The ministers believed they were gathering to discuss the possibility of another dangerous war with Iran. Instead, they found themselves listening as Benjamin Netanyahu read aloud from a lengthy document he had submitted last week to the state comptroller – a text plainly attempting to deflect responsibility for the cataclysmic failures surrounding October 7.
In what surprised exactly no one, in Netanyahu’s version, the military and security services, past governments, opposition figures, the media, and even the judiciary emerge as the culprits. Missing is acknowledgment of the prime minister’s role, despite his near-continuous hold on power since 2009 and ultimate authority over national security policy.
With elections legally required by October, Netanyahu is positioning himself for another relentless campaign for the top job – his twelfth since 1996. In that context, the text reads like an attempt to shape public memory.
The document also cannot be separated from Netanyahu’s extraordinary legal circumstances. Across successive election cycles, he has campaigned under the shadow of trial for bribery, fraud, and breach of trust – proceedings that have stretched on for years without resolution. Critics have long argued that the slow pace reflects his procedural expansions and repeated delays.
This reality sits uneasily beside Netanyahu’s earlier commitments to the judiciary. As a condition for remaining in office while on trial, he assured the Supreme Court that his duties would not interfere with legal proceedings. In a legally binding affidavit, he pledged to recuse himself from involvement in judicial changes during the course of his case.
And yet, within days of the current government’s formation, the coalition launched a sweeping effort to restructure Israel’s legal system. The initiative went far beyond technical adjustments, proposing mechanisms granting the executive and parliamentary majority decisive influence over judicial appointments while curtailing the courts’ ability to check legislative power. Central to the controversy was the provision allowing a simple Knesset majority to override Supreme Court decisions.
The initiative triggered an unprecedented wave of public opposition. Throughout 2023, mass demonstrations spread across the country, mobilizing numbers without precedent in Israel’s history – reflecting anxieties and anger that had the look of a society being ripped apart. Senior defense figures cautioned that such discord could project vulnerability and invite attack. Netanyahu ignored this and, on several occasions in the summer of 2023, refused to meet with them.
Gaza border largely undefended during the October 7 massacre
When Hamas launched its October 7 assault, the Gaza border was almost completely undefended – with much of the manpower relocated to the West Bank, where Netanyahu’s extremist allies were preparing to cause mayhem with the Palestinians.
In the war that followed, Netanyahu consistently resisted diplomatic off-ramps that many Israeli officials and allied governments considered strategically advantageous. Proposals circulated at various stages: normalization with Saudi Arabia, arrangements envisioning the Palestinian Authority’s return to Gaza, and comprehensive agreements for the release of hostages. Each carried risks but also the possibility of reshaping Israel’s strategic environment.
Netanyahu declined them, arguing that the war could not end before Hamas was decisively crushed – an objective that, despite a scale of destruction that has trashed Israel’s image and caused war crimes charges against Netanyahu at The Hague, remains unmet.
Simultaneously, he insisted that a state commission of inquiry into the failures of October 7 could not proceed during wartime. Yet with combat largely halted – and Hamas, while degraded, still governing the Gazans – Netanyahu continues to reject an independent inquiry, advancing a government-controlled one critics say would lack credibility.
So, what we have is a prime minister on trial clinging to power while resisting mechanisms of institutional accountability that might clarify the gravest failure in the state’s history; a leader whose judicial overhaul attempt triggered Israel’s largest protest movement; a wartime premier who defined victory as Hamas’s elimination but confronts a reality that falls conspicuously short. The hostages have returned, as part of deals imposed by the United States – which Netanyahu consistently resisted.
Across Israel’s political system, a strikingly wide assumption has taken hold. The prevailing belief is that Netanyahu will exhaust every available lever to reverse his current, and considerable, deficit in the polls. It is axiomatic that he will attempt to ban Arab politicians in hopes of demoralizing the Arab minority and cause it to vote in low numbers.
There are constant reports that he may try to use legal chicaneries to delay the vote. It is assumed he will ramp up the implausibly deniable propaganda campaign, executed through WhatsApp groups, suggesting – with astounding recklessness and cynicism – that elements of the security establishment bore hidden responsibility for October 7, seeking to help Hamas in order to bring him down.
To understand how deep the distrust and hopelessness extend, consider that two months ago, former military intelligence chief Maj.-Gen. (res.) Amos Malka told KAN radio that a new Israeli attack on Iran would likely come “two weeks before the election.” The implication was that a matter so existential, that could cost so many lives, would be filtered through electoral considerations.
There is now widespread discussion of a clause in the law that might allow elections to be cancelled due to just such a national emergency.
Now let's go back 29 years. Netanyahu is asked by talk show host Dan Shilon how long he wishes to serve as PM.
He replies: “I have an answer for you that is carved in stone. I was one of those who initiated and pushed for the direct election law… A prime minister should not be able to serve more than two terms. If we don’t do this in the first term, perhaps we’ll do what is necessary in the second – but beyond that, you don’t need more. Do what needs to be done, then go home – in the political sense.”
What happened to this person?
One might also ask what happened to the Netanyahu of 17 years ago, who demanded that PM Ehud Olmert resign because of a police investigation: “A prime minister up to his neck in police investigations has no moral and public mandate to determine critical things for Israel, since there is a not-unfounded concern that he will decide based on his personal interest – for his political survival, and not in the national interest.”
That very same person now stands up to his neck not only in investigations but in trials, controversy, and distrust.
For many overwhelmed Israelis, it is the smaller patterns that rankle most – like the many diplomatic missions artificially extended over weekends, with his wife, into shopping and vacation boondoggles that often include trips at taxpayer expense to Miami, where his son lives. Netanyahu increasingly evokes the Louis XIV complex – the ruler who believed, “I am the state.”
In the spirit of civic helpfulness, I think someone should explain why stepping aside might be wiser than clinging to office like a man possessed.
First, legacy resembles fresh bread: best preserved before it goes stale.
Second, voluntary exits remain politics’ rarest and most admired maneuver.
Third, absence performs miracles on reputation as one’s successors will offer new failures of their own, pushing yours into the past.
Fourth, there is life after high public office, and it is healthier.
Mostly, though, there is the deepest, darkest truth: Power corrupts the politician – but the unbridled lust for endless power corrupts the soul.
The writer is the former Cairo-based Middle East editor and London-based Europe/Africa editor of the Associated Press, former chairman of the Foreign Press Association in Jerusalem, and the author of two books. Follow him at danperry.substack.com.