Amid the political turmoil and media frenzy surrounding the end of the ceasefire and the evacuation of foreign nationals, the former Sudanese prime minister Abdullah Hamdok has issued a warning that the conflict may escalate to levels even more dire than those seen in Syria and Libya.
This statement has sparked speculation about his intentions and the possibility of such a scenario coming to fruition. British International Development Minister Andrew Mitchell echoed these concerns, stating that the situation could turn extremely grave unless a permanent ceasefire is achieved.
It’s highly probable that the former Sudanese prime minister’s warning stems from privileged insights into internal politics and covert interactions between domestic and foreign stakeholders that remain hidden from external observers. Nonetheless, it’s possible that his motives may be evident to all, particularly the factors driving the acute crisis that has perpetuated the conflicts in Syria and Libya.
The factors driving the Sudan crisis
Foremost among these is the conflicting external interests vying for power in Sudan, which are even more significant than those in Syria and nearly as contentious as in Libya.
Unlike Syria, which saw a unified regional and international position, both Libya and Sudan face a highly fragmented situation, with regional and international support divided among different factions. This impasse is likely to endure until internal and external parties can reach a consensus on their respective perspectives and interests. Achieving this outcome may remain elusive until one party secures the flexibility to negotiate its position.
The second critical aspect of the Sudanese crisis is the willingness of the conflicting factions to engage in a protracted and extensive military confrontation. Unlike in the Libyan and Syrian crises, where one side (the military) was already combat-ready, while the opposing side (the militia) gradually acquired military hardware over time, Sudan’s situation appears distinct.
On one side, there is a national army, while on the other, there are dispersed paramilitary units with a hierarchical command structure and suitable, albeit limited, combat capabilities (primarily with light weaponry) for this type of conflict. These types of conflicts are often labeled civil wars, where past experiences indicate that lightly armed militias hold an advantage over unprepared regular armies.
Additionally, the Rapid Support Forces possess specialized expertise and familiarity, whether in Darfur or other internal crises, and their disregard for established protocols and procedures governing regular armies enables them to sow chaos and disruption.
The third factor exacerbating concerns about the Sudanese crisis is the stance of the international community and regional and global powers. These parties are addressing the crisis formally, mirroring the approach taken in Libya.
The two generals, Burhan and Hemeti, have a network of external connections that enable them to communicate and convey their viewpoints to the outside world. They are embroiled in a fierce media battle that is followed by all major international news organizations. Neither of them is officially regarded as a rogue or rebel party but rather as two parties competing for power in their nation.
In fact, Hemeti still holds his position as the deputy to the head of the Sovereign Council, and as of this writing, no decision has been taken by General Abdel Fattah Al Burhan to remove his deputy, who commands forces that the Sudanese military identifies as rebels.
This element also encompasses the official external communications that are occurring with both generals and are publicly announced. This is mainly because Hemeti is a member of the recognized internal and external political framework in Sudan and thus these communications appear routine, given the prevailing conditions in the country prior to the recent outbreak of fighting.
THE FOURTH factor that fans the flames of concern about the Sudanese conflict is its location in Africa, specifically at one of its most important entry points. The intersection of borders and crises, such as the Renaissance Dam crisis and the Libyan crisis, as well as the fragile situations of neighboring countries geographically adjacent to Sudan, create an environment that is ripe for external parties to interfere. With no opportunity for international consensus or a UN-led intervention to control the security situation and restore stability, the situation is a ticking time bomb.
What’s worse, terrorist organizations based in East and West Africa are taking advantage of the situation, which adds a new, more complicated dimension to the conflict. The looming frustration over the situation in Sudan is providing an ideal environment for these organizations to exploit ideology to attract and recruit young people to their ranks, which only adds to the gravity of the situation.
The fifth element, of least strategic impact but still influential, is the weakness or absence of the role of the Arab collective systems and the inability of the Arab collective action institutions to exert influence in Sudan or other Arab countries. In fact, there are reports that speak of fundamental differences in Arab positions regarding Sudan, reminiscent of the situation in the crises of Syria and Libya and led to a protraction in both crises.
The sixth element is characterized by a long history of political instability, military coups and inter-ethnic rivalries that have plagued Sudan since its inception, culminating in the secession of South Sudan in 2011.
The seventh element, equally concerning, is the lack of any coherent international strategy to address the crisis and bring about lasting peace. Instead, the focus has been primarily on humanitarian aid and temporary ceasefires, without a clear roadmap for a sustainable solution.
All in all, it can be said that the military conflict in Sudan is likely to continue and deteriorate unless this crisis is quickly contained by regional and international powers, and pressure is exerted on the parties to the conflict to de-escalate the situation before it escalates into a civil war involving other elements, such as tribal, regional and party affiliations, becoming a real threat to the unity of Sudan’s territories as has happened in other internal crises.
Therefore, the military conflict in Sudan appears to be heavily dependent on the positions of external actors, whose involvement could either exacerbate or alleviate the situation. It is imperative that a coordinated diplomatic effort be made to mediate the crisis and restore stability to the region.
The writer is a UAE political analyst and a former Federal National Council candidate.