The recent statement from the Izzadin al-Qassam Brigades about the death of Mohammed Sinwar and the tribute to Abu Obeida marks more than just a delayed military update or another name added to the list of losses.

It is a political and security admission, full of consequences. In practice, it signals the end of one phase of Hamas leadership and the forced beginning of another. In this new phase, the movement focuses on avoiding collapse rather than leading a project or rebuilding its authority.

In ideological groups like this, the death of major symbolic figures is only admitted when hiding the loss becomes impossible. Hamas, which spent decades perfecting ambiguity and narrative control, did not choose transparency willingly. It had no choice. Silence stopped working as protection, and admitting the truth became less damaging than keeping up the pretense.

The real importance lies not just in Sinwar’s death (which many already knew about) or in Abu Obeida’s symbolism alone. It comes from the timing and the way the announcement was made. A new military spokesman delivered it, combining tributes to several leaders in one single message. This does not show smooth continuity. It reveals an emergency restructuring of the leadership story under heavy pressure.

This is where the new Hamas starts to appear. The movement is no longer run through a balance between its political wing and military arm, or through symbolic figures who both mobilize people and keep control. Decisions now stay within small military and security circles. The main goal is no longer taking the initiative or growing stronger. It is holding the ranks together and stopping further breakdown.

Abu Obaida, the spokesman of the Izz el-Deen al-Qassam Brigades, gestures as he speaks during an anti-Israel military show in the southern Gaza Strip November 11, 2019.
Abu Obaida, the spokesman of the Izz el-Deen al-Qassam Brigades, gestures as he speaks during an anti-Israel military show in the southern Gaza Strip November 11, 2019. (credit: REUTERS/Ibraheem Abu Mustafa/File Photo)

Hamas chain of command damaged by war

The war has steadily targeted Hamas’s structure: its organization, its sources of power, and its command chain. With less support from regional countries and changes in the wider world, the group now faces a harsh new reality: an exhausted organization with little political depth and no real protection. In such conditions, you do not rebuild leadership. You just try to manage the crisis.

This change inside Hamas cannot be separated from the way Israel has broken the deterrent image the movement relied on for so long in its words and actions. Israel has shown it can fight a long war across multiple fronts, mixing conventional battles with guerrilla tactics, while keeping operational superiority.

Even more important, this superiority came mainly from intelligence. Israel penetrated Hamas’s command structure, followed decision-making lines, and steadily eliminated both field commanders and symbolic figures. These targeted killings not only reduced fighting strength.

They destroyed the whole idea of deterrence. The movement went from one that built up threats to one now operating under constant pressure, forced to admit losses after losing the ability to hide them or use them for political gain.

Here, the analysis needs to go beyond counting losses and into the real issue. What is left of a movement that has lost its leaders, its story, and its ability to take action, leaving only damage control? In times of such open weakness, the question becomes unavoidable: are we seeing a movement trying to rebuild, or just an organization trying to hold on to whatever remains?

Hamas’s own history points to the latter. In 2006, it entered politics as a way to rise, then turned against the whole political process the moment it blocked its hold on power. Politics was never a matter of principle for Hamas; it was a tool used when convenient. Today’s talk of political change inside Hamas follows the same path. It comes from a much weaker position.

Hamas negotiates from exposure rather than strength or ambition. Gaza has become a place it can neither control nor govern freely. It has gone through military and geographical changes. Holding weapons fails to translate into governance, or even long-term survival. So any political shift is not a real strategy. It is simply an attempt to reduce the cost of staying alive under total siege.

The writer is a UAE political analyst and former Federal National Council candidate.