It seems that the term “total victory” does not apply to the Middle East, because in this region one never truly wins – one merely replaces adversaries. For the first time in decades, Israel has managed to deliver a crushing blow to the Shi’ite axis led by Iran. The Shi’ite Crescent, stretching from Tehran through Baghdad and Damascus to Beirut, has been dismantled.
This is a remarkable strategic achievement, credited to Israel’s unprecedented boldness, ingenuity, and creativity on the battlefield. Yet in the Middle East, every vacuum fills quickly. The collapse of the Iranian threat is now giving way to a new one, equally deep but far more sophisticated and subtle – the neo-Ottomanism of the Muslim Brotherhood, led by Turkey and Qatar.
It must be remembered that Hamas is the crossroads where these two radical axes – Shi’ite and Sunni – have intersected for years. The organization has long benefited from two parallel lifelines: one Iranian, military in nature; the other affiliated with the Brotherhood, built on ideological, humanitarian, and diplomatic infrastructures funded by Qatar and supported by Turkey.
As the Iranian axis weakened, the other began to grow stronger. Thus, even as Hamas is crumbling in Gaza, it may well be reborn in new forms, sustained by the Brotherhood network that surrounds it.
Already now, with the fighting in Gaza subsiding, we see Ankara and Doha’s fingerprints on nearly every aspect of the “day after.” Turkey’s deep involvement in the diplomatic efforts that brought the war to an end, together with Qatar’s expected dominance in aid and reconstruction channels, signals that the influence of these two players continues to rise across the Middle East.
While Iran faces domestic crises and international isolation, the Brotherhood axis offers a softer alternative, one that seeks to reshape the regional agenda and reinforce the power of political Islam throughout the region.
In this sense, Hamas has not disappeared. It was dealt a severe military blow in Gaza, but as a local offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, it possesses what Arabic calls sabr – historical patience. As long as the global Brotherhood network exists, Hamas will continue to draw strength from it. Even if its ability to act directly in Gaza is curtailed, its patrons will ensure its preservation at a certain level and shift its operational focus to other platforms and arenas.
How this dynamic will manifest
Looking ahead, this new dynamic will manifest on several fronts simultaneously. First and foremost, in Gaza itself: Turkey and Qatar’s anticipated involvement in the reconstruction and stabilization of the Gaza Strip will grant both countries significant leverage, as well as the potential to help restore part of Hamas’s organizational resilience, even without overt or explicit activity. Consequently, Gaza may remain a de facto Brotherhood stronghold on Israel’s southern border, albeit in a more discreet and sophisticated form.
In the West Bank and east Jerusalem, Hamas seeks to rekindle the flames. Many of the militants deported in past hostage deals have found refuge in Turkey, and some will likely be sent there again in the current deal. These individuals, many of them freed prisoners from east Jerusalem, will be able to continue exerting influence and directing terror from afar. It is hard to believe that the Turks will lift a finger to prevent such activity; on the contrary, they may well turn a deliberate blind eye.
Yet perhaps the most significant threat lies in the realm of soft power – the battle over public opinion, da’wah, and ideological influence. Turkey and Qatar, both of which have cultivated an image as “defenders of the Palestinian people,” exploit Arab public sympathy and Western guilt to establish narrative dominance.
Ankara promotes a neo-Ottoman ideology that places Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque at the center of its religious-national discourse, while Doha funds media platforms, civil-society organizations, and anti-Israel campus activism across the United States and Europe. All of this is wrapped in the language of human rights but driven by a distinctly anti-Western and anti-Zionist worldview.
For Israel, the complexity only deepens. Turkey and Qatar are not enemy states; on the contrary, they are close partners of the West. Turkey is a NATO member, and Qatar hosts the largest American military base in the Middle East. Both enjoy personal proximity to the current Trump administration and maintain strong business ties with its closest circle of advisers.
This is therefore not a conflict that can be managed through targeted assassinations or air operations. It is a struggle of influence, diplomacy, social media, and persuasion – a prolonged battle for hearts and minds.
Direction for Israeli strategy
Accordingly, Israel’s real challenge in the coming years is not only to preserve its military achievements but to expand and deepen its soft-power capabilities. A comprehensive strategy must be developed, focusing on three main arenas:
- Preventing Turkish subversion within Israel’s borders, especially in Jerusalem and other sensitive areas.
- Disrupting the remote direction of terror in the West Bank by Hamas operatives based in Turkey and Qatar.
- Intensifying the fight against Qatari influence in the West – on campuses, in the media, and within civil-society organizations that promote anti-Israel narratives.
Given this complexity, Israel must act wisely. This is not a call to sever ties completely with Turkey or Qatar, but rather to conduct a careful, calculated, and interest-based policy, one that safeguards national security while exercising restraint when it serves Israel’s broader interests.
The ultimate goal is to narrow the maneuvering space of Brotherhood-aligned actors, prevent their expansion on the ideological level, and thwart their efforts to undermine Israeli sovereignty and governance, in Jerusalem or anywhere else.
The war may appear to be over, but in many ways it has merely changed form. The Shi’ite Crescent has collapsed, yet the neo-Ottoman axis of the Muslim Brotherhood is taking its place. If Israel fails to prepare for this new kind of war – softer, multidimensional, and far more sophisticated – it will once again find itself reacting instead of leading.
The writer is a former adviser on Arab affairs to the mayor of Jerusalem, and a senior research associate at the Jerusalem Center for Applied Policy.