When Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu walks into the Oval Office next week to meet US President Donald Trump, he won’t just be arriving as the leader of a country fresh off a stunning military victory. He’ll be stepping onto a carefully choreographed stage designed to amplify that success.

Behind the pageantry and proclamations of a joint triumph over Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, Trump, Netanyahu and their teams are expected to hammer out the building blocks of a post-war Middle East – one that includes strict curbs on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, a ceasefire in Gaza, a regional mechanism to replace Hamas, a possible expansion of normalization agreements, and the sketching of a renewed diplomatic path for the Palestinians.

A tall order, indeed.
 
This will be the third time the two leaders have met in the White House in less than six months – and, given the regional shifts since their first meeting on February 4, it is likely to be the most consequential.
 
Coming just two weeks after Operation Rising Lion that crippled Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and saw unprecedented American–Israeli cooperation and coordination – including US strikes on key Iranian nuclear installations – this summit is loaded. Peace. Politics. Hostages. Normalization. Tariffs. And, of course, legacy.

US PRESIDENT Donald Trump meets with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Oval Office in April 2025.
US PRESIDENT Donald Trump meets with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Oval Office in April 2025. (credit: KEVIN MOHATT/REUTERS)

As Netanyahu told the cabinet earlier this week, “Taking advantage of the success is no less an important part of achieving the success.” And that will be the challenge of the meeting: how to translate military success in Iran into lasting diplomatic and strategic gains.


THE MOST immediate priority will be finalizing a ceasefire in Gaza and securing the release of the 50 remaining hostages, 20 of whom are believed to be alive. Trump has called the most recent proposal his “final” one, warning Hamas that “it will not get better – IT WILL ONLY GET WORSE.”

While final terms are still being negotiated, the deal is believed to involve a 60-day ceasefire with the staggered release of 10 live hostages and 18 bodies. Eight living hostages would be released on the first day, and two more after 50 days, with the deceased released in phases during the ceasefire. If an agreement is reached to end the war entirely, another 10 hostages and 12 bodies would follow.
 
Israel’s core demand – the removal of Hamas from power and the creation of an alternative governing structure – remains in place. As does Hamas’s demand for an end to the war, with ironclad guarantees.
 
The prime minister is under political pressure from Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich not to agree to any deal short of total Hamas capitulation. But the strategic success in Iran has given Netanyahu greater political room to maneuver.
 
Even if Smotrich and Ben-Gvir walk away from the coalition as a result of this deal, potentially triggering new elections, Netanyahu would – if the deal came to fruition – then face the voters while riding high on the astounding success in Iran, the return of hostages, and the possible end to the Gaza war. That’s a significantly better narrative than going to elections under the shadow of October 7.

Trump also brings domestic considerations to the meeting. Like Netanyahu, he wants to capitalize on foreign policy momentum – but he’s also looking to reshape the regional order.

At a press conference with Netanyahu when they met in the White House for the first time back in 2017, Trump spoke of using a “bigger canvas” – a shift from bilateral Israeli-Palestinian talks to a broader regional framework. He said that such a bigger canvas to work with would make it easier for Israel to show more flexibility. Now, the degrading of Iran, the defeat of Hezbollah, and the defanging of Hamas have created conditions to dramatically expand the canvas even more by bringing more countries into the Abraham Accords.
 

WHITE HOUSE officials have floated the idea of Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Indonesia joining the Abraham Accords fold. Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt recently declared that the administration sees “a new era,” and that Trump is eager to add more countries to the normalization agreements, “perhaps even before the end of the year.”

Netanyahu, too, has framed the moment as historic: “Alongside the release of our hostages and the defeat of Hamas, there is a window of opportunity here that must not be missed,” he said.

Still, it’s not all smooth sailing. The prospect of extending normalization to Saudi Arabia and beyond comes even as some existing peace partners have grown increasingly distant. On Sunday, Jordan’s under-19 basketball team refused to play Israel in a Basketball World Cup match – a disturbing barometer of public sentiment in the Arab street.

