Here is what the future holds for Israel-Egypt relations - opinion

Israeli-Egyptian relations withstood several crises resulting from regional storms since they signed the peace agreement.

 PRIME MINISTER Naftali Bennett meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Sharm el-Sheikh in September.  (photo credit: Egyptian Presidency/Reuters)
PRIME MINISTER Naftali Bennett meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Sharm el-Sheikh in September.
(photo credit: Egyptian Presidency/Reuters)

Shortly before Yom Kippur, Prime Minister Naftali Bennett held his first official visit to an Arab state, meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. The invitation was conveyed to Bennett by Egyptian Intelligence Chief Abbas Kamel on his August visit to Israel.

Nothing in the Middle East is happenstance, not even the date of that summit meeting on the first anniversary of the signing of the Abraham Accords between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain. Much has happened since the previous visit by an Israeli prime minister to Egypt 11 years ago. Egypt underwent two revolutions and a short-lived rule by the Muslim Brotherhood, several Arab states entered into an unending vortex of terrorism and civil war, Israel signed peace agreements with four Arab and Muslim states and the US continued to withdraw from the region, while Russia and China stepped in – to stay.

Israeli-Egyptian relations withstood several crises resulting from regional storms (and perhaps because of them), with certain warming felt in some aspects. What lies ahead for Jerusalem-Cairo ties in the coming decade? Who in Egypt is responsible for shaping Israel’s image? And why is Egypt continuing its dizzying military buildup?

Together against Islamic terrorism

Cooperation between Jerusalem and Cairo achieved unprecedented closeness in recent years, as Egypt faced widespread terrorist attacks and attempts by organizations loyal to the Islamic State to entrench themselves in the northern part of the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt, struggling to wipe out terrorist activity in the Sinai, welcomed the cooperation with Israel and did not try to deny or hide it, while Israel was pleased with the opportunity to enhance its ties with Cairo and was quick to accede to its many requests, including an increased Egyptian military presence in the Sinai.

Despite the regime changes between 2011 and 2013, one factor remained as constant as the massive Giza pyramids – the Egyptian army. All Egyptian presidents, except the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammed Morsi, were former military generals. All, without exception, saw to the military’s strengthening and enhancement of its image as “Egypt’s defender.”

 Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett meets with Egyptian president Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, on September 13, 2021. (credit: KOBI GIDEON/GPO) Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett meets with Egyptian president Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, on September 13, 2021. (credit: KOBI GIDEON/GPO)

The Egyptian armed forces play significant roles in the economy, culture and other aspects of life, and are estimated to control some 40% of the Egyptian economy. It’s not surprising, that the military is also tasked with the delicate issue of relations with Israel, as reflected in the fact that it was Intelligence Chief Kamel who handed the invitation to Bennett to visit Egypt, not Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry.

Such special envoys, who prefer the shadows to the limelight, are tasked with the sensitive mediation between Israel and Hamas and managing Hamas-Fatah relations in a manner that serves Egyptian interests and protects it from additional upheavals. Cairo would like to see a long-term truce between Hamas and Israel, and perpetuation of the status quo in the West Bank-Israel-Gaza triangle to prevent renewed cooperation between Hamas and ISIS in the Sinai. In this respect, Israeli and Egyptian goals do not necessarily converge because a long-term truce and lifting of the siege on Gaza could significantly bolster Hamas and result in a more significant escalation with the organization in the future.

Shaky civilian cooperation

Who is to blame for the paucity of economic, cultural and diplomatic ties with Egypt despite four decades of peace? Israeli ambassadors to Egypt have reported for years feeling unwelcome in the Egyptian capital, having a hard time setting up meetings with Egyptian officials, and saying that the Egyptians who did agree to meet with them risked being boycotted or denounced. Bilateral trade also remains limited, reaching some $122 million in the first six months of 2021, whereas trade with Jordan stands at $244m. and with the UAE at $613m.

Experts say Israel has much to offer Egypt in technological development, agriculture and especially water regime issues, but such cooperation has barely advanced. I, too, experienced negotiations over water regime cooperation with members of the Egyptian Parliament in 2016 and 2017. The other side expressed great interest in the various Israeli proposals but subsequently dialed down its enthusiasm. When asked why, one of the Egyptian lawmakers said, “such matters need to be dealt with directly by the leaders,” and that was the end of that.

