During his November 11 speech, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu outlined his political vision for the aftermath of Hamas’s defeat in the Gaza Strip. He emphasized that Israel would maintain a security presence in Gaza post-Hamas, explicitly stating no intention of transferring control to the Palestinian Authority (PA). Simultaneously, he firmly rejected the prospect of establishing Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip in the future.
Opposing the rule of the PA in Gaza is a crucial decision for the country’s security. Strategically, there is no distinction between the goals of Hamas and the PA; both aim to destroy Israel and its citizens. The disparity lies in ideology (Islamism vs nationalism) and tactics (immediate destruction vs gradual and continuous harm to Israel).
It’s important to note that under the rule of the PA, Gaza also did not resemble Singapore, and there was little difference in the level of animosity toward Israel, the promotion of terrorism, and the actual acts of terrorism. Rocket launches from Gaza to Israel began years before Hamas took control in 2007, with numerous deadly attacks against Jewish settlements in Gaza. The PA’s education system also encouraged assaults on Jews and advocated for the destruction of Israel.
Despite their political and ideological differences, Fatah and Hamas collaborated in both Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip during the Second Intifada.
Additionally, the PA has been a political failure, evident in the forceful takeover by Hamas in Gaza in 2007. Over the past decades in areas A and B in Judea and Samaria, it is Israel’s intelligence and military power that have been instrumental in preventing a coup and the ascension of Hamas.
Moreover, there has been a recent surge in terrorism, particularly in northern Samaria, including Jenin and Nablus. In these areas where the PA struggles to establish and maintain rule, Israel faces significant challenges. The PA’s governance is marred by corruption, nonprofessionalism, and a lack of control in many areas, posing a continuous threat to the citizens of the State of Israel.
The PA incites against the State of Israel
FURTHERMORE, IT is crucial to underscore the PA’s ongoing incitement against the State of Israel, its citizens, and Jews, propagated through its education system, culture, sports, and various avenues. This extends to a systematic economic policy that incentivizes violence against Jews, evidenced by the PA’s payments to the families of terrorists.
In light of these factors, the reinstatement of the PA in the Gaza Strip not only fails to present a political solution for Gaza but exacerbates the problem. Taking such a step would risk Israel’s eventual regression to a state reminiscent of its situation pre-October 7, 2023.
In conjunction with the prudent decision to prevent the return of the PA to Gaza, it is essential to recognize the grave and strategic error of artificially segregating “security” rule from “civilian” rule in Gaza. This division is inherently flawed, as genuine security will be elusive without a sustained Israeli civilian presence on the ground.
History demonstrates that in regions devoid of Jewish settlements, Israeli security forces eventually withdrew, resulting in the transformation of those areas into terrorist bases.
This pattern has manifested in various parts of Judea and Samaria, Lebanon, Gaza, and even, albeit to a lesser extent, in Sinai. There’s no reason to assume that a similar scenario won’t unfold in Gaza once again. Without an Israeli civilian presence, the IDF forces, lacking a military purpose, are likely to depart, providing an opportunity for Palestinian terrorism to resurface.
Moreover, Israeli settlement in Gaza offers advantages such as enhanced freedom of action for security forces, improved protection with the addition of civilian security forces, and the acquisition of a high-quality, long-term intelligence picture.
Strategic architectural planning may involve breaking up the territory into different segments, facilitating better control for security forces. Similar to the situation in Judea and Samaria, settlements in Gaza would provide crucial support and both physical and spiritual assistance to soldiers in the field who understand the purpose behind their presence.
Simultaneously, Israel should resist the return of the hundreds of thousands of Gaza residents who evacuated to the southern Gaza Strip. Efforts should be made, whether individually or through agreements with regional countries, to encourage them to relocate, likely to Sinai. Time constraints might intensify tensions between Gazans at the Egyptian border and Egyptian security forces, potentially leading to concessions or forceful attempts by refugees to enter Egypt at any cost.
This presents Israel with a historic and unparalleled opportunity to reshape the threat landscape, alter the demographic balance in the region, and rectify the moral and strategic injustices associated with the 2005 disengagement plan that removed some 9,000 Israeli citizens from their homes in Gaza.
The country’s leaders should not let this opportunity slip away, and certainly, they should avoid loudly announcing their renunciation of it to the entire world in advance.
The writer has a PhD in political studies. He is a military strategy and national security expert and a researcher at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS) and at the Israel Defense and Security Forum (Habithonistim).