Has US President Donald Trump followed the path of previous Democratic and Republican presidents who believed the Islamic Republic could be trusted to honor a negotiated agreement? Or will he come to recognize that Iran is not merely a difficult adversary but a revolutionary regime whose objectives fundamentally differ from those of the United States?
If the reported agreement between Iran and the United States takes effect, it should be understood for what it is: not a peace agreement but a transactional arrangement.
Describing this interim deal as “a broad regional agreement… that guarantees long-term peace in the region,” as a senior White House official did, or claiming, as a Wall Street Journal headline proclaimed, that the parties are “on the cusp of peace,” reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of both the agreement itself and the regime with which it is being made.
In exchange for ending the American economic blockade and restoring Iran’s access to billions of dollars in frozen assets, the Islamic Republic would allow commerce to flow through the Strait of Hormuz without relinquishing claims to the international waterway. The details of nuclear issues appear headed to a separate track as Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said, “The nuclear issue has been postponed to the final agreement.”
Negotiations over Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium are also expected to continue for another 60 days, while other critical concerns, including ballistic missile development and the regime’s systematic human rights abuses, remain absent from the talks.
Israel would be forced to end its war in Lebanon before it satisfies its security needs, in particular to shift the balance of power in favor of the Lebanese government, rather than Iran’s terrorist proxy, Hezbollah.
Two months ago, I argued that Iran would likely accept an agreement removing, exporting, or diluting its enriched uranium, provided it could sidestep every other contentious issue. Such a deal would allow Tehran to wait out the remainder of Trump’s term and then do what it has repeatedly done in the past: quietly rebuild its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The result would be a temporarily defused crisis but not a lasting solution, leaving Israel increasingly isolated and vulnerable in the years ahead.
Western assumptions about Middle Eastern conflicts
Yet the larger problem extends beyond any single American agreement. The mistaken assumption that people everywhere, including authoritarian leaders, share our aspirations has undermined generations of US policymakers seeking to resolve conflicts from Tehran to Gaza. Too often, they project Western assumptions onto Islamist regimes and terrorist movements whose worldviews are rooted in fundamentally different religious, cultural, and civilizational traditions.
For decades, American administrations have assumed that Islamist adversaries ultimately seek stability and prosperity. The Islamic Republic has repeatedly demonstrated otherwise. For Tehran, regime survival, revolutionary expansion, and resistance to Western influence take precedence. Its priorities are fundamentally ideological.
Many of America’s failures in the Middle East are self-inflicted. Policymakers often assume that economic incentives, diplomacy, and international legitimacy will moderate revolutionary Islamist movements. Yet groups such as Iran’s ruling regime, Hezbollah, and Hamas derive legitimacy from resistance and confrontation with the West. Religious obligation, martyrdom, and historical grievance carry greater weight than many Western strategists recognize.
As a result, Washington has repeatedly misread both Islamist intentions and resilience. What American officials interpret as pragmatism may instead reflect strategic patience. What appears to be moderation is often a temporary adjustment designed to mislead Western policymakers while preserving long-term ideological objectives.
Compounding the problem is the theme popular within the American progressive wing, narrating Islamist movements through the lens of anti-colonialism and victimhood. This has produced absurd alliances between Western liberal activists and deeply illiberal regimes whose values often stand in direct opposition to the progressive’s purported principles. The common denominator is not shared values but shared opposition to American influence and Israel’s legitimacy.
Nowhere is this misunderstanding more consequential than in relation to Iran. Washington continues to approach Tehran as though it were a conventional state pursuing conventional interests for the welfare of its citizens. This flies in the face of reality; the Islamic Republic has consistently demonstrated that it views negotiations, ceasefires, and diplomacy as tools to advance the survival of the regime and its revolutionary project.
This is why the current debate over Iran often misses the larger point. The issue is not whether uranium enrichment can be temporarily limited or tensions reduced for a period of time. Such measures may be desirable and even necessary.
However, they don’t touch the underlying challenge that radical Islamism, in all its forms, poses to American national security interests. As long as the Islamic Republic remains intact, it will remain focused on rebuilding its capabilities, funding terror proxies, and pursuing regional dominance whenever circumstances permit. Time is on their side.
Diplomatic frameworks in Gaza and Lebanon
The same reality applies to Gaza and Lebanon. American policymakers continue to place their hopes in diplomatic frameworks with promises of disarmament, while Hamas and Hezbollah retain the capacity to intimidate rivals, rebuild their capabilities, and assert control. No political arrangement can produce lasting stability if the strongest armed actors remain committed to their radical religious agenda.
Moreover, Hamas and Hezbollah are pillars of Iran’s regional strategy. As long as the Islamic Republic retains the resources and freedom to finance, arm, and direct these organizations, any progress achieved in Gaza or Lebanon will soon be lost.
This is why the illusion that regional stability can be achieved without fundamentally weakening the Iranian regime is perhaps the most dangerous American misconception of all.
One cannot sustainably address the symptoms of Iran’s reach beyond their borders while leaving the source untouched. Only regime change in Iran will collapse the strength of Iran’s proxies.
The choice ahead
Trump therefore faces a consequential choice when Iran inevitably reneges on or violates its signed agreements. He can look the other way, or, if he concludes that the next stage of negotiations cannot meaningfully alter the behavior of the Islamic Republic or lead to the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons program, he must decide whether the objective of American policy is merely to manage the threat or to resolve it.
Any durable agreement would require intrusive inspections, the complete dismantlement of enrichment and weaponization infrastructure, severe restrictions on missile production, and an end to the financing of proxy organizations. There is no reason to believe Tehran would accept such terms. It is part of its DNA to resist them.
If that assessment is correct, the logical conclusion is difficult to avoid: The only lasting solution is replacing the current regime with a government that abandons the revolutionary ideology that has driven Iranian policy for nearly half a century.
That means recognizing that supporting Iranian opposition movements, empowering ethnic and political minorities, providing secure communications, and arming anti-regime forces should become central components of a long-term American strategy. Perhaps the president is waiting until after the midterm elections to pursue such a course.
A strategy aimed at altering the regime would require patience, something Americans are not known for, particularly when they have not been told why it serves US security interests.
Regime change is not a short-term project, nor is success guaranteed. But convincing ourselves that this preliminary agreement constitutes a genuine peace deal is a dangerous illusion. Long-term success is unlikely when one party views jihad as a religious obligation. If Washington seeks lasting stability, it must recognize that managing the Islamic Republic is not the same as solving the problem it represents.
The writer is the director of MEPIN, the Middle East Political Information Network, and the senior security editor of The Jerusalem Report. He regularly briefs members of Congress, their foreign policy advisers, and the State Department.