The Libyan elections in July that saw a poor performance on the part of Islamist
parties were justifiably hailed by many commentators, who saw Libya as a notable
exception to the theory of a universal regional ascendancy for the Islamists. I
myself had wrongly predicted that the Islamists would gain the lion’s share of
the votes.
However, the election results should not lead to
complacency.
As Reuters reports, armed Islamists have demolished Sufi
shrines in Tripoli and Ziltan, with Libya’s Interior Minister Fawzi Abdel A’al
affirming that he would not want the security forces to engage in an armed
confrontation with these religious radicals.
What’s more, the destruction
of the shrine in Tripoli took place by day in the open, and many of the
perpetrators are reportedly members of the very same security forces.
In
my article on the outcome of the Libyan elections- “Rethinking Libya” (July 15
2012) – I suggested that looking at developments in Iraq post-2003 serves in
many ways as a useful guide to understanding how things might pan out in
Libya.
IN THIS particular case, analogy with Iraq is helpful, for it is
clear that the post-Gaddafi Libyan security forces are being built up in much
the same way as the new Iraqi security apparatus was created and developed
following the fall of Saddam’s regime.
That is, facing a situation of
chaos caused by competing militias, the post-Gaddafi Libyan government has
understandably pursued a policy of trying to build up the new security forces as
quickly as possible – an approach that was also adopted by the United States in
Iraq.
However, the major problem is that the focus is on quantity, not
quality, and so political factions and other ideologues can take advantage of
the situation, flooding the ranks of the new security forces with their own
partisans.
In Iraq, the result has been the large presence of Kurdish
Peshmerga fighters and Shi’a Islamist militiamen.
The former means that
Baghdad cannot risk an armed clash with the Kurds, as illustrated by a recent
stand-off between the two sides at the disputed Rabia bordercrossing town,
located near the Syrian border. The incident resulted in no actual armed
conflict.
As for the Shi’a Islamists, their presence in the security
forces means that they can enforce their rules in many areas with impunity,
something that was apparent in the reports earlier this year of targeted
killings of dozens of “emos.” Even if the Iraqi government wanted to do
something about this string of killings, it would likely refrain from action,
lest elements of the security forces should effectively be at war with each
other.
And so it is with Libya. Filling the ranks of the new security
forces with their own partisans serves as a useful alternative to elections for
Islamists to wield influence and authority in the country. In this context, the
remarks of the General National Congress speaker Muhammad Magarief who –
according to a McClatchy report – first alleged that those responsible for the
acts of desecration of Sufi shrines “are unfortunately aligned with some in the
Supreme Security Committee and exrevolutionaries.”
THE SAME report also
notes admissions by the General National Congress that Gaddafi loyalists have
infiltrated the security forces. This development provides an interesting
contrast with the experience in Iraq where – in light of the de-Ba’athification
process – loyalists to the prior regime have not been able to join the Iraqi
security forces. Instead, they have simply been waging an active insurgency
campaign against the government, most recently under the banner of the militant
Naqshibandi movement that works with al-Qaida in Iraq.
At the same time,
it should not be concluded that the Gaddafi loyalists are refraining from
violence against the new order. Already they have been suspected of committing a
series of car bomb attacks in Tripoli, and it is hardly implausible that they
are behind such operations.
Indeed, entry into the security forces could
be viewed as a mere stepping-stone to acquire the necessary weaponry and funding
to begin an active insurgency campaign.
The factionalization of the
security forces is not only allowing Islamist militants to get their way with
impunity, but is also making the task of reigning in militias that remain
independent of the central government all the more difficult. Low-level violence
– with perhaps dozens of casualties on a monthly basis – looks set to dominate
the Libyan scene for quite some time. On the other hand, this problem is
unlikely to impede economic growth. As in Iraq, foreign investment will be
deterred by violence, but the intact oil infrastructure that is unlikely to be
dismantled will ensure that there is no shortage of money.
The writer is
a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum and a student at Brasenose
College, Oxford University. His website is http://www.aymennjawad.org