American policy toward Iran has oscillated between two inefficient poles: negotiations that grant time and resources to a predatory regime, and military signaling that stops short of regime change. A serious Iran policy requires an alternative that is politically legible to Iranians and operationally legible to US President Donald Trump and allied governments. Today, that alternative exists in Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi.
The standard is about leadership capacity. Movements succeed when they can mobilize the nation, message discipline, and demand international coordination– especially when the regime’s core advantage is repression. Pahlavi has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to mobilize at scale within and across Iranian borders, while translating public energy into a coherent set of actionable policy demands.
Mobilization at scale: Inside Iran and across the Diaspora
In early January, the unprecedented multi-million-person uprising inside Iran followed Pahlavi’s call for mobilization. Shortly thereafter, on 14 February, large-scale rallies abroad, organized under the Global Day of Action – with Munich’s Theresienwiese as the central gathering, concurrent with the Munich Security Conference, and more than 250,000 Iranians in attendance according to Munich police – brought together Iranians from Europe and North America. Taken together, Munich, Toronto, and Los Angeles – along with rallies in other cities – drew attendance of more than a million, making it the largest coordinated Iranian-diaspora mobilization ever.
This suggests a rare capability: mobilizing domestically under severe constraints while also coordinating disciplined participation abroad. That inside-and-outside organizational capacity is what turns revolutionary energy into sustained political leverage capable of driving regime change and a successful transitional government.
The six-demand framework
Pahlavi’s latest message to Iranians abroad is, in effect, a field manual for turning diaspora freedom into leverage for compatriots who face lethal costs at home. He asks the diaspora to become more coordinated, more disciplined, and more focused – and he directs that energy around a defined agenda.
The agenda is a six-demand framework: protect Iranians by degrading the regime’s repression apparatus; maximize economic pressure by targeting assets and sanctions evasion – including oil-shipping networks described as a ghost fleet; expand resilient internet access; expel regime officials and prosecute those accused of crimes against humanity; free political prisoners; and prepare for a democratic transition in Iran and recognize the transitional government.
This is precisely what American and allied policy has lacked. They often invoke support for “human rights” – but without a counterpart to coordinate action with, such declarations remain symbolic. Many Iranians oppose the Islamic Republic, and many voices deserve respect. But only one figure has shown the combination of national recognition, organizational reach, and strategic clarity necessary to serve as an operational counterpart.
Washington’s role: engage, coordinate coercion, flip loyalty
If Pahlavi can mobilize inside Iran and coordinate disciplined action in the diaspora, American policy should be structured to engage that capacity as its operational counterpart.
That means three practical steps.
1) Formal engagement. American officials should meet with Reza Pahlavi openly and regularly – alongside Israeli and European governments – so that policy aligns with the diaspora mobilization rather than running in parallel. If American officials are willing to talk to the regime emissaries, they should be willing to talk to the most consequential figure organizing pressure against the regime.
2) Pair military action with a credible counterpart. Deterrence and compliance have not changed Tehran’s behavior, so the threat environment must be altered. American military action is necessary but should be coordinated with a politically and operationally legible counterpart capable of amplifying its effects through internal mobilization. In other words, external coercion should reinforce – and be reinforced by – internal mobilization enabled by Pahlavi’s demonstrated leadership capacity.
3) Accelerate internal unraveling by making departure safer than loyalty. The regime’s advantage is not legitimacy: it is loyalty. A logical strategy therefore, has to make departure from the regime safer than continued service. This requires shifting incentives for the regime’s coercive and administrative pillars by pairing pressure with credible assurances.
The American government should communicate clear off-ramps for those who disengage: protection for defectors, pathways for safe exit, and conditional leniency for non-violent functionaries who stand down and facilitate a peaceful transition. This is in accordance with Pahlavi’s vision for a successful transition. The objective is straightforward: raise the cost of obedience, lower the risk of defection, and make a rapid internal unraveling more likely than prolonged confrontation in the streets.
The democratic alternative capable of governing
Trump does not have to choose between negotiations that prolong the regime’s lifespan and military signaling that stops short of political effect. A successful Iran policy should pair military action with a politically and operationally legible alternative leader who has a viable transition pathway.
Hence, for a successful regime change, the president should coordinate military action with the democratic alternative who is capable of mobilizing, and most crucially, governing Iran: Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi.
The author holds a PhD in International Relations from Queen’s University.