf capitals will remain cautious about the regional balance of power. The Saudis have long feared Iranian hegemony in the region – and, as this week’s Iranian strikes on some of their oil infrastructure demonstrate, with good reason. But they are unlikely to want to see Israel emerge as an overwhelmingly dominant regional power, either.

Yet one conclusion will be difficult for the Saudis – or anyone else in the region – to escape: When it comes to long-range intelligence, operational reach, and sustained military capability, there is currently no other actor in the Mideast with Israel’s ability to project power.

This may not create affection, but in this harsh neighborhood, respect often matters more – and respect can be the foundation of new alliances.