Since 2006, attacks by insurgent groups have multiplied exponentially. The reduced number of US military forces had allowed these groups to have more movement, since the deployed NATO forces throughout the country were unable to confront them with sufficient force. The narrow impact of counterterrorism created by Operation Enduring Freedom was massively inadequate to stabilize Afghanistan. Counter-terrorist campaigns were inadequate, not only because of their limited resources, but also because of the difficulties in accessing regions where these insurgent groups were hiding, mainly the border regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
As the US realized that counterterrorism was failing, there was an intense debate between NATO members on how to approach Afghanistan. Some states, led by the US, started to argue for the development of a COIN (counter-insurgency) strategy and focusing on military operations that would confront the insurgency and create a secure environment which would enable the reconstruction and the legitimacy of the state. Others, including Germany, argued for operations mainly of a civilian character, like development and reconstruction. As a result, in 2008, the Comprehensive Approach was approved, which placed an emphasis on the population.
But it is impossible to create cohesion within an organization like NATO. The structure of this alliance is inadequate, as it could not even agree on the primary mission of the organization in Afghanistan. Moreover, certain conditions were imposed by the national assemblies of each of the member states, which imposed caveats or conditions, on the work each of their militaries could do on the ground in the middle of a war. Many of these NATO members opposed increasing resources and personnel, which never allowed a unified strategy. And the United States, the British, Canadians and Dutch were the only NATO member states performing actions of a military character in the south and eastern portions of a country in war.
WITH PRESIDENT Barack Obama, the war in Afghanistan was prioritized over the one in Iraq, therefore making a substantial shift from the Bush administration. Nevertheless, progressive elements within the administration and the Democratic Party still opposed both wars, as well as the change that was taking place in terms of funneling resources and personnel over to Afghanistan. These in incoherencies and fights prevented the successful performance of a COIN strategy. Obama took the middle road, increasing troops but deploying them for an insufficient period of time.
With Afghanistan as a new focus of US foreign policy, there was a need to create a strategy that would be able to confront the real challenges that the US was facing there. Other than the application of the FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Manual, it was also vital to consider Afghanistan and Pakistan as a single theater of operations. This was a valid approach.
The Field Manual FM 3-24 approach built the bases for the development of a new doctrine that sought to confront modern insurgencies that had evolved since they were first studied in the 1960s and had taken shape in the background of decolonization. The Manual sought to address a new challenge, which was that some insurgencies do not necessarily seek to replace a government but rather to destabilize its power and authority. The Manual, first put into practice in Iraq because of its short-term achievements, was to be applied to Afghanistan. But it would eventually fail because of political considerations during the Obama administration and certain military miscalculations.
But one of the main basic principles of a COIN theory should be that it is more political than military. So while military action is necessary, it should not be the main driver. General Stanley McChrystal ordered military personnel to perform work of a political and civilian character. He believed this was necessary in order to achieve a sufficient level of security. But leaving political issues in the hands of the military is controversial, as the military is not an expert on issues of a civilian character. Unfortunately, this same approach was followed by General David Petraeus when he took over.
Even though at the start the Obama administration had prioritized the war in Afghanistan, there were certain obstacles that were imposed by the Administration on the development of a coherent COIN strategy. The Obama administration was not willing to give the US Armed Forces what was needed to complete the mission, including the sufficient forces and resources. Instead, the administration increased the use of technology, including drones, in order to make up for ground troops. This had the negative effect of higher civilian casualties, and created distrust from local populations.
When troops were increased in 2009, they were deployed to Helmand, one of the least-populated provinces but a major epicenter of the Taliban and opium production. This was a strategic mistake, as a COIN strategy calls for the deployment and securement of populated regions, followed by routes that connect the rest of the country and other less- populated areas. While around 30,000 troops were sent to Afghanistan in that same year, the date of their withdrawal was fixed for 2011.
THE MAIN complication with COIN is that it is not a short-term strategy. To confront insurgents and win over the “hearts and minds” of the population takes time. By attaching a return date on the troops, the Obama administration was giving the Taliban a strategic advantage, by telling them when it would be safe for it to increase their operations. It was also impossible for the military to carry out what was needed within that space of time. And in the end, the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops was an insufficient number to confront the complexity of the war in the country.
The successful killing of Obama Bin Laden in turn terminated the possibility of the pursuit of a successful COIN strategy. This gave the Obama administration the opportunity to present the American public the impression that it had achieved the mission that had brought them to the region.
But just as the violence did not stop then, it will not stop now. Biden is committing a catastrophic strategic mistake, and if the US ever needs to return, it will be extremely complicated, as Washington will not be able to count on Pakistan or Russia for the deployment of troops and resources.
The writer is a researcher on US foreign policy and unconventional warfare. He holds postgraduate degrees from Columbia University.