The Israel-Hamas war is different from Israel’s previous wars, including the War of Independence. Never were there so many civilian casualties. Nor is it the “war to end all wars,” to quote former president Woodrow Wilson (and he was wrong too), but it could and should be the war to provide Israel, and especially its south, with the normal security to which its inhabitants are entitled.
The hostage “deal” has come and gone for the time being and there was no choice but to make it, considering the unique Israeli situation. We rejoice over each of those who were saved, but continue to worry about those who are still in the hands of the monsters.
Hamas tried to rig the deal right from the beginning and continues to manipulate its successive phases in order to squeeze more concessions and as part of its psychological warfare against the Israeli public.
The government and the heads of the army announced that they were determined to persevere, notwithstanding possible international pressure. Indeed, as I heard from a source close to the Pentagon, the Biden administration is firm in its views that Hamas cannot be a partner to any future status in Gaza, i.e., that it must be destroyed. But I was also told that US President Joe Biden needs support on matters such as “humanitarian aid,” fuel, and so forth to continue his stance, against his opponents, of backing Israel – particularly within his party.
Taking this into consideration, the Israeli compliance was right and in fact unavoidable, even though some of this aid and certainly the fuel might also strengthen Hamas’s resistance.
As Israel perseveres with its military efforts, the question has already arisen, and now more forcefully, how it views the military-political situation once the war is over. The clear objective outlined by the war cabinet is the dismantling of Hamastan, and Israel, hopefully with the full support of the US, will not deviate from that aim, among other things, ascertaining that in any scenario, security in Gaza will remain under Israeli control, an imperative which could require setting up a temporary military administration in the Gaza Strip (though not a permanent one).
So, what should come next?
BUT THIS still does not provide an answer to what should follow and to this we must add the proviso that since Gaza was never intended to contain and economically support 2.3 million people, a real and full solution to its problems would in any case depend on reducing its population by at least a third – hence, we are talking only about an interim solution – and even that will require extensive and ongoing international and inter-Arab financial aid.
In the public discourse, both at the professional and the lay level, there are such ideas as creating an international mandate (but who would volunteer an army for it?), a pan-Arab trusteeship (which Arab country, except perhaps Qatar, would stand in line to fill this role?), some kind of local organization (but who will guarantee that it won’t be Hamas in disguise?), but the most frequently and persistently mentioned option – especially by the United States that never missed an opportunity to raise it – is putting Gaza under the control of the Palestinian Authority, thus de-facto unifying it with the “West Bank” and, ipso facto, creating the two-state “solution.”
Such an effort in the current circumstances and due to the majority support Hamas enjoys in the “West Bank” means even after eliminating Hamas in Gaza, a state dominated by it on Israel’s eastern frontier – all this without even mentioning the inherent corruption of the PA – its adherence to the Palestinian Charter that calls for the destruction of Israel, the antisemitic record of its leaders, its refusal to recognize Israel’s very right to exist, and its educational curriculum of incitement against Israel. Apparently, the US administration is aware of all the above, this being the impression gained from Biden’s recent article in The Washington Post in which he called for a “re-vitalized,” i.e., different, Palestinian Authority, adding that Palestinian statehood was the “ultimate” and “eventual” target, thus not the immediate one.
It remains to be seen if this wording reflects his understanding that anything approaching the Palestinian Authority in its current state cannot be a partner for any arrangement including in Gaza. Probably this conclusion also reflects what was raised in the president’s talks with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, which would indicate a level of understanding rather than as some commentators stated, a sign of disagreement between them.
But maybe we are playing chess with ourselves facing a situation that is considerably different from what we imagined. In addition to the above-listed scenarios, regarding the future of the Gaza Strip, and perhaps purposely ignoring them, there are also different ideas – some perhaps in tune with American positions, others contradicting them.
ACCORDING TO an article in the magazine Foreign Affairs there supposedly exists an understanding between Washington and Tehran on the Iranian nuclear program, despite frictions and tensions between them on other matters – and also, as a result of what was initially perceived as a Hamas success – the overall strategic image of Iran and its various proxies being enhanced, the US would bring all its weight to bear on promoting the case of the Palestinian state before its other goals and not, as before, on normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Perhaps this is the reason (though this was not mentioned in the article) why we are not seeing a more determined American response to the repeated attacks on its soldiers and other personnel in Iraq and Syria, or for pressures on Saudi Arabia to end its conflict with the Houthis in Yemen.
According to unofficial reports, in the weeks since October 7, Iranian proxies have made more than 70 rocket and drone attacks against US troops in Iraq and Syria, as well as against a US ship in the Red Sea – and questions have arisen over the nature of the American response. According to one interpretation, Iran intends its proxies’ actions to be a warning to the US in case Israel would extend its campaign to Hezbollah in Lebanon – which would mean that Tehran was trying to turn the tables on the US regarding the forces the latter has assembled in the region. According to the thesis expressed in said article, Saudi Arabia, whose relations with Iran have recently thawed, also has a role to play in the proposed order of things, while Washington would be expected to pressure Israel to stop its military campaign in Gaza, or at least to restrain it. Furthermore, the US should not oppose the drawing closer together of Saudi Arabia and Iran but rather encourage it.
It is readily clear one can discern Iran’s not-so-hidden hand behind the above one-sided expectations nor can we ignore the probability that this is a misreading of US intentions, but even so Israel should not ignore some of its details and implications and focus on ways and means to avoid surprise.
Israel would welcome comprehensive regional arrangements, building upon the Abraham Accords, but, of course, not if the hand on the steering wheel were to be that of Iran.
The writer, a former MK, served as ambassador to the US from 1990-1993 and 1998-2000.