Toward a Palestinian Deal

By EHUD YA’ARI
Column from Issue 15, November 10, 2008 of The Jerusalem Report. To subscribe to The Jerusalem Report click here. Egypt has begun packaging a new deal between Fatah and Hamas. This is no easy task and it will require no small amount of sweat, but it is not devoid of potential success. In a few weeks, or months, the negotiations under way in Cairo, mediated by the Egyptian Intelligence Minister Gen. Omar Suleiman could well conclude with a solemn declaration regarding termination of the separation between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and replacement of the two rival governments in Gaza and Ramallah by a "government of national accord." The deal is also expected to include the reformation of the Palestine Liberation Organization so that down the road it could absorb Hamas and other rejectionist movements. Clearly, this would not be a genuine reconciliation. Rather, it would be a truce between the feuding Palestinian camps, the type of arrangement that would set temporarily new rules for the competition, primarily by calling for general elections during 2009 for both the presidency and the legislature. The package would also include reform of the Palestinian security apparatuses under Egyptian supervision, entailing transfer of the security installations in Gaza from Hamas to the new government, with Egyptian generals implicitly running the show. There's no lack of stumbling blocks on the way to the projected understandings: Hamas has no intention of relinquishing its control of Gaza, dismantling the military forces it has built up or even giving up its infrastructure in the West Bank. Hamas aims to win the elections and ultimately seize control of the PLO's institutions. For its part, Fatah wants the Egyptians and their Arab partners to take its chestnuts out of the fire and rescue it from the jaws of Hamas. Palestinian Authority President Mahmud Abbas and his colleagues are not prepared to let control of the PLO - as irrelevant as it may be - slip out of their hands and they don't want to open the gates of the West Bank to their enemies. However, even though expectations on both sides are diametrically contradictory, it is still possible that they might see fit to adopt the pretense of agreement, if only for the sake of the ostensible healing of the amputation of Gaza from the West Bank and the reunification of the two Palestinian territories. This would be a significant achievement for both Fatah and Hamas. It is therefore inadvisable to heed the assessments recently disseminated by various Israeli officials, stating that the disconnect between the two territories can only deepen with time. Even if the internal Palestinian rift does indeed become a fixture in the scenery around us, it is still possible to paper it over, even with transparent celluloid, making it possible for the Palestinian leadership to deny its existence. A development of this type would put Israel in a tough spot. It would have to cope with an apparently united Palestinian Authority, even though, in reality, the situation would be the same as it is today. In the background, there's a development that doesn't seem to touch on the Palestinian issue, but it actually does: The campaign in the Arab world against Iran has recently reached new heights with a series of unprecedented declarations by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the leading Sunni Islamic authority and the most senior spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. Speaking in Qatar, where he resides, the Egyptian sheikh warned against "the Shi'ite menace" and accused Iran of trying to force the Shia doctrine on the Sunni world. Iran and Hizballah, he said, are trying to win over millions of Sunni Muslims to the Shi'ite faith. The power of the storm raised by Qaradawi and his ilk cannot be exaggerated. With one fell swoop, they transformed the political confrontation between the Arab states and Iran into a full-fledged religious struggle. Allying with Iran has become, for them, akin to entering a pact with the enemies of the true faith, Sunni Islam. Thus, it is clear how hard it is for Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal, who met with Qaradawi at the "Jerusalem Conference" in Doha, Qatar, to maintain cooperation with Tehran. In the current atmosphere, Hamas, as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, will find it difficult to continue to rely on the Shi'ite "Islamic revolution," if that makes them suspect of allying themselves with the enemies of the faith. Initially, Hamas officials were angry with Qaradawi for making these statements, but they lack the power to silence him and must adapt to the strict religious ruling he has handed down. As a result of all this, it is convenient for Hamas to come to terms with Fatah under the aegis of Egypt and the Arab League. Indeed, the Egyptians are threatening Hamas, apparently with Saudi backing, that if it does not accept the proposed package of understandings, it will be publicly denounced as renegades against Sunni Arab, and not only Palestinian, unity and for inviting Shi'ite missionaries to continue spreading their version of Islam. For Mashaal and his cohorts, these are weighty considerations and as far as can be assessed right now, he is urging Hamas representatives in Cairo to show a degree of flexibility in the negotiations. So far, official Israel has been following these developments in total silence, and that's a pity. It is precisely now, when the bargaining in Cairo is at its height, that Israel should publicly declare that it will not automatically accept whatever agreement is presented. We must not behave as if these matters have no direct effect on Israel. On the contrary: We must make it clear to all involved that what happens on our doorstep is of vital concern to us and that therefore they may not assume that Israel will be bound to give its blessing to any and all outcomes. First and foremost, Israel must make it extremely clear that, as far as it is concerned, preservation of any form of Hamas forces as part of an agreement with Fatah will empty that agreement of all positive content. It's better to scream now than to whine later. • Column from Issue 15, November 10, 2008 of The Jerusalem Report. To subscribe to The Jerusalem Report click here.