Social media has become a central battlefield for disinformation, posing a growing threat to democracies where public opinion shapes policy and elections. In recent years, new technologies — including artificial intelligence — have made these campaigns faster, cheaper, and more disruptive than ever before. Hostile actors can now flood the digital space with content that appears authentic, exploits algorithms to amplify their reach, and push false narratives into mainstream debate almost instantly.
The danger is especially acute in liberal democracies, where perceptions of “what the public thinks” strongly influence leaders and decision-makers. This is not a distant or abstract concern; it is happening now, at scale and with increasing sophistication. For Israel, a liberal democracy surrounded by adversaries eager to sow despair and division, the risk is even greater. Disinformation campaigns threaten national security and, therefore, require constant monitoring by the relevant authorities.
The ISNAD Campaign
One of the disinformation campaigns is called ISNAD, a digital initiative that emerged in late 2023, after the Hamas-led October 7 massacre and the war against Hamas that followed. It presented itself as a volunteer network supporting the Palestinian cause. Tens of thousands of participants, coordinated through Telegram, flooded social media - mainly X - with posts in Hebrew and other languages, often impersonating Israeli citizens. While it looked like a civilian initiative, ISNAD’s scale, discipline, and ideological alignment with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood suggested something else: a prototype of influence operations that could threaten Western democracies.
At the center of the initiative stands filmmaker Ezzeldeen Dwidar, a former Muslim Brotherhood supporter who left Egypt for Turkey after supposedly distancing himself from the movement. However, the campaign’s narratives align closely with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, raising the possibility that the “civilian” façade masks the hand of a strategic actor. Behind the activism lies a political weapon directed not only against Israel, but potentially also against Egypt, Jordan, and other American and Israeli allies.
Orchestrated Chaos, Not Grassroots Activism
ISNAD stood out due to its size and discipline. Tens of thousands of participants operated through Telegram, while most impersonation activity occurred on X. They employed artificial intelligence, automation, and social media tactics to pose as authentic Israelis. Outwardly, it appeared to be grassroots activism; in practice, it was organized and professional. Research indicates the presence of a managerial layer guiding volunteers, supported by experts familiar with Israeli society, graphic designers, and technical specialists.
Digital Infiltration
By creating Hebrew posts and fake Israeli profiles, ISNAD sought to penetrate Israel’s domestic debate and shape the conversation from within. Its goal was to erode trust, amplify divisions, and weaken social resilience. The campaign also described itself as the “digital arm of the resistance,” acting in line with Hamas’ perceived interests, including calls to end the war.
ISNAD made headlines when a post inciting violence against Prime Minister Netanyahu’s family was treated as an authentic threat—until it was exposed as hostile and external.
The Tunnel Strategy
ISNAD showed unusual resilience. When platforms deleted accounts, new ones quickly appeared. Leaders compared the process to tunnels being destroyed and rebuilt—always returning, sometimes stronger. This persistence, combined with evolving tactics, enabled ISNAD to adjust its objectives in response to strategic developments. During the June 2025 Twelve-Day War with Iran, for example, the campaign shifted to demoralizing Israeli civilians, even beyond its Hamas-focused messaging.
Why the West Should Care
The implications go far beyond Israel. ISNAD’s methods—emotional flooding of discourse, impersonation of citizens, use of advanced tools, and disciplined coordination—create a model others may replicate. Unlike Russian troll farms, ISNAD leveraged civilian-style activism, mobilizing large numbers of “volunteers” rather than relying only on trained professionals.
Lessons to Learn
Democracies facing similar threats should take note:
- Look beneath the surface: Grassroots activism may be a coordinated campaign.
- Recognize the target: Manipulation increasingly aims at internal cohesion, not just external image.
- Expect persistence: Once exposed, such networks adapt and regenerate quickly.
- Build resilience: Societies need media literacy, trusted institutions, and stronger detection tools.
ISNAD is not just another disinformation effort in the Middle East. It reflects how influence campaigns are evolving—organized, adaptive, and designed to penetrate domestic debate. For Western democracies, the challenge is not only to counter ISNAD but to prepare for future campaigns built on the same model. Understanding ISNAD today means being better prepared for tomorrow. Most importantly, the sheer volume of inauthentic users poses a direct risk to authentic public discourse, making it harder for societies to separate genuine civic voices from coordinated, foreign manipulation.
The author is a Senior Researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).
This op-ed is published in partnership with a coalition of organizations that fight antisemitism across the world. Read the previous article by Sacha Stawski.