In the summer of 2015, when I served as the Jerusalem mayor’s adviser for Arab and east Jerusalem Affairs, I was called, together with the city engineer and his team, to a house in the Muslim Quarter, where deep cracks had appeared in the walls, and the residents feared its imminent collapse. We arrived quickly, toured the site, handled the safety issues, and examined options for alternative housing for the residents, with the assistance of municipal welfare officials.
Before returning to City Hall, I spoke with members of the household, one of whom said, “You missed, by just a few minutes, the Turkish representatives who came to help us.” Since then, I have encountered many more instances – both openly and discreetly – of Turkish organizations operating in the streets of east Jerusalem. I witnessed firsthand how Turkish activism has deepened violent and anti-Israeli radical Islamic attitudes among the Arab-Palestinian population in east Jerusalem.
The Turkish-Qatari axis, under the ideological guidance of the Muslim Brotherhood, is consolidating its current foothold in Gaza and carries with it the continuation of Islamist confrontation.
Qatar or the UAE
The main alternative to this axis is the Saudi-Emirati one, which enjoys Western support. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are not the “cup of tea” of many in the Israeli government, as evidenced by recent remarks made by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether those who object to Saudi-Emirati involvement are aware of the deep changes in textbooks, culture, and educational systems in those countries regarding Israel and Jews.
This knowledge is important, as one of the greatest challenges in shaping contemporary Gaza is the issue of deradicalizing a community that has absorbed Hamas’s murderous ideology for roughly 20 years.
The central challenge in promoting the Saudi-Emirati alternative, from the perspective of the Israeli government, lies in its Palestinian component. The Saudis and Emiratis insist that a necessary condition for their involvement in Gaza is the comprehensive and meaningful involvement of the Palestinian Authority. The Israeli government has clarified that the PA will have no place in the “day after,” consistent with the doctrine of “neither Hamas nor [Mahmoud] Abbas.”
Rejecting PA is a mistake
In my view, the categorical rejection of PA involvement in the “day after” is a mistake. Instead, I propose that Israel officially support the return of the PA to Gaza, conditioned on the implementation of reforms in the PA in both the West Bank and Gaza, especially in the education system and in the funding of families of shahids, martyrs. This should be done in the spirit of the changes implemented in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as noted above.
Why would the PA agree to such conditions, given that its support for prisoners and shahids is central to its identity?
The PA may agree for three main reasons. First, it is in a severe economic crisis and desperately needs Gulf and international funding. Second, regaining control of Gaza instead of Hamas is a top strategic priority for the PA. Third, the deep hatred PA officials hold toward Hamas and their desire for revenge following Hamas’s violent takeover of Gaza in 2007 is a motivating force that Israel and mediators could use effectively in the struggle against Hamas, similar to what has been done successfully in the West Bank.
To be clear: In my view, Mahmoud Abbas is an enemy of Israel. Even if he does not deny the Holocaust, he diminishes its severity and scale. In the past, he was involved in financing acts of terror – at the 1972 Munich Olympics– as the PLO’s finance officer. He does not dispatch terror cells like his predecessor, Yasser Arafat, but he does fund terror prisoners and shahids. The PA’s curriculum glorifies jihad against Israel, and Israel does not appear on Palestinian school maps.
Turkey-Qatar axis is much worse
So why do I support PA involvement in Gaza after Hamas? First, because the Qatari-Turkish alternative is far worse and more destructive. Second, through a long-term, supervised, and Gulf-backed process, it is possible to gradually reform Palestinian education and stop support for terrorists. Third, and most important, this is the only avenue through which such reforms could potentially affect not just Gaza but also the West Bank. This is part of a broader effort to create a Palestinian partner with whom Israel can coexist.
In my view, the Israeli political Right should consider shifting away from a model of total rejection of any Palestinian partner (i.e., full annexation of the West Bank and renewed Israeli sovereignty over all of Gaza) toward a model of living alongside a structured Palestinian partner committed to deradicalization.
Finally, strong Gazan clans are not adequate Palestinian partners. They can only exert influence over limited, family-based geographic areas. Also, they lack experience in running an educational, governmental, and institutional system like that of the PA. Additionally, no viable Palestinian alternative can exist without a broader sense of Palestinian national identity.
A possible option in this regard is to create a framework that links Gazan clan-based power centers with the Palestinian Authority into a unified structure, under a Saudi-Emirati umbrella with American, Western, and Israeli backing.
The writer is the CEO of the Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research, a lecturer at Bar-Ilan University and the Shalem Academic Center, and a member of the Coalition for Regional Security.