The decision announced in recent weeks to move ahead with direct Egyptair flights from Cairo to Tel Aviv, is a move in the right direction, as is the upcoming renewal of flights to Sharm el-Sheikh.

One exception to the rule worth mentioning is obviously energy cooperation, which has undergone transformative changes in recent years – the establishment of the Cairo-based regional gas forum with Israeli participation and the agreement on Israeli gas sales to Egypt. Both developments were approved because they serve Egypt’s economic and geopolitical interests.

Israel, too, prioritizes security relations with Egypt over civilian ones, according to National Security Council sources. This is ostensibly a pragmatic approach – if members of the military can get along with each other, especially given the extensive role of the Egyptian military in the affairs of state, then so be it. Meanwhile, the term “peace with Israel” remains unacceptable to most members of Egyptian society.

While the level of hostility toward Israel in Egyptian media has declined somewhat in recent years, one occasionally comes across articles claiming Israel is in cahoots with ISIS to destroy Egypt and the Arab world. Several changes were also made to school textbooks, which now include chapters on the Jewish religion and Jewish community of Egypt, and the regime has invested significant efforts in rehabilitating ancient synagogues in Cairo and Alexandria.

Nonetheless, just months ago, a major storm erupted when a photo taken in Dubai of popular Egyptian actor and singer Mohamed Ramadan alongside Israeli singer Omer Adam and Israeli-Arab football star Dia Saba resulted in a boycott of Ramadan in his home country, with his appearances canceled and songs silenced on Egyptian radio stations for several months.

The supreme leader

During his initial years in power, Sisi avoided public meetings and photo-ops with Israel’s prime minister, although he knew many top Israeli military and Defense Ministry officials very well. Sisi was part of the Obama administration’s efforts to hold a regional summit with the participation of Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian Authority in 2016. He reportedly also met with then-prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and opposition leader Isaac Herzog but preferred to avoid public scrutiny of these contacts and opted for discretion.

Israelis who know Sisi describe him as a religious man who held solid and critical anti-Israel views, but they appreciate his determined stand against the Muslim Brotherhood takeover of Egypt. “Sisi is nothing short of a miracle,” one of his interlocutors once told me, “perhaps he doesn’t like us much, but he dislikes the Muslim Brotherhood much more.”

Power games

It is no secret that the US is trying to distance itself from the Middle East and its many troubles. Its ambiguous policy on Syria, mistakes in Libya and the prevailing perception among the Arabs that the Americans abandoned their ally president Mubarak at the time, along with the US pullout from Afghanistan and Iraq, have prompted a rapprochement between Egypt and the competing powers – China and Russia.

While the US is slashing military aid to Egypt (by 10%, for now) over its human rights infractions, China, which is less interested in Egyptian human rights, is building the country’s new administrative capital. Russia, for its part, is building the country’s first nuclear reactor at el-Daba’a site, expanding its industrial zone on the shores of the Suez Canal and selling Egypt state-of-the-art weapons, among them the SU-35, competitor to the American F-35 stealth fighters.

The general orientation is clear – Egypt does not intend to replace the US with Russia or China, but it would like to have its cake and eat it, and prompt these two powers to compete for its favors.

Sisi dreams of restoring Egypt’s battered regional status. He would like to turn Egypt once again into the regional leader of the olden days and has therefore been investing a fortune in mammoth national projects such as expanding the Suez Canal, as well as in a comprehensive military buildup. In the short term, Israel does not expect a clash with Egypt and is not concerned by this buildup, but in the long term, it cannot ignore the erosion of its qualitative military edge and Egypt’s accelerated weapons shopping, courtesy of the Arab Gulf states.

Conclusion

Egypt is important to Israel and vice versa. The Israeli government wisely decided to invest time and energy in improving ties with Cairo; alas some encouraging signs of melting the icy relations are also coming from Cairo. Peace with Egypt is strategic and of tremendous importance to Israel. The tight security cooperation must not obliterate a sober view of Egypt’s rearmament and its future implications for Israel’s security. It’s paramount for Israel not to solely develop the security ties, but also economic, diplomatic and cultural relations with Cairo.

The writer, a former MK, is director of the Mitvim Institute program on Israel-Middle East relations.