Note: This op-ed was written prior to Israel launching strikes on Iranian nuclear and military sites on June 13, 2025
The Islamic Republic of Iran is not negotiating to resolve conflict – it is negotiating to outlast it. Earlier this month, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei publicly rejected the latest US proposal to curb uranium enrichment. His defiant remarks made clear that Iran would not suspend enrichment under any circumstances. But in the world of diplomacy, public statements are rarely sincere. They are weapons in a broader campaign aimed not at resolution, but manipulation. Tehran uses public defiance to project strength, demoralize adversaries, and reinforce internal cohesion, all while continuing private engagement designed to stall meaningful pressure.
This tactic is not improvisational. It is part of the regime’s survival doctrine. Every time Tehran faces credible international pressure, it turns to negotiations – not to reach an agreement, but to buy time. That time is then used to reinforce its nuclear program, strengthen its regional proxies, and reconfigure deterrence. Between 2003 and 2005, the Paris Agreement talks delayed UN escalation while Iran built out its enrichment base. A decade later, the 2013–2015 negotiations that led to the JCPOA created space for the regime to expand its missile arsenal and entrench Hezbollah and the Houthis deeper into the region. Today, the cycle repeats – only with hardened facilities, faster centrifuges, and fewer consequences.
Tehran’s objective is not diplomatic resolution – it is nuclear permanence. By maintaining technical capabilities just below the breakout threshold, the regime keeps its options open while avoiding a unified global response. This strategy is known as latency: the ability to weaponize quickly if politically decided.
Iran’s nuclear latency has no civilian purpose. After two decades of enrichment, it still imports fuel for its only reactor at Bushehr. The regime enriches uranium not to power homes, but to preserve leverage. It understands that deterrence can be achieved not only through weapons, but through ambiguity – as long as diplomacy grants it cover.
This is no longer speculative.
In its June 2025 report, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found Iran’s explanation for uranium particles at the Turquzabad site “not technically credible,” and identified contradictions between regime claims and open-source evidence.
Iran had argued that sabotage caused the contamination – but photographs showed the presence of surveillance cameras before the alleged date of installation.
The IAEA's conclusion that Iran provides inaccurate, inconsistent information
The IAEA’s conclusion was clear: Iran provided inaccurate and inconsistent information to the international community. This is not the behavior of a state seeking peaceful nuclear energy. It is the pattern of a regime shielding a latent weapons capability.
Recent assessments from former IAEA inspector David Albright underscore the urgency. Iran now has the capacity to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for eleven nuclear weapons in just one month – nine of them using the Fordow facility alone.
Its rate of production accelerates month by month. The breakout timeline is no longer measured in years – it is measured in weeks. Moreover, Iran’s goals may not be limited to missile delivery.
Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani, a former senior nuclear official, recently asked: “What if they are attacked from within?” That unusual framing reveals a deeper truth: The regime’s nuclear posture may not be limited to foreign deterrence. It could include scenarios for regime collapse – suggesting that nuclear capability serves not just as a deterrent to war, but as a shield against revolution.
The Islamic Republic uses diplomatic cover effectively. As long as negotiations appear to be ongoing, urgency dissipates. Pressure stalls. Sanctions regimes loosen. Headlines soften.
The regime exploits every pause to solidify gains. New centrifuges are installed. Bunkers are reinforced. Delivery systems are tested. And while the West debates talking points, Iran shifts the balance of power in the region with quiet precision.
This is not simply delay. It is psychological warfare. Khamenei has ruled for more than three decades. He has watched five US presidents enter and exit office. He understands that Western governments are constrained by electoral cycles, political fatigue, and media noise. His regime plays a long game. Democracies don’t. Iran doesn’t just endure pressure – it absorbs it, outlasts it, and uses it to project discipline.
While American negotiators come and go, Iran’s system endures. Its diplomats don’t negotiate; they manage confrontation. They fragment talks, compartmentalize technical issues, and drain attention through complexity.
At the same time, the regime signals resolve to its proxies through coordinated messaging. Public defiance in Tehran is matched by renewed activity in Lebanon, Gaza, Yemen, and Iraq. These signals serve two purposes: to deter adversaries from escalation and to reassure allies that the regime remains in control.
Recent developments show the cost of this strategy. On June 4, President Donald Trump announced that he had enlisted Vladimir Putin to assist in new nuclear negotiations with Iran. The Kremlin confirmed. Tehran benefits from this immediately. It gains not only a geopolitical buffer but also the ability to exploit friction between Washington and Moscow. The more actors in the room, the more leverage the regime holds. And the longer it can delay any real consequence.
But diplomacy with Tehran is not a neutral process. Time is not a holding pattern. Every day the regime is allowed to maneuver through delay, it strengthens systems that are meant to survive collapse, resist inspection, and project threat.
The nuclear program is not the core threat – it is the shield.
What must be dismantled is not just Iran’s enrichment infrastructure, but the regime that built it to delay, deceive, and survive. It is no longer enough to manage the crisis through talks. It is time to dismantle the regime itself – before it crosses the nuclear threshold and makes the cost of action exponentially higher.
The writer is an Iranian-American research professor and energy expert, and a political and human rights activist. X: @Aidin_FreeIran