As we approach election day a week from tomorrow, it is worth taking a look at our 37th government, which has probably been the most unstable and malfunctioning government Israel has ever had. Israel’s interest is undoubtedly that its next government will be better, in all respects.

When the government was formed on December 29, 2022, it was supported by the 64 MKs of the Likud, the Religious Zionist Party and Otzma Yehudit union, United Torah Judaism, Shas, and Noam. Soon after being established, it included 32 ministers, some of whom (for example Ron Dermer, who later left the government) were not MKs, while others left the Knesset on the basis of the “Norwegian Law,” to enable other members of their respective parties to enter the Knesset.

In a study about the government soon after it was formed, Prof. Ofer Kenig of the Israel Democracy Institute pointed out that most of the ministers in the new government lacked ministerial experience. In retrospect, we can add that quite a few of the ministers appointed were also unsuitable from a professional point of view, such as Education Minister Yoav Kisch (Likud), and former construction and housing minister Yitzhak Goldknopf (United Torah Judaism).

Several other appointments were of persons prone to be problematic because of their extreme positions and/or conduct, such as Itamar Ben-Gvir (Otzma Yehudit) and Bezalel Smotrich (Religious Zionist Party), who were appointed to the National Security Ministry and the Finance Ministry, respectively (Smotrich was also appointed as an additional minister in the Defense Ministry on Judea and Samaria affairs).

Though there are limits to which a prospective prime minister can decide on the ministers from parties other than his own, and sometimes even on the ministers from his own party, we should at least expect that he will seek to establish the best possible government to serve the state, rather than his own political survival.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz attends a memorial ceremony for fallen Israeli soldiers of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, at the National Hall of Remembrance at Mount Herzl in Jerusalem, September 22, 2026
Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz attends a memorial ceremony for fallen Israeli soldiers of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, at the National Hall of Remembrance at Mount Herzl in Jerusalem, September 22, 2026 (credit: CHAIM GOLDBERG/FLASH90)

In the second half of the government’s term, Netanyahu’s appointment of Israel Katz on November 7, 2024, as defense minister, to replace Yoav Gallant, was undoubtedly based on the latter consideration. Of the eight defense ministers who served under Netanyahu since 1996, Katz is undoubtedly the least suitable from a professional point of view.

When the government was formed at the end of 2022, it was the second largest government Israel had ever had – the largest was the short-lived Netanyahu-Gantz government (Israel’s 35th government), which included 34 ministers. Both governments included many superfluous small ministries.

On October 12, 2023, Benny Gantz’s National Unity Party joined the government following the outbreak of war in the Gaza Strip, and three of its members – Gantz, Gadi Eisenkot, and Gideon Sa’ar – became ministers-without-portfolio. All the components of the National Unity Party resigned on June 9, 2024, against the background of their rejected demand that the government adopt a strategic plan for the war, and delays in bringing back all the hostages.

However, on September 29, 2024, Sa’ar and his newly established United Right party, rejoined the government, with Sa’ar being appointed foreign affairs minister. At this stage, the coalition’s majority rose to 68.

TODAY, MORE than two years later, the coalition includes only 60 members, after Noam left on March 25, 2025, and Torah Judaism left on July 14, 2025. Shas has not formally left the coalition, but has resigned from all its coalition positions in the government and the Knesset.

Noam left because its leader and only MK, Avi Maoz, claimed that most of the promises he had received upon joining were not kept, while the two haredi parties quit against the background of the non-passage of a law for the full exemption of the haredim from military service, which Netanyahu had promised them.

Though Netanyahu failed to give the haredi parties what they demanded, it was another case of Netanyahu putting his own political survival before the national interest.

What this means in practice is that besides being justice minister, Yariv Levin also serves as acting labor minister, Jerusalem and Jewish tradition minister, and religious services minister, while Tourism Minister Haim Katz also serves as health minister, construction and housing minister, and welfare and social security minister.

All these extra ministerial positions were held by the two haredi parties, and Netanyahu decided not to appoint full-time replacements because he needs the haredi parties for his political survival.

One may argue about Levin’s quality as justice minister – depending on whether one supports or opposes the plans he put forward for a legal reform/revolution of Israel’s justice system in January, 2023. But given the major manual labor shortage that Israel is suffering, the absence of a full-time labor minister is no joke.

It could be argued that even though these days, when foreign tourism to Israel is down to a trickle, leaving Israel’s health, construction and housing, and welfare and social security in the hands of Tourism Minister Katz is tantamount to neglect in these fields.

The problem is especially severe in the case of health, which is in a serious crisis due to the results of the unending war, and the vast numbers of physically and mentally injured military personnel. Add to this a growing shortage of doctors and other medical personnel, due to the departure from Israel of over 4,000 doctors in the years 2023-2025.

Experts on Israel’s political system argue that today there isn’t a single ministry that is run efficiently and fulfills its tasks satisfactorily. It is also a statistical fact that coalition funds – money provided by the government to the parties that are members of the coalition for distribution to their specific sectors without Knesset approval – are much higher today than since the system began in the 1980s.

From 2023-2026, coalition funds reached NIS 20.1 billion, while the ministerial budgets for education, health, welfare, and employment for the population at large were cut by NIS 11.7 billion.

Why is this important in regard to the elections to the 26th Knesset?

Because, should Netanyahu once again emerge victorious, the government he will form in its aftermath might be even worse than the outgoing government. Voters should certainly take this into account.

However, at the moment it looks as if the best the Likud and its political bloc can hope for is that the opposing political bloc will fail to form a government like themselves, and Netanyahu will remain the prime minister of a transition government for several months, until new elections take place for the 27th Knesset.

Should the political bloc that opposes the current government, either headed by Yashar’s Gadi Eisenkot or someone else, manage to form a new coalition after the elections, constructing a more stable and properly functioning government will undoubtedly be one of its first goals.

The writer has written journalistic and academic articles, as well as several books, on international relations, Zionism, Israeli politics, and parliamentarism. From 1994 to 2010, she worked at the Knesset Library and the Knesset Research and Information Center.