Netanyahu, Israel's war cabinet cannot delay calls on Gaza any longer

From what Gallant said about unity and cooperation, it is possible to infer what he didn’t say: that these two attributes are not currently in abundant supply in the government and the war cabinet.

 PRIME MINISTER Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and Minister Benny Gantz attend a press conference at the Defense Ministry in November.  (photo credit: Chaim Goldberg/Flash90)
PRIME MINISTER Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and Minister Benny Gantz attend a press conference at the Defense Ministry in November.
(photo credit: Chaim Goldberg/Flash90)

On Monday, the 101st day of the war, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant held a solo press conference during which – in his signature deep-voiced, macho style – he briefed the nation on where things stand, stating that 2024 would be a year of war that would result in victory.

“I would like to reiterate: at the end of the war, there will be no military threat from Gaza,” he said. “Hamas will not be able to control and function as a military force in the Gaza Strip, and the IDF will have full freedom of action to do whatever is required to defend the citizens of Israel. It may take a long time, but it will end with a single scenario: total victory.”

At the end of his prepared comments, before taking questions, he added this: “I want to urge my two senior colleagues in the unity government, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Minister Benny Gantz: This is a time for unity and partnership. This is a time for compromises between us in order to achieve the goals of the war for the sake of us all.”

The establishment of an emergency government 

The emergency government Gallant referred to was established five days after the war began and involved Gantz’s 12-seat National Unity Party entering the government. One of the conditions was the establishment of a war cabinet that would make the major wartime decisions. In addition to Netanyahu, Gantz, and Gallant, this now includes three nonvoting “observers”: Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, Gantz’s party colleague Gadi Eisenkot, and Shas head Arye Deri.

From what Gallant said about unity and cooperation, it is possible to infer what he didn’t say: that these two attributes are not currently in abundant supply in the government in general and the war cabinet in particular.

 PRIME MINISTER Benjamin Netanyahu is flanked by Justice Minister Yariv Levin (right) and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant in the Knesset plenum, earlier this year. (credit: YONATAN SINDEL/FLASH90)
PRIME MINISTER Benjamin Netanyahu is flanked by Justice Minister Yariv Levin (right) and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant in the Knesset plenum, earlier this year. (credit: YONATAN SINDEL/FLASH90)

If they were, the defense minister would not have needed to make this public appeal. One need not call for unity and partnership where unity and partnership already exist.

TRUTH BE told, the nation did not need Gallant’s revelation to understand that the war cabinet was not humming like a well-oiled machine. Over the past few weeks, there have been any number of indications that there is trouble in war cabinet paradise.

Consider the following: Netanyahu, Gallant, and Gantz – the three war cabinet principals – used to regularly hold joint press conferences. They have not done so in weeks.

And this: Gallant reportedly stormed out of a war cabinet meeting this week when he was told that his chief of staff, Shachar Katz, could not join the meeting since aides were to be left outside. Gallant was reportedly angered since five of Netanyahu’s advisers did attend.

And this as well: Netanyahu reportedly prevented Gallant from holding a one-on-one meeting with Mossad chief David Barnea.

In other words, even without Gallant’s call for unity, there were signs of tension inside the war cabinet.But is that surprising?

Netanyahu and Gantz are political rivals, with Gantz watching his party’s poll numbers soar as Netanyahu watches his plummet.

Netanyahu and Gallant have a troubled past, going back to March when Netanyahu fired Gallant after the latter said in a press conference that the judicial reform was endangering national security. The prime minister retracted, however, following massive protests.

And Gallant has a problematic history with Gantz, who became chief of staff in 2011 after Netanyahu backed away from appointing Gallant to the job because of allegations that he violated building code regulations at his family home.

So, no, there is not a lot of affection and goodwill between those sitting in the war cabinet. That, however, does not mean they cannot work together. Most meaningful political and military forums in this country include members who have a troubled history with each other; it’s a natural byproduct of politics and the military – you are going to have to work today with people you might have fought with yesterday and who will be vying for your job tomorrow.

The hope is that in times of national crisis, individuals can put their grievances aside and work for the good of the country.