Moreover, the conditions that led to the Abraham Accords in 2020 may no longer hold. At the time, fear of a nuclear-armed Iran helped drive Gulf-Israel convergence. But with the Iranian threat now significantly degraded, that shared urgency has faded. It may now be more difficult to sell normalization to other Arab states as a strategic imperative when the core threat – Iran – has just been neutralized.

Furthermore, the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia are among the countries vying for dominance in the region. They obviously did not want to see Iran reign supreme or as the regional hegemon. By the same token, however, they also don’t want to see Israel in that role, either.

This is where Trump’s transactional foreign policy approach may make a difference. Unafraid to use leverage with allies – as he did recently with Israel, ordering Netanyahu to abort a retaliatory strike on Iran after it violated the ceasefire a few hours after it went into effect on June 24 – Trump may apply similar pressure on Riyadh. He knows what the Saudis want from Washington – a security pact and civilian nuclear capabilities – and will likely use that as leverage to bring them to the table.

Who will govern Gaza after Hamas?

IF THE ceasefire in Gaza does take hold, one of the thorniest questions will be who will govern Gaza after Hamas. This, too, is an issue expected to be addressed during the meeting.

One working model being discussed involves an Arab-led stabilization force, with Egypt managing border security, the UAE and Saudi Arabia financing reconstruction, local Palestinian technocrats overseeing day-to-day operations, and Jordan playing an advisory role.

The aim is to establish a governance structure that excludes both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority – which Israel views as completely ineffective – while avoiding direct Israeli occupation.
 
Regarding Iran, the two leaders are expected to discuss ways to concretize the successes in Iran, discuss redlines that should be placed on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile production capabilities, and coordinate what actions to take if these lines are crossed.

But not everything on the agenda involves high-stakes diplomacy. Netanyahu said he will also be meeting with Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, meaning that trade will also feature in the visit.

While less politically dramatic than war and peace, trade carries real economic and political weight. As prices in Israel continue to rise, any progress in lifting tariffs would be a much-needed win for Netanyahu on the domestic economic front – especially if new elections may be in the offing.


THE STAKES in this meeting for both leaders are high. Trump wants to cast himself as a decisive global leader, one who confronts enemies and delivers peace – a sharp contrast to the Biden-era image of caution and compromise. His approval ratings, which had languished earlier in the year, have edged up in the wake of the Iran strikes.

Among Republicans and Evangelicals, his backing for Israel plays particularly well, with support levels topping 70%. Some Evangelical leaders have already praised his Iran strikes as divinely inspired. For Trump, this meeting provides an opportunity to consolidate that narrative.

For Netanyahu, the meeting serves multiple functions. It is a chance to present himself as a statesman, to get public US backing at a crucial moment, and to counterbalance political pressures at home. Appearing next to Trump as a victorious wartime prime minister enhances his stature with his base and deflects criticism at home.

But then there is the matter of indebtedness. Stretching back to Trump’s first term, Israel has benefited enormously from this president --  from the US embassy move to Jerusalem and recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, to the Abraham Accords and, most recently, the coordinated military campaign against Iran and the strike on the Fordow, Natanz, and Istafan nuclear weapons sites.

That type of support, obviously, comes with expectations. And the looming question is how much Israel now owes Trump – and when and how he will opt to collect. Trump hinted at it earlier this week when he called for an end to Netanyahu’s corruption trials, and hinted broadly that US aid to Israel might be dependent on it.

The Netanyahu–Trump meeting may not produce an immediate Gaza ceasefire deal and the return of the hostages, or a new normalization pact with other Arab and Muslim countries. But it could very well mark the point at which developments began turning sharply in that direction. This is not just about a victory lap or headline-grabbing handshakes: It’s about whether the leaders can convert military gains into something much more durable – in other words, a new Middle East.