Deposed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad – like his father, Hafez Assad before him – was a very bad actor. Brutal, vicious, and implacably hostile to Israel.
But he was also predictable.
Hafez Assad, throughout his long tenure, and Bashar Assad at least until the Syrian civil war and the deep Iranian and Hezbollah entrenchment that followed, operated within clear and familiar parameters. Israel never liked the Assads, but it could read them – and in the Middle East, that counts for a great deal.
One of the clearest expressions of that predictability was the assumption, proven over time, that Damascus would respect the 1974 Disengagement Agreement lines. And it did.
For decades, that border held. Israel had concerns along its borders with Lebanon and, at times, Jordan – but not with Syria. The arrangements along the Golan Heights were treated as almost inviolate.
That predictability vanished overnight when Assad was overthrown and fled to Russia in November 2024.
Uncertainty surrounded by openly hostile armed groups
In its place came uncertainty – and uncertainty in a fragmented state crowded with armed groups, many of them openly hostile to Israel. Within days of Assad’s fall, Israel moved decisively: destroying Syria’s air force, navy, and heavy weapons depots to prevent them from falling into dangerous hands, and taking control of a wide swath of southern Syrian territory, including the Syrian side of Mount Hermon.
The rationale was simple. Israel had no idea who would ultimately control Syria – or even which parts of it – and could not risk strategic areas so close to its border falling into the hands of Iranian-allied militias, Hezbollah, jihadist factions, or ISIS.
That background is important for appreciating the significance of the US-mediated talks that resumed this week in Paris, aimed at forging a new Israeli-Syrian security arrangement.
Following talks on Tuesday, the US, Syria, and Israel released a rare joint statement that spoke of “productive discussions” and announced agreement on the establishment of a joint “fusion mechanism.” This mechanism, under US supervision, was defined as a “dedicated communication cell to facilitate ongoing coordination on intelligence sharing, military de-escalation, diplomatic engagement, and even commercial opportunities.”
The mechanism is also to “serve as a platform to address any disputes promptly and work to prevent misunderstandings.”
While far short of a security agreement, the statement marked the first formal, trilateral acknowledgment that the talks, now in their fifth round, are producing tangible – if still interim – understandings.
Tuesday’s round, the first to produce a joint statement, was mediated by US President Donald Trump’s Syria envoy Tom Barrack, with the goal being a security agreement that would demilitarize southern Syria and define the scope, pace, and conditions of an Israeli withdrawal from territory it entered after Assad’s collapse.
Washington is pressing hard. The Trump administration sees an agreement as a way to stabilize the Israel-Syria border and, potentially, lay the foundation for expanded diplomatic normalization down the road.
The talks resumed following a direct request by Trump to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during their meeting last week at Mar-a-Lago. Netanyahu is reported to have agreed to continue negotiations, but stressed that Israel has red lines that must be preserved.
Nevertheless, Trump emerged from meeting Netanyahu sounding optimistic, saying, “We do have an understanding regarding Syria,” and adding that he believed Israel and Syria, under its new President, Ahmed al-Sharaa, would be able to get along.
Sharaa, a former jihadist leader, has won significant goodwill in Washington. Trump hosted him in the White House in November and appears convinced that he has genuinely abandoned his past and is intent on steering Syria onto a new trajectory.
From Washington’s perspective, Israel’s continued military presence in southern Syria – and its periodic strikes – jeopardize Sharaa’s ability to consolidate power, rebuild institutions, and stabilize the country.
Israel, however, sees the situation through a post–October 7 lens.
The nightmare scenario in Jerusalem is a buildup of jihadist forces on another border directly adjacent to Israeli communities – this time in the Golan Heights – paralleling the situation in the South prior to October 7.
While Trump might sincerely believe Sharaa’s intentions are genuine, if he is wrong, then Israel -- especially residents of the Golan communities -- not the US, will pay the price.
Syria’s demands in the negotiations are clear: a full Israeli withdrawal from territory the IDF moved into after Assad’s fall, a revival of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, an end to Israeli strikes, and a framework that ensures Syria’s sovereignty and freedom from foreign interference.
Israel’s position is more dependent on conditions being met. It wants to see southern Syria demilitarized, strong enforcement mechanisms put into place, protections for minority communities – especially the Druze in Sweida – and continued freedom of action against emerging threats.
But behind these positions lies a disagreement between Washington and Jerusalem over what security actually means.
For Washington, “demilitarization” means no heavy weapons beyond a defined line, limits on the number of forces in the defined zone, international monitors, and procedures in place to address violations.
For Jerusalem, what is needed is not a demilitarized zone, but a buffer zone under effective Israeli control, with IDF operational freedom, intelligence capabilities, and the ability to act preemptively.
From Israel’s perspective, the newly announced fusion mechanism fits into this framework: a useful channel for communication and de-escalation, but not a substitute for control on the ground. At least not yet.
Another factor complicating the negotiations, and one only indirectly addressed in the joint communiqué, is the situation in Sweida, the Druze heartland in southern Syria.
Israel maintains that it has both a moral and strategic obligation to ensure the security of the Druze – especially following the massacre there last year. Damascus, however, sees this as a blatant infringement on its sovereignty.
Damascus has insisted that any arrangement respect Syria’s “sovereignty, unity, and stability” – language that was inserted in Tuesday’s joint statement – while Israel argues that protecting the Druze cannot wait until the central government demonstrates effective control.
Sweida, for Damascus, is a test of state authority and sovereignty as well as a point of national pride. For Israel, the concern is whether the Druze there – many with ties to their coreligionists in Israel – can be protected when the central government’s control is so weak.
While Sharaa’s government has made some advances – reintegrating some militias into state frameworks, restoring basic services in urban areas, and reestablishing international ties – the country remains deeply fragmented. The regime controls roughly 50% to 60% of the country, with local militias, tribes, Kurdish forces, Turkish-backed factions, and Druze communities in control of the rest.
In addition, ISIS, while not holding territory, remains active in the country’s vast desert regions and has recently expanded operations toward Damascus and Idlib – a signal of how quickly security vacuums can be exploited.
For Syria, a security deal with Israel would bolster Sharaa’s legitimacy, stabilize the southern part of the country, reduce Israeli military pressure, and accelerate reintegration into the international system – potentially including the permanent removal of remaining sanctions. For Israel, the talks offer an opportunity – but also a risk.
A successful agreement could translate its post-Assad military moves in Syria into a durable security arrangement. It could also lay the foundation of a wider agreement with Syria and perhaps its eventual joining the Abraham Accords. But a premature or poorly enforced deal could place the communities in the Golan at risk.
The talks in Paris are not about peace or normalization – at least not yet. They are about how to restore a measure of predictability to a border that once seemed permanently quiet, without endangering the country’s residents in the North in the process.