Israel’s Mossad on Sunday publicly named Sardar Ammar, a senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps operative under Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani, as the architect of a years-long campaign to attack Israeli and Jewish targets on multiple continents.
The agency detailed a network that recruited foreigners and criminals, used covert communications, and sought to leave “no Iranian fingerprints,” and said dozens of plots were thwarted in cooperation with partners abroad.
The exposure has real diplomatic consequences. In August, Australia expelled Iran’s ambassador, Ahmad Sadeghi, after intelligence concluded the IRGC directed antisemitic arson attacks in Melbourne and Sydney; Canberra also said it would move to designate the IRGC a terrorist organization.
In Germany, authorities this summer summoned Tehran’s ambassador after a Danish suspect was arrested on allegations that he spied on Jewish sites in Berlin on behalf of Iranian intelligence. Greece, for its part, has arrested suspects linked to arson attacks on an Israeli-owned hotel and a synagogue in Athens, a pattern Greek officials and Israel have previously tied to Iran-directed activity.
This is the news, and it should be stated plainly. According to the Mossad’s statement, Ammar’s mechanism “was directly responsible” for attempted attacks revealed in Greece, Australia, and Germany over the past year, and the agency says its work “removed [Iran’s] space for denial.” These are not isolated files in far-off capitals. They are a single campaign with a single author.
Things to consider
There are several angles readers should note. First, this is deterrence by daylight. Intelligence services usually prefer shadows. When Israel chooses to expose a senior IRGC operator by name, it is sending two messages at once: to allies, that there is a concrete case to rally around; and to adversaries, that Israel can burn assets, methods, and reputations at a time of its choosing.
Second, allies are connecting the dots. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said there was “credible intelligence” linking the IRGC to the attacks his government cited in expelling the ambassador, the first such step by Australia since World War II.
When a G20 democracy moves toward designating a foreign state’s military arm as a terrorist organization, it signals a broader recognition that the IRGC exports violence by proxy and targets Jewish civilians abroad. Germany’s summoning of Iran’s envoy after the Berlin case underscores that European governments understand the stakes for their own Jewish communities.
Third, the targets are not only Israeli embassies or officials, but also synagogues, schools, kosher businesses, and community centers. In Athens, arrests over the arson of a synagogue and an Israeli-owned hotel illustrate the point; in Australia, investigators tied IRGC-directed proxies to attacks on a synagogue and a Jewish business. The intended victims are families walking to services and teenagers buying a sandwich, not soldiers on a battlefield.
Those who seek to harm Israel or the Jewish people will pay a price. The Jewish story includes a chapter in which we could not fight back. During the Holocaust, our people faced industrialized annihilation without a sovereign shield. This is a different era.
The State of Israel exists to protect Jewish life, and its arms of defense – the IDF, the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency), and yes, the Mossad – exist so that Jews in Jerusalem, Berlin, Melbourne, and Brooklyn can live openly and safely.
Israel also owes the Jewish people everywhere vigilance, advocacy, and capability. Diaspora communities owe Israel honesty about their security needs and partnership in confronting threats, political, legal, digital, and physical. The exposure of Ammar’s network should accelerate joint action among Israel’s security establishment, friendly governments, and Jewish organizations to harden community sites, share timely intelligence, and push for legal tools that treat IRGC operations abroad as what they are: organized terrorism.
There is also a diplomatic track to pursue. Countries that host Iranian operatives should expel them. Banks and tech platforms that see procurement, fundraising, or covert communications linked to IRGC activity should shut them down. Finally, a word to Jewish communities reading this editorial. We have your back. If you notice unusual surveillance near a synagogue, report it. If a community center needs resources for cameras and trained guards, ask for them.
If your school wants a security drill, schedule it. The point of exposing Ammar is to save lives. As the Mossad put it, its cooperation with partners “thwarted dozens of tracks” and “saved many lives.” That work will continue.