“President Trump was curious to know why they [the Iranians] did not surrender,” wondered the US special envoy, Steve Witkoff. Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, replied: “Because we are Iranians.”
The outcome is well known: Iran’s hardline stance in the negotiations led the United States and Israel to launch an attack against it, aimed at targeting the leadership and weakening the foundations of the regime, in the hope that the Iranian people would complete the task.
The modern history of the region shows that this is not the first time rulers have faced overwhelming military power, Yet chose armed confrontation due to national and personal honor and fear of public humiliation.
Nasser and the 1956 Suez War
In July 1956, Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalized the Suez Canal Company. This meant that revenues from ships passing through the canal would go to Egypt rather than to the British-French joint company. The two powers, along with the international community through the UN, rushed to deal with the defiant leader. For about three months, various diplomatic manoeuvres were attempted, but all failed.
The tripartite collusion between Israel, Britain, and France on October 29, 1956, caught Nasser by surprise. Its aim was not only to regain control of the canal but also to overthrow his regime, seen as a major enemy of both the West and Israel. Yet Nasser quickly recovered.
On November 2, responding to an ultimatum to withdraw from the canal following Israel’s capture of Sinai, he declared in a speech: “We must decide: shall we fight or surrender? [I say] we shall fight for Egypt’s honor and freedom…We shall fight, and we shall not surrender.”
In the West and in Israel, this decision was viewed as irrational, since Nasser could not militarily confront two global powers and a regional power. The result is well known: Israel did capture Sinai but was soon forced to withdraw; Nasser survived, his regime and pan-Arabism were strengthened, while British Prime Minister Anthony Eden resigned in disgrace over the conspiracy.
Nasser’s gamble succeeded not only because Britain and France were declining powers, but because he enjoyed the backing of the Egyptian public and the wider Arab world. By contrast, his gamble in 1967 failed disastrously, but here too, he was pushed toward war partly due to considerations of honor and fear of humiliation.
Saddam Hussein and the Invasion of Kuwait, 1990
On August 2, 1990, Iraq’s president, Saddam Hussein, invaded and occupied Kuwait. In doing so, he not only seized control of roughly 10% of global oil production (and together with Iraq’s own, about 20%), but also posed a major challenge to international norms by effectively obliterating a UN member state. This set a dangerous precedent.
For about six months, negotiations were conducted with Iraq in an attempt to resolve the crisis, to no avail. Meanwhile, US President George H. W. Bush assembled a global military and political coalition and set a deadline for Saddam to withdraw: January 15, 1991.
The climax came on December 9, when Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz met US Secretary of State James Baker in Geneva, similar to the meeting between Iran’s Araghchi, Witkoff, and Kushner. After six hours of talks, no agreement was reached. At the last moment, the UN Secretary-General arrived in Baghdad, but after Saddam humiliated him – meeting him only after a 24-hour delay – no breakthrough was achieved.
Many wondered, just like Trump and Witkoff, why Saddam did not surrender. Saddam saw himself as a great Islamic conqueror like Saladin, or like Nasser – someone who could stand up to the West against all odds, survive, and perhaps even emerge as a hero.
At a press conference, he said, “Bush spoke only of our surrender. He did not speak of peace. Therefore, I tell him now: the days of surrender are over. The word ‘surrender’ does not exist in my dictionary.”
Saddam’s army was defeated within days, and he was forced to withdraw from Kuwait, yet he and his regime survived. Kurdish uprisings in the north and Shi‘ite uprisings in the south were brutally suppressed. The international community imposed economic sanctions, but these did not topple the regime. This only happened in 2003, when the United States invaded Iraq.
The War Against Iran
The discourse of honor has become central to the rhetoric of the current war. While Trump promised that “there will be no deal with Iran – only unconditional surrender,” Iran’s leaders and the Revolutionary Guards insist they will not surrender, that Trump will be eliminated, and that they will decide when the war ends. Given the heavy military blows Iran has been suffering, how can this be explained?
The humiliation of Jews is already mentioned in the Quran (Sura 3:112). More broadly, the history of Shia and Iran is replete with experiences of humiliation at the hands of outsiders – not necessarily Jews. The first was the defeat of Husayn, son of Caliph Ali, at the Battle of Karbala in 680, which led to the schism between Shi’ite and Sunni.
One of the sayings attributed to Husayn before his death is that he would never accept humiliation. Iran has also experienced numerous foreign conquests – from Alexander the Great to the Turks, Seljuks, Mongols, and finally Britain and Russia in the 20th century. All these left deep marks of defeat and humiliation in the Persian collective memory.
These cases demonstrate three common elements: First, A perception of the West and Israel as forces of darkness, seeking not only to topple regimes but also to humiliate the Arab and/or Islamic nation. Second, a serious miscalculation of the enemy’s capabilities, especially regarding its willingness to carry out threats.
And finally, willingness to endure hardship to survive without surrender, since public surrender leads to humiliation – something considered worse than death and likely to result in loss of power.
Therefore, from the Iranian regime’s perspective, survival means victory. The very fact of surviving against global and regional powers prevents humiliation and preserves honor.
The importance of honor should not be attributed only to Arabs or Muslims. In truth, no one relishes defeat or surrender, regardless of culture. Trump, too, is obsessed with his own honor and that of the American nation.
The terms “honor” and “humiliation” run through his speeches. Already in his 2016 Republican nomination speech, he spoke of repeated humiliations suffered by the nation in Somalia, Syria, and Libya. The idea of “making America great again” can be seen to a large extent as an attempt to restore lost national honor.
Everyone wants honor, but this is an elusive term. Sometimes it comes after military defeat – as with Nasser in 1956; sometimes it is severely damaged- as with Nasser in 1967 and Saddam Hussein in 1991. How this will end with Iran is still too early to tell, but it is clear that honor plays a central role in the current conflict.
The writer teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, is a board member of Mitvim, and a member of the Coalition for Regional Security. He thanks Yosef Mahfoud Levy for his assistance in preparing this article.