Iran’s large-scale attack on Israel and the successful interception of the majority of the missiles and drones launched marked a turning point in the war that began with Hamas’s attack on October 7. This shift has three main aspects: First, unlike the military and intelligence failure of October 7, Israel’s defenses were ready for this assault and were well coordinated with the forces of the United States, Britain, and several Middle Eastern countries.
Those who were ready to eulogize Israel after the surprise attack of October 7 learned that it was not a true indication of the capabilities of the IDF. At the same time, it is too early to determine the extent to which this recent success has restored Israel’s deterrence capabilities.
The second change was that the attack diverted regional and international attention toward Iran and away from Gaza, the hostages, and the Palestinian issue in general. Finally, the attack created a basis for regional and international cooperation against a common enemy. This stands in contrast to Gaza and the Palestinian issue, which have served as friction points between Israel, on the one hand, and the United States, the West, and the moderate Arab states on the other.
What's going on in the wider region?
However, the successful response to Iran does not alter the fact that Israel remains “captive” in Gaza. That is, not only are 132 hostages still in the hands of Hamas, but without some form of political horizon regarding Gaza and the Palestinian issue as a whole, Israel will remain “captive” in its current regional and international situation.
On the face of it, the balance of regional power has not changed dramatically during the war: None of the states that have signed peace treaties or normalization agreements with Israel have withdrawn from them. While Jordan did recall its ambassador from Israel to Amman (not such an unusual occurrence in the history of the two states’ relations), when push came to shove, it stood with Israel against the Iranian attack.
However, all the Arab states that aided Israel against Iran chose to play down this fact in their local media. In other words, Israel has returned to its old position in the Middle East, as a “mistress” that Arab countries are willing to be helped by and even help, but behind the scenes. This constitutes a regression.
Furthermore, one of the signatories to the Abraham Accords, Sudan, has renewed its diplomatic relations with Iran and is now receiving Iranian military and economic aid. Effectively, Tehran is exploiting the Sudanese civil war to remove the country from the Western sphere of influence and compel it to withdraw from the Abraham Accords. If this effort succeeds, Sudan could find itself serving as a regional weapons depot for Iran, used to arm and finance jihadist organizations throughout the Middle East, as it did before the Abraham Accords.
IN THE LONG TERM, addressing the Iranian threat for Israel and the West relies not solely on military means but also on diplomatic strategies. In this context, two primary courses of action emerge:
The first involves efforts to alter the regional power dynamics by enticing neutral or Iran-leaning actors with promises of substantial future benefits. These actors comprise Oman, Iraq, Syria, and notably, Sudan. Oman holds historical significance as the first Gulf state to establish ties with Israel in the 1970s, formalizing diplomatic relations in 1996. In the case of Iraq, it transcends mere alignment with pro-Iranian Shi’ite militias, as evidenced by the Iraqi prime minister’s coincidental visit to Washington during the Iranian assault on Israel.
Syria’s historical alignment with Iran contrasts its past associations, notably with Egypt and Saudi Arabia until the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. Notably, Hafez al-Assad backed the Western coalition against Iraq during the Kuwait invasion in 1990. Syria recently rejoined the Arab League following the withdrawal of opposition from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Arab states.
The country is in dire need of massive amounts of aid, potentially paving the way for a shift in its foreign policy. Any such change would likely face opposition from Russia, though its current capacity is constrained by its war with Ukraine.
In addition, though Hezbollah is the primary military force in Lebanon, there are many Lebanese—Christians, Sunnis, and even Shi’ites—who oppose the organization and are dissatisfied with the consequences of war for their country. Finally, the possibility should not be ruled out of Sudan returning to the Western camp if the rewards on offer are right.
The Palestinian issue
THE SECOND avenue of action focuses on addressing the Palestinian issue. This would entail the development of an Israeli-led plan or initiative, in collaboration with the United States and moderate Arab states, aimed at establishing a credible alternative to Hamas governance in Gaza. The ultimate goal would be to work towards the establishment of a Palestinian state in the long term, while also advancing the process of normalization with Saudi Arabia. Such efforts could potentially pave the way for additional agreements with various Arab and Muslim states, including Indonesia.
However, it is important to acknowledge the significant challenges inherent in this endeavor, from the perspectives of both Israel and the Palestinians. Nonetheless, a demonstrated willingness to pursue progress and initiative in this direction could lay the groundwork for a regional diplomatic process and help mitigate criticism of Israel in both Arab and Western public opinion.
At present, these ideas may appear to be far-fetched dreams. However, it’s worth noting that not long ago, the notion of Arab countries assisting Israel in a conflict against Iran would have seemed implausible. In light of this, we should embrace the vision expressed in Shimon Peres’s final book title: No Room for Small Dreams. This suggests that even seemingly ambitious goals are worth pursuing, as history has shown that remarkable shifts can occur when bold visions are pursued with determination.
The writer teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a board member of Mitvim—The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.