When Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee chair Yuli Edelstein was ousted by the executive the other week, few were surprised. That, in itself, is telling. His offense was neither scandal nor incompetence, but something far more dangerous in Israeli politics: He tried to do his job. By overseeing the government’s handling of the ever-contentious conscription law, Edelstein committed the cardinal sin of acting like a legislator with independent authority.
The ease with which the executive replaced him was not just a matter of political housekeeping. It was a reminder that the legislature, despite its formal status, has never really been allowed to operate as a coequal branch of government. Its independence is more theoretical than real; its ability to check the executive is mostly symbolic.
While public debate rages over the tug-of-war between the judiciary and the executive, few seem to notice the more fundamental imbalance: The legislature was never seriously in the game to begin with.
Since the days of David Ben-Gurion, members of the governing coalition have been subject to micromanagement by the executive on nearly all matters of consequence. Independent legislative initiative is rare and discouraged. The opposition, meanwhile, exists largely to oppose noisily and ineffectively. True, some legislation occasionally squeaks through without government backing. However, anything of genuine importance is shaped and steered by the executive itself.
The consequences are not hard to predict. With no real power comes little real responsibility. Void of comparative influence, many MKs act out their roles as political pawns. They issue dramatic statements and perform rhetorical somersaults, often in hopes of vaulting from parliament to the cabinet. Bipartisan cooperation is scarce. Time that should be spent scrutinizing bills and overseeing the executive is instead spent talking lavishly on radio interviews, morning shows, and podcasts.
A misaligned structure
To be fair, the blame does not lie entirely with the legislators. The structural incentives are misaligned. The system rewards loyalty over competence and performance over substance.
In recent years, several serious institutional proposals have been put forward to restore balance between the branches of government.
Among the more notable proposals is a plan for a senate put forward by my former colleagues, Dr. Sagi Barmak and Amiad Cohen, which has received considerable media attention. Their proposal is just one among many, some of which offer real potential. Yet as long as the executive continues to dominate the Knesset unchecked, the chamber will remain what it too often is: performative, loud, and largely hollow.
Fixing this chronic imbalance will not be easy, to say the least. While many see the next election as yet another referendum on Bibi, a more thoughtful citizen should look beyond personalities and back the party or candidate serious about institutional repair. A reformed Knesset, independent, competent, and assertive, would be better positioned to scrutinize executive action regardless of who sits in the Prime Minister’s Office.
This would serve both sides of the aisle. For the Right, which has long demanded greater democratic control over state institutions, a strong Knesset could serve as a more legitimate counterweight than the judiciary. For the Left, now in opposition, legislative independence would offer a genuine avenue to shape policy, fulfill campaign promises, and work across the aisle. Instead of sprinting across Givat Ram to the Supreme Court with another urgent petition in hand, opposition leaders could finally do their job from their own office.
What is needed now
There are three things to look out for that are essential to treating this institutional malaise: (1) separation, (2) representation, and (3) professionalism.
Separation: A modern aircraft may be what passengers see, but it relies on far more than the cockpit crew. Air traffic controllers chart the course. Ground teams refuel, inspect, and coordinate departures. Each plays a separate role. No captain is expected to fly the plane, guide it from the tower, and handle operations on the tarmac. He might manage for a while, but not for long, and certainly not safely.
The same applies to government. When the executive starts drafting laws, implementing them, and managing its own oversight, the system drifts. Legislators are meant to define direction, not just echo commands from the cockpit. Concentrated power may be efficient. It is rarely stable.
Two distinct jobs exist: The MK scrutinizes and legislates; the minister governs. The so-called Norwegian Law, which allows ministers to temporarily resign their Knesset seats and then re-enter, has turned parliament into a revolving door. Disgraced or sidelined ministers are rewarded with legislative sinecures, while party loyalists are shuffled in and out of Knesset like pieces on a board.
A better model is obvious: Once appointed to the cabinet, ministers should forfeit their Knesset seats until re-elected. No exceptions. It may come with a modest price tag, but Israelis would likely prefer a slightly more expensive government that works to a cheaper one that doesn’t. Lawmakers would focus on lawmaking. Ministers would run ministries. This would create fewer absences, fewer distractions, and far less political musical chairs.
Representation: The electoral threshold, currently set at 3.25%, was designed to keep fringe parties out and protect the larger ones. However, the threshold now does the opposite of what was intended. Instead of creating order, it encourages chaos. It pushes parties into awkward mergers, forces voters to vote tactically, and makes the Knesset harder to navigate, not easier.
What we get instead is a field full of medium-sized parties with no real ideological spine, held together by fear of falling below the line. Consider United Torah Judaism, where hassidim and litvaks (Lithuanians), after centuries of rivalry, now campaign on the same list, not because they’ve reconciled, but because they have no better option. Or take The Democrats, the product of a merger between Meretz and Labor, whose main shared platform is that they still exist.
Without the threshold, these unnatural alliances could break apart. Parties could run on what they actually believe, and legislators could get back to legislating. Political negotiation would return to the floor of the Knesset, where it belongs, instead of being jammed into pre-election deals and post-election power plays.
And new voices, like a hypothetical, Zionist modern haredi (ultra-Orthodox) party, might finally gain a foothold. Even a single seat could offer a constructive way forward on issues like the conscription law. That would do far more for governance than another stitched-together coalition with no purpose beyond staying in power.
Professionalism: Flowing naturally from separation and representation is professionalism. A member of Knesset who knows his job is in the Knesset is far more likely to take it seriously. He will spend less time currying favor with ministers and more time legislating, overseeing, and building political capital where it belongs – in parliament.
This would shift incentives. Instead of seeing the Knesset as a waiting room for ministerial promotion, lawmakers might begin to treat it as a career in its own right. In the United States, senators and representatives can become national figures without ever entering the executive branch. Power accumulates with seniority, expertise, and committee leadership. There is no reason Israel should not follow suit.
A legislature filled with long-serving, ideologically coherent, policy-focused parliamentarians would be better for everyone. It would reduce the revolving door of disposable MKs and create lawmakers who actually understand the portfolios they scrutinize. And it would serve voters, who might finally be represented by politicians more interested in passing laws than in chasing ministerial titles.
Israel’s constitutional dysfunction is not new, and it is not going away on its own. But a system that separates powers clearly, reflects real ideological diversity, and treats the Knesset as something more than a launchpad for ministries would be a start. It might even look like a parliament.
The writer is a political consultant and former director at Hashiloach, a journal of policy. He founded its English-language edition, Hashiloach Frontlines, and was an organizer of the Hertog Forum on national security.