The expected meeting between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud and US President Donald Trump at the White House could prove to be a pivotal moment, not only in the relationship between Riyadh and Washington but for the entire Middle East. This is not just another diplomatic encounter; it is an event with the potential to reshape the regional balance of power and directly affect Israel’s strategic standing.
From Israel’s perspective, Saudi Arabia is a key state, because of its political, religious, and economic weight, as well as its centrality to the Iranian and Palestinian issues.
Riyadh’s closeness to Washington is essential, not only because it enhances the kingdom’s security and international standing and strengthens its posture vis-à-vis Iran, but also because it firmly anchors it in the American camp, one that opposes China’s growing influence in the Gulf. Any move that reinforces Saudi Arabia’s ties with Washington would seem, at first glance, to serve Israel’s interests.
The risks of a Saudi-American partnership
Yet this same process carries considerable risk. The deeper the Saudi-American partnership becomes, the less incentive Riyadh will have to normalize relations with Israel.
Trump, known for his willingness to give his Middle Eastern partners nearly everything they ask for, may offer bin Salman an extensive package of benefits: access to advanced civilian and military technologies, including the possible sale of F-35 fighter jets; expanded cooperation on nuclear energy; and even a formal security pact similar to that granted to Qatar.
Before the Israel-Hamas War, these were precisely the carrots promised to the Saudis in exchange for normalization with Israel.
The implications could be twofold. First, Saudi Arabia might achieve its political and security goals without paying the political price of normalization with Israel, a step that still faces domestic opposition and regional criticism. Second, Saudi access to advanced military technology could further erode Israel’s qualitative military edge in the Middle East, a cornerstone of its national security doctrine.
Moreover, granting the Saudis permission to enrich uranium, even under restrictions and monitoring, would break a longstanding taboo and could open the floodgates to nuclear proliferation in the region.
Consequences for Israel
The paradox is clear: The closer Washington and Riyadh become, the more distant a Saudi-Israeli agreement may seem, unless Israel demonstrates diplomatic flexibility and long-term vision. Such an approach could include acceptance of a role for Palestinian Authority forces in Gaza and rhetorical support for the creation of a demilitarized Palestinian state as a starting point.
Israel, which seeks to see a broad political front aligned against Iran, may find that Saudi Arabia is getting everything it wants from Washington without Israeli involvement. The Saudis, for their part, continue to demand a credible Israeli-Palestinian political horizon as a prerequisite for formal ties with Israel – albeit under a different model than the Abraham Accords – and as a condition for deeper Saudi engagement in Gaza.
The upcoming White House meeting therefore requires Israel not merely to observe from the sidelines but to carefully consider how to preserve its unique role within the Washington-Riyadh-Jerusalem triangle. If it remains passive, Israel could soon discover that a new Saudi-American axis is emerging without it.
However, if it acts wisely, it may still be able to leverage this convergence into a renewed opportunity, not only for normalization but also for the preservation of its strategic edge.
The writer is a senior research fellow and head of the Gulf Program at the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University, and an associate fellow at The Middle East Institute, Washington, DC.