In Tehran’s corridors of power, a dangerous concept seems to have hardened into dogma: destabilizing the Persian Gulf, targeting oil tankers, and threatening Arab states’ energy infrastructure will create effective leverage over Washington. This rests on a basic misreading of today’s geopolitical reality. What the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) views as a clever tactical move to raise energy prices and deter the United States is, in practice, accelerating Iran’s isolation and strengthening the regional alliances it fears most.
At the tactical level, striking Gulf states is playing with fire. The Persian Gulf is a central artery of the global economy. Any disruption there is never a local incident, it becomes a trigger for expanded Western monitoring, intelligence collection, and interception capabilities. The IRGC ultimately exposes its operational patterns in real time, giving Western militaries and intelligence services the chance to rapidly refine their technological and operational responses against it.
The opposite is happening
At the strategic level, the price is far heavier. Tehran assumes that aggression will push Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain to reconsider their course and distance themselves from the West out of fear of escalation. The opposite is happening. Instead of producing deterrence, Iran is deepening the historic rupture between itself and the Sunni Arab world. Violating Gulf states’ sovereignty drives them to rely more heavily on an American security umbrella, and at times on a broader regional framework that also includes Israel.
The belief that the United States will fold under “energy terrorism” also proves mistaken. Washington’s commitment to maritime security and the stability of Gulf energy markets is a core element of its global standing. Attacks on Gulf states are perceived as direct blows to a vital American interest. Such moves do not pull the US out of the region, they compel it to deepen its presence, surge forces, and reinforce defense arrangements with regional partners.
The Israeli angle illustrates the depth of Iran’s error. In the past, Tehran managed to keep Israel separated from its Arab neighbors. Today, Gulf aggression pushes in the opposite direction. The Abraham Accords are no longer only a framework for economic cooperation, they are becoming an increasingly tight strategic and security infrastructure. As the Iranian threat grows, so does the shared understanding in Jerusalem and in Gulf capitals that this is one regional threat. Intelligence and military cooperation, sometimes under the auspices of US Central Command, is creating a coordinated front that constrains Tehran’s hegemonic ambitions. Through its own actions, Iran has turned Israel from an external actor into a relevant partner in the defense of the Gulf.
Ultimately, the IRGC’s strategy relies on short-term coercion that can generate tactical gains, at the cost of lost legitimacy and a strengthened opposing axis. Instead of splitting its rivals and forcing concessions, Iran is facing a more cohesive, more determined, and more connected regional and international front. The Gulf, which Tehran sought to turn into a pressure arena under its control, is gradually becoming a hub of international cooperation designed to block Iran’s expansion.
The writer is an expert on Iran and financial terrorism at the Jerusalem Center for Foreign Affairs and Security.