Is a democratic Iran possible? - opinion

The NCI is not a political party but a coalition platform promoting non-violent transition to a democratic future. It advocates national unity among Iranians across ideological and ethnic lines, promotes human rights, and calls for free elections under international observation.

With Pahlavi as leader, the NCI naturally contains monarchists, but it is also supported by republicans, and Pahlavi makes clear that he is not campaigning for the restoration of the monarchy. He has said he is ready to serve a new democratic Iran in any capacity – perhaps as president or prime minister – and is prepared to run for any position in a democratic election.

The NCRI was founded in Tehran in 1981 as a broad coalition of democratic Iranian organizations, groups, and personalities opposed to the Islamic Republic. Its core mission is to overthrow the current Iranian regime and establish a democratic, secular, and coalition government in its place. The NCRI’s constitution stipulates that, following regime change, it would form a provisional government for six months whose main task would be to hold free and fair elections for a national assembly.

Before the 1979 Islamist revolution, the MEK conducted armed attacks against the Shah’s regime, which included assassinations and bombings. It supported the revolution that overthrew the Shah, and initially aligned with ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Later it fell out with the Islamic Republic over issues of ideology and political differences.

Throughout the 1980s, the MEK waged an armed insurgency against the regime from within Iran. In 1981, having launched an uprising that failed, the MEK went into exile. Over time, the group became dominant inside the NCRI, and eventually the NCRI became its political front. One unsolved mystery is what became of Massoud Rajavi, the founder and long-time leader of the MEK. He disappeared in 2003, and his fate remains unknown. His wife, Maryam Rajavi, now serves as the NCRI’s president-elect.

The two councils remain at arm’s length, and there is no sign of willingness on either side for a formal relationship. Their leadership, organizational structures, and core constituencies are separate. The NCRI in particular has a long-standing, structured coalition with its own provisional plans for government, while the NCI operates more as a broad umbrella under which are clustered various opposition factions focused on the principle of free elections. Mutual distrust and divergent political programs prevent any meaningful coalition.

One main difference between the two is that while the NCI includes a return to the monarchy as one possibility among a number of others, the NCRI utterly rejects it. The NCRI was founded on the basis of “No to the Shah and no to the Mullahs.” In fact, it states that “the model of monarchy, which is also a model of dependence and despotism, has failed.”

The idea of a constitutional monarchy simply does not enter their thinking. It is a concept totally alien in the Middle East. The NCRI’s aim is to establish a republic in post-ayatollah Iran. Pahlavi, however, says he is fine with whatever constitution emerges as the democratically established will of the Iranian people. He stands ready to serve his country regardless.

“Everybody knows that I carry the monarchic heritage,” he says, but “if the country is more ready for a republic, even better. That’s great.”

Neither of the councils appears to have any undercover or internal network inside Iran working directly for, with, or under it. There are grassroots networks inside Iran – feminist, student, labor, and ethnic groups – but these movements are fragmented and internally suspicious of external figures, even when monarchism is not the issue. The available evidence seems to indicate that neither council has the internal support structure and organizational mechanisms required to coordinate a successful uprising from within. Each seems to hope that one will somehow occur, and that it can step in afterward to help develop a democratic government.

As for a spontaneous regime collapse, the probability is extremely low. Despite the Israeli bombardment of nuclear sites throughout the 12-day war; the assassination of key military, political, and scientific figures; and the final attack by US stealth bombers on the three underground nuclear facilities, the regime retains strong control through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and security apparatus.

The IRGC’s economic and political entrenchment, coupled with ideological indoctrination, creates a durable power base. Even with military setbacks, the regime’s survival mechanisms – which includes surveillance and repression – remain effective. As one analysis notes, “The Iranian government might be a disaster, though its fall could be a matter of wishful thinking.”

Internal dissent certainly exists, and from time to time it explodes into mass protests across the nation, but no cohesive opposition movement has emerged capable of organizing a successful uprising. Experts note that the regime has weathered decades of pressure, and recent attacks could possibly bolster nationalist sentiment in certain quarters rather than weaken its grip. For example, there seems little likelihood of either council finding support from Iran’s Jewish community.

It is not generally known that Iran is home to more Jews than anywhere else in the Middle East outside of Israel. Iran’s Jewish community numbers some 9,000, most of whom live in the capital, Tehran. Of the 30 active synagogues nationwide, 20 are located in Tehran, which serves as the epicenter of Jewish life, featuring Jewish schools, kosher restaurants, and community institutions. There are kosher butcheries and even a matzah factory. The community also operates a Jewish hospital and publishes a newspaper called Ofogh-e-Bina, written in Farsi.

Judaism is one of the three officially recognized religious minorities in Iran, alongside Christianity and Zoroastrianism. Jews have a reserved seat in the Iranian parliament and are officially permitted to practice their religion, protected by law as a religious minority. However, there is social suspicion, especially in separating Jewish identity from Zionism. The government distinguishes between Judaism, which is tolerated, and Zionism, which is condemned. Jewish leaders have historically worked to reinforce this distinction.

This may go some little way toward explaining this extraordinary statement issued by Iranian Jewish leaders on June 16: “The Zionists’ brutality, which is far from any human morality and has caused the martyrdom of a number of our beloved compatriots, including innocent children, has hurt all of our hearts. We urge the armed forces to continue daily missile salvos.”

Prompted by motives which can only be guessed at, Iran’s Jewish leadership would seem to be urging the regime to keep sending missiles into Israel.

This was not a rogue or one-off message. The next day, a declaration from the Jewish community in the city of Yazd was published, strongly condemning “the Zionist regime’s brutal aggression on the sacred soil of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the martyrdom of a group of military commanders, nuclear scientists, and our beloved compatriots.”

Then, on June 24 came a message from the sole Jewish member of Iran’s parliament, Homayoun Sameyah  Najafabadi. He declared he had “no trust that the Zionist regime will keep the ceasefire” and accused Israel of “seeking to breach the truce to regain lost deterrence.”

Three days later, Iran’s Chief Rabbi, Yehuda Gerami, declared: “The country’s Jews stand in a single front in defense of our homeland.”

There is, of course, no information about how this robust support from the regime’s Jewish leadership came about – whether it was spontaneous, induced, or demanded under threats. What it does demonstrate is that the regime retains its grip on power, and that it is far from succumbing to bodies intent on replacing it with a democratic alternative.■