As tensions with Iran increase amid a US military build-up, there are many places that Iran could strike during a war. For instance, in the Gulf, many countries have been concerned about attacks in the Straits of Hormuz, where Iran recently conducted naval drills. Another possible front is the Kurdish opposition groups that operate in Iran, as well as members of the Kurdish diaspora in northern regions of the country.
On the evening of February 18, a vehicle exploded in the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq. It was traveling on a road between Sulaymaniyah and Dukan. Many Kurds from Iran have fled to northern Iraq in the last four decades.
Some of them have joined opposition groups that oppose the Iranian regime. The Iranian Kurdish opposition is fragmented into around seven different groups. Five of the groups increasingly work together on a unified platform and front against the Iranian regime.
One group said that two of its members, whom it described as Peshmerga fighters, were killed in the mysterious explosion on February 18. Many accounts on social media initially said the vehicle was attacked by a drone. Later, others said the vehicle may have been carrying explosives or munitions, and they may have exploded.
“Two members of an Iranian Kurdish opposition party were killed on Wednesday afternoon when their vehicle exploded on the Sulaymaniyah-Dukan road,” the Kurdish media Rudaw reported. The two men who were killed were members of the Komala Party of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan (Shorshger). It’s worth noting that the Komala Kurdish party has several offshoots, and this is one of them.
The two men were in a Toyota Land Cruiser, which is a relatively expensive vehicle. “Karzan Sherko, spokesperson for the Kurdistan Region Security Agency (Asayish) in Sulaymaniyah, said that following an investigation, it was determined that the ‘incident was a car accident,’” the Rudaw report said.
“Bakir Abdulkarem, mayor of the Piramagrun district, near where the explosion occurred, said the vehicle was carrying munitions at the time of the blast.”
The Iranian regime's oppression of Kurdish groups
The explosion and the fact that many people initially believed this was an Iranian drone attack illustrate how on edge many people are in the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq. Iranian Kurdish groups have opposed the Iranian Islamic regime for decades.
They are well organized but have also been brutally oppressed. Iran often prefers to lash out at Kurdish groups because they are easy targets, and it has attacked Kurds in northern Iraq numerous times. It has used missiles and drones to attack the two branches of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI), has struck other Kurdish groups, and even attacked a Kurdish businessperson in Erbil, accusing him of being linked to Israel.
The Kurdish opposition groups have been coordinating their efforts in recent months since protests broke out in Iran in late December. Iran brutally suppressed the protests beginning around January 7.
The Komala Party, which is known as “The Komala of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan,” is described by Rudaw as “a left-wing Iranian political party and armed group founded in 1969 by Kurdish university students.”
Rudaw also notes that this branch of Komala, known as Shorshger, “along with other Iranian Kurdish parties, was subsequently required to relocate from its headquarters to other areas of the Sulaymaniyah province under an agreement between Baghdad and Tehran.”
According to a post on X/Twitter by Rojhelat.info, Kurdish parties in Iran are moving toward forming a unified front. Rojhelat is the name for Eastern Kurdistan among Kurds. These are the areas of Kurdistan that are controlled by Iran and that neighbor the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq.
Known as “Suli” among locals, Sulaymaniyah, near the Iranian border, has long been a hotspot for Iranian Kurdish opposition groups. Some have had bases nearby in Koya, around 100 km. north of Sulaymaniyah. Many smugglers and some armed groups have, in the past, used the mountains nearby to cross back and forth. Iran has killed Kurdish border crossers.
The Rojhelat.info article on the Kurdish groups notes “The Iranian Kurdish political landscape is witnessing a significant structural evolution as major parties seek to transition from a consultative ‘Dialogue Center’ into a robust, unified cooperation platform. This initiative aims to broaden the scope of collaboration, ensuring the parties can exert maximum influence and maintain operational readiness for any potential political shifts in Iranian Kurdistan (East Kurdistan).”
The groups have been meeting regularly, and leadership is apparently rotated among them. There is also an objective to create a Joint Cooperation Platform, which is described as a “strategic blueprint designed to unify the Kurdish political voice and prepare for governance or crisis management should conditions in Iran shift.”
Five Kurdish parties have signed on to this platform. These include the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), the Komala Party of Kurdistan (led by Reza Kaabi), and the Khabat Organization of Iranian Kurdistan.
The following two parties have not signed on: the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan (led by Abdullah Mohtadi) and Komala – Organization of the Communist Party of Iran (led by Ibrahim Alizadeh).
It should be noted that of the three different Komala groups, one of them is part of the platform and two are not. This creates a confusing situation. However, fragmentation among Kurdish groups has often been an issue for Kurds in Iran. The PDKI, for instance, used to have an offshoot confusingly called PKD-I.
Even though two groups are not part of the platform, the dispute appears to be related to minor ideological issues. This is the kind of issue that unsurprisingly affects the more left-leaning and Communist types.
The more nationalist Kurdish opposition groups, such as PAK and PDKI, have signed on.
The Rojhelat report notes, “experts suggest that even if certain factions remain outside the formal alliance, the synergy between PDKI and PJAK effectively creates a formidable ‘power pole.’” This partnership is expected to bolster the Kurdish movement’s success in both domestic mobilization and international diplomacy.