Effect over intentSir, – Regarding “State gives more land to settler farms in Jordan Valley” (June 29), if settlements and the occupation stop a two-state solution, Israel dissolves into one large binational state. Then, the biggest threat to Israel is Israel.Former Harvard president Larry Summers said there can be “anti-Semitism in effect if not in intent.” If so, there can be “anti- Zionism in effect if not in intent.” Sorrowfully, for Israel’s liberal and realistic well-wishers anti-Zionism is the self-destructive bent of Israel’s most right-wing government in history.JAMES ADLER Cambridge, MassachusettsAdvocate for ArikSir, – After reading Herb Keinon’s “Sharon should have hit back hard when first rockets fell after Gaza disengagement” (June 24), I have a feeling that former US ambassador Dan Kurtzer lacks a profound understanding of what led to the unilateral disengagement in 2005 and of Israel’s policies prior to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s illness.An immediate attack on Gaza could have been politically useful to Sharon because it would immediately have lessened rightwing pressure on him after the disengagement. Before his illness, surveys gave his party 44 seats. One can assume that after a strike in Gaza, these surveys would have given it more than 60 seats.But he did not act, and there were a number of reasons.The disengagement had not been aimed only at withdrawing from Gush Katif. Another reason was to separate the Gaza Strip from the West Bank, thus separating Hamas from Fatah, and those who accepted the existence of a Jewish state from those who denied its right to exist.Sharon needed time and additional legitimacy to strike back fully against Gaza and its leaders. He had foreseen attacks from there and was slowly preparing for action against terrorists. He applied the same kind of tactics during the Second Intifada. Even after the terrible terrorist act at Tel Aviv’s Dolphinarium in 2001, he did not lead the army directly into Gaza, waiting with patience for all the world to understand that Israel cannot coexist with terror. This was the reason that a wide military operation began only after the Passover 2002 terrorist act at Netanya’s Park Hotel.This is not a guess. This is from impressions from regular meetings with him in 2005, when I was a Likud MK and deputy minister.It is difficult to say what Sharon would have done after Hamas’s election and the capture of Gilad Schalit. One can be sure that in contrast to former prime minister Ehud Olmert and former defense minister Amir Peretz, who were drawn into the Second Lebanese War, he would have attacked Gaza first and foremost.MARINA SOLODKIN Ashkelon The writer is a member of Knesset from the Kadima party, whose first leader was Ariel Sharon
July 4: Shirts and the IDF
Whether or not one sympathizes with the message’s sentiment, we have the right to expect discipline and honesty from IDF troops.
Effect over intentSir, – Regarding “State gives more land to settler farms in Jordan Valley” (June 29), if settlements and the occupation stop a two-state solution, Israel dissolves into one large binational state. Then, the biggest threat to Israel is Israel.Former Harvard president Larry Summers said there can be “anti-Semitism in effect if not in intent.” If so, there can be “anti- Zionism in effect if not in intent.” Sorrowfully, for Israel’s liberal and realistic well-wishers anti-Zionism is the self-destructive bent of Israel’s most right-wing government in history.JAMES ADLER Cambridge, MassachusettsAdvocate for ArikSir, – After reading Herb Keinon’s “Sharon should have hit back hard when first rockets fell after Gaza disengagement” (June 24), I have a feeling that former US ambassador Dan Kurtzer lacks a profound understanding of what led to the unilateral disengagement in 2005 and of Israel’s policies prior to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s illness.An immediate attack on Gaza could have been politically useful to Sharon because it would immediately have lessened rightwing pressure on him after the disengagement. Before his illness, surveys gave his party 44 seats. One can assume that after a strike in Gaza, these surveys would have given it more than 60 seats.But he did not act, and there were a number of reasons.The disengagement had not been aimed only at withdrawing from Gush Katif. Another reason was to separate the Gaza Strip from the West Bank, thus separating Hamas from Fatah, and those who accepted the existence of a Jewish state from those who denied its right to exist.Sharon needed time and additional legitimacy to strike back fully against Gaza and its leaders. He had foreseen attacks from there and was slowly preparing for action against terrorists. He applied the same kind of tactics during the Second Intifada. Even after the terrible terrorist act at Tel Aviv’s Dolphinarium in 2001, he did not lead the army directly into Gaza, waiting with patience for all the world to understand that Israel cannot coexist with terror. This was the reason that a wide military operation began only after the Passover 2002 terrorist act at Netanya’s Park Hotel.This is not a guess. This is from impressions from regular meetings with him in 2005, when I was a Likud MK and deputy minister.It is difficult to say what Sharon would have done after Hamas’s election and the capture of Gilad Schalit. One can be sure that in contrast to former prime minister Ehud Olmert and former defense minister Amir Peretz, who were drawn into the Second Lebanese War, he would have attacked Gaza first and foremost.MARINA SOLODKIN Ashkelon The writer is a member of Knesset from the Kadima party, whose first leader was Ariel Sharon