Apple’s new operating system, iOS 26, includes many design changes that received widespread attention thanks to the refreshed and aesthetic interface, but one of the less talked-about innovations – a new permissions mechanism for wired accessories – may prove to be the most practical and significant defense line the company has introduced in recent years. Until now, users mainly knew the message “Trust this computer,” which appears when connecting the iPhone to a computer and asks whether to allow that computer access to files and content. That feature maintained a basic level of security, but did not provide a solution for other situations, such as connecting to wired accessories at public charging stations or using counterfeit cables that could be used to steal data. Here comes the new feature, which, upon every connection to a wired accessory, presents the user with a request for approval: If approved – data communication is enabled, and if denied – the device continues charging but completely blocks any attempt to access information.

In iOS 26 Apple also offers users broader control through the settings, where one can choose whether the device will always ask, ask only regarding new accessories, allow automatically when the device is unlocked, or always allow. The default – always ask – provides a significant layer of protection against threats such as Juice Jacking, an attack in which a public charging station or an innocent-looking cable tries to extract sensitive data. An important advantage is that even if access is denied, charging still takes place normally, so users do not experience reduced convenience.

However, there is also a weak point. The wording of the message that appears on the screen – “Allow accessory to connect” – is too general and may be interpreted as simple consent for charging, even though charging happens anyway. In a context where it is a critical security mechanism, the natural expectation is that Apple will phrase the warning more sharply and clearly in order to illustrate the risk to the user. An example of this can be found in the O.MG cable, which looks identical to an official Apple cable but hides spying and remote data transfer capabilities.