There are those, primarily in the opposition and in the media, who believe that Netanyahu is congenitally incapable of doing just that. But these also include people who have an interest in casting him in that role, who want to bring about the collapse of the emergency government, and who are keen on magnifying the differences that do exist to get Gantz and Eisenkot and their party to exit the government, something they believe – and hope – would lead to the collapse of the government and either a new government established without Netanyahu at its head, or elections.

THE TRUTH is that there are substantial differences inside the war cabinet over fundamental issues. But those differences are not only the result of narrow party political considerations, such as Netanyahu not wanting to take specific steps because of fear of alienating other coalition members who might later bring down the government.

Instead, they reflect substantive and legitimate differences, and three significant differences have emerged recently.The first has to do with the hostages.

On one side of the fence sit Netanyahu and Gallant, who believe that only continued heavy military pressure on Hamas will bring about the eventual release of some 100 hostages still believed to be alive and in Hamas captivity.

Reflecting this position, Gallant said at his press conference: “If the fire stops, the fate of the hostages will be sealed for many years in the captivity of Hamas. Without military pressure, no one will talk to us. Only from a position of strength can the hostages be freed.”

Eisenkot and Gantz are on the other side of the fence, reportedly pressing the government to consider different ways to free the hostages, including agreeing to a prolonged halt to the fighting as a precondition. “We have to stop lying to ourselves, to show courage, and to lead to a large deal which will bring home the hostages,” Eisenkot told a war cabinet meeting this week, according to leaks to Channel 12 and Yediot Aharonot.

Both positions are legitimate. Neither is necessarily a result of “political considerations” but stems from a genuine disagreement about what would ultimately be better for the country. Unlike other issues, which remain undecided, this one – so far – seems to have been determined, as evidenced by the continued fighting inside Gaza.

The second central area of disagreement has to do with the day after the war, when and if Hamas is removed from power. Here the dueling parties are not Netanyahu and Gallant vs Gantz and Eisenkot, but rather Gallant vs Netanyahu.

Up until now, Netanyahu has been hesitant about detailing Israel’s plans for the day after the war, essentially saying that Israel will deal with the day after when that day comes. In this, his critics say, he is motivated by political considerations, afraid that if his day-after plan includes the Palestinian Authority in any capacity inside Gaza, or if it does not include the possibility of a return to Gush Katif, then he will lose two coalition partners since Religious Zionist Party head Bezalel Smotrich and Otzma Yehudit head Itamar Ben-Gvir are adamantly opposed to PA participation and would like to see Jewish settlements reestablished inside Gaza.

On the other side is Gallant, who, in his press conference, said that while the IDF will have complete freedom of action “the day after,” the Palestinians would run their lives, and Jewish settlement would not return. He called on the political echelon to make decisions, saying that the failure to do so “may harm the progress of the military operation.”

“The future government in Gaza must grow from the Gaza Strip; Gaza will be ruled by Palestinians. The end of the military campaign must be anchored in policy,” he said, fearing that the failure to decide now is creating a vacuum in areas where the IDF has withdrawn that may be filled, again, by Hamas.

Even if Netanyahu certainly has an eye on the political fallout of dealing with such a plan now, it is legitimate for there to be disagreements over what role the PA should play, and it is unreasonable to dismiss opposition to the PA playing a role merely because Smotrich and Ben-Gvir are also opposed.

A third major issue of disagreement has to do with whether to permit Palestinian laborers from the West Bank back into Israel and settlements in Judea and Samaria to work.

While the security establishment, represented by Gallant – the army and the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) – are recommending that workers be let back in under certain conditions, Netanyahu has delayed deciding on the matter, reportedly, again, because he does not want to antagonize Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, who are opposed.

The question of whether and how to allow Palestinian workers back inside Israel is also a legitimate one, considering the role workers from Gaza played in providing Hamas with intelligence it used in the October 7 attacks.

Smotrich said that the idea that these workers need to be let back or else the West Bank will explode is a first cousin of a security doctrine that held sway before October 7 that maintained that if Qatari money would be allowed into Gaza, and the economic situation there would not become dire, quiet would be maintained.

The problem is not that there are disagreements inside the war cabinet – those are natural and even healthy. The problem is that these disagreements are preventing decisions from being made on too many issues. But with the country in its fourth month of war, some critical decisions simply cannot be postponed any longer.