Sources say Israel's defense establishment at odds, note force can't solve all war aims - analysis

That consensus has broken into a wide-open chasm.

None of these officials is shy about using force to alter the region’s diplomatic and military realities. But many of them also believe that the government and some of their colleagues have become drunk on believing that every problem can be solved by using military force.

These sources believe this is a fallacy.

According to some of these sources, the Iran war has become a quagmire and a war about a crisis in energy markets and failed attempts at regime change when it should have focused solely on nuclear and ballistic missile issues.

For example, there has been almost no public discussion about what to do regarding the more than 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to the 60% level that Iran is trying to reach, which is likely buried underground at Isfahan and Natanz.

Further, some of the officials say the Iran war should have ended after two to three weeks. At that point, Israel and the US could have declared a unilateral ceasefire and reaped all of the gains of the first stage of the war without suffering the costs that have grown since then. Regarding potential Iranian regime change, they say this was never really a realistic focus and was unprofessionally raised by some unrealistic politicians’ public statements.

Next, they say that all of the theories and ideas published about rallying the Iranian Kurds or other minorities to achieve a quick and easy regime change have no value in an honest professional military assessment.

Homing in on whether regime change might be more possible in Iran at some point post-war – that is possible, note the officials. But breaking with conventional wisdom again, they say that the regime might be toppled internally in six months or at some other point, regardless of whether the world lifts sanctions.

In contrast, a standard Israeli talking point has been that even if a ceasefire deal is reached with Iran, sanctions pressure must be kept on it to help achieve regime change. This unconventional viewpoint suggests that limiting negotiations with Iran regarding a deal on its nuclear and ballistic missile programs to insisting on maintaining sanctions could lose a deal opportunity.

The question would be whether one prioritizes the nuclear-ballistic missile issues over regime change and whether one believes regime change can only be achieved by constant pressure, or whether the pressures unleashed by the current war could be sufficient to bring it about, even if sanctions are lifted.

These sources suggest that tough questions should be asked both of the Mossad and of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about all talks regarding regime change. For example, the sources would likely say, “If the Mossad thinks it can do it, ok, so go do it!” implying that there have been no major signs of even substantial progress toward regime change, such as the regime losing control of even limited portions of the country, to date.

Further, they would criticize the huge amounts of funds that have been put into producing regime change with nothing to show for it to date.

Recalling Israel’s attempt to actively lead regime change in Lebanon in the 1980s with Christian-Lebanese leader Bashir Gemayel, the sources note that this was a decision by former prime minister Menachem Begin, not the Mossad, even if the spy agency was ordered to carry out the decision.

The clear implication here was that the final responsibility for whether there is regime change or not lies at the feet of Netanyahu.

Everyone was so impressed with the opening attacks of the war, which killed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and around 40 other top Iranian officials, but then came his son, Mojtaba, and others, who have solidified Iran’s war-fighting efforts.

As the war drags on, the sources say that the potential for drifting into new losses may emerge as larger than the achievements to date. They suggest Israel should cut its losses regarding any goals that have not yet been achieved and take the least bad path still available.

The price for the home front must be carefully weighed instead of just pretending everything is fine, they argue.

In fact, any new targets being hit in Iran in recent days and in the future, they contend, are just more of the same, without changing the broader strategic picture. Some of them refer to the newest “achievements” sarcastically, many of which are mere economic targets, such as factories, which cost Iran in the long run but have little to no immediate impact on Iran’s war-fighting posture.

In addition, sources are disappointed that Israel’s decision about when to stop the Iran war is not necessarily attuned solely to its national interests but is rather clearly linked to President Donald Trump’s decision, which could both overlap and conflict with Israeli interests.

A series of critical questions for Israel, they noted, are not being fleshed out by top war decision-makers, such as: “If a ceasefire deal is struck, is there a clear Iranian ‘address’ to negotiate with, or are Iranian negotiators disconnected from the real Iranian generals in charge?

If sanctions are lifted, what would be the pace for lifting them? What strategic moves can be made to cope with Iran’s problematic and expected post-war claim of “victory,” given that it will claim it survived a grand attack by both Israel and the US combined?

All of these questions are on the back burner, say the officials, as there is no dialogue of critical thinking about war policy. This remains true, they add, even as many unpleasant facts are starting to pierce the veil of the “absolute victory” that has been presented so far.

Moving on to the likely largest achievement of the war – the destruction of much of Iran’s ballistic missile capacity – the sources acknowledge the achievement in the short and medium term but question whether it can hold long-term.

They question whether, even if Israel were to reduce Iran’s missile arsenal to zero in the present, which is doubtful, it could ever succeed in completely stopping Iran from rebuilding its conventional weapons. Iran is simply too gigantic a country in physical size, population, and resources.

The opening question the sources ask regarding the Lebanese front with Hezbollah, given the admission that this war on its own will not disarm the terror group, is: “How much power should Israel have used against Hezbollah?”

The sources say that Hezbollah went into the war minimally and symbolically, disregarding a defense establishment source who claimed that the terror group might have carried out its own preemptive strike.

Next, the sources question why no one seriously confronted whether it made sense to start a larger second front with Hezbollah before finishing the war with Iran. This meant Israel has had to fight large battles on both fronts simultaneously.

Additional questions, they say, should be asked are: What were Israeli military intelligence’s estimates about Hezbollah’s capabilities going into this war?

Also, on top of questioning how massive Israeli counter-airstrikes needed to be against Hezbollah’s “symbolic” opening, why did Israel initiate a land invasion before the Iran war was done, and what was considered in terms of what resources and parameters were available for such an invasion?

IDF soldiers continue to get killed or wounded in Lebanon almost daily, while Israel is surprised that Hezbollah was not an easy win.

This is partially because there has not been enough air force support for a major operation against Hezbollah, given that the IAF is focused on Iran, say the sources. This is one of the reasons the terror group was able to launch 600 aerial attacks in a single day in the middle of the current war.

The sources know that an invasion of Lebanon had been planned for January and think this could have made sense with full aerial support if there was no Iran war. But once the decision was made to go to war with Iran, they say the Lebanese front should have been kept quieter, just like it was for most of 2024 when the IDF was focused on Gaza first.

Finally, all defense sources are beyond themselves that the government is letting the haredim (ultra-Orthodox) avoid serving in the IDF even as it initiated a massive two-front war only half a year after Israel’s longest war.