Meron commission of inquiry should restore state's authority - opinion

The Mount Meron disaster as a lesson in absent governance

YA’ACOV LITZMAN speaks to a man during the Lag Ba’omer celebration on Mount Meron last Thursday. (photo credit: DAVID COHEN/FLASH 90)
YA’ACOV LITZMAN speaks to a man during the Lag Ba’omer celebration on Mount Meron last Thursday.
(photo credit: DAVID COHEN/FLASH 90)
 The terrible tragedy that occurred in Israel in which 45 people were crushed to death during a mass religious gathering has sparked calls for a state commission of inquiry. But what exactly would the commission be investigating?
Commissions of inquiry, which are established by the government or by the Knesset’s State Control Committee, are appointed ad hoc to investigate specific issues defined in its mandate. Commission members are appointed by the president of the Supreme Court, and the commission disbands upon the submission of its final report. Such commissions are usually headed by a retired Supreme Court justice.
Over the course of Israeli history, 18 state commissions of inquiry have been established, most of them in the wake of events of the highest public significance, such as the Yom Kippur War, the First Lebanon War, the assassination of prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, and the massacre of Muslim worshippers at the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron.
The authors of this article held senior positions on the most recent such commission, established in 2009 to investigate the state’s treatment of citizens evacuated from Gush Katif and northern Samaria as part of Israel’s disengagement from Gaza.
State commissions of inquiry generate extensive media coverage, and the Israeli public has great faith in them as a measure employed only sparingly – the heavy artillery reserved for special cases of the highest national import. The recent tragedy in Meron – unparalleled in Israeli civilian life – surely justifies the establishment of such a commission.
And yet, are commissions of inquiry really an effective tool for changing reality? In general, the answer is no. Although these commissions are vested with legal authority, especially with regard to collecting evidence, their recommendations have no legal force, and the government can disregard them, or selectively decide which ones to adopt. Moreover, the commissions dissolve once their conclusions have been submitted, and therefore have no power to monitor the implementation of their recommendations. 
Given this gap between inquiry commissions’ formal but unenforceable power to shape reality and their high public visibility, one may well suspect the institution of being an empty cover. It gives the appearance of serious treatment of a matter of great public interest but actually silences debate – and all without the government, which bears responsibility – having to change its course.
Nonetheless, the commission of inquiry on which we served did succeed in changing reality. In retrospect, we can say that the commission played a decisive role in advancing the rehabilitation of the Gush Katif evacuees and bringing a close to their ordeal. The government and the evacuees, who were at odds for years, accepted the commission’s determinations in full and acted accordingly. What was the secret of the commission’s success? Why did everyone view it as the “responsible adult” whose recommendations should be followed?
A JOINT STUDY we conducted after the commission finished its work found that the key to its success was the unique triple role it took upon itself. In addition to its investigative function, i.e., examining the actions and omissions of the relevant authorities, it served as a remedial and rehabilitative commission. Its three complementary functions were to examine past events (investigatory role); to offer practical recommendations for the future (remedial role); and to try to heal the rift between the state and the disengagement evacuees, while addressing their emotional/social needs and reaffirming their sense of worth (rehabilitative role).
Its decision, in principle, to look forward and find a way to improve and rectify the existing situation, and not merely to assign blame to those involved, earned it the trust of both sides. Everyone appreciated the sincere effort of the commission to fulfill its remedial and rehabilitative roles.
The commission of inquiry established in the wake the Mount Meron disaster should take the same approach – at once investigative, remedial, and rehabilitative. Identifying those directly to blame for the catastrophe, though necessary, will not be enough. Ensuring future arrangements for the Meron site – via the commission’s recommendations – is also a task of limited scope, relative to what needs to be done.
The critical issue the commission will have to address is the fact that the State of Israel allows autonomous societal groups to conduct their affairs outside the rule of law, with far-reaching consequences. Mount Meron had become a symbol of extraterritoriality, run by a variety of stakeholders, where Israeli governance did not apply, and was therefore fertile ground for disaster. Governmental authority is being similarly flouted by the Bedouin in the Negev, by Arab crime in Israel’s Arab localities, and by the hilltop youth in parts of Samaria. In all of these places, further disasters are lurking for us.
Although each example merits a separate analysis, the common denominator is the state’s practical abdication of its authority and responsibility in the face of strong-willed minority groups. The commission of inquiry should bring this pathological reality into the public consciousness, map its various manifestations, elucidate its immediate and long-term implications for Israeli civil society as a whole, and propose a plan for restoring governance to all geographic areas. And it must do so in a way that reflects high social sensitivity toward Israel’s minorities, but without flinching from the inevitable resulting frictions.
Forty-five Israeli citizens perished, not just because of the wrong decisions of an engineer, a police officer or a government minister, but due to the state’s absent governance. A commission of inquiry will only merit its “state” status if its mandate and composition allow it to offer a practical, detailed and farsighted proposal for rectifying the failures of governance exemplified in the Mount Meron disaster.
The Israeli political system has trouble ensuring that the authority and responsibility for what transpires in all parts of the country lie with the sovereign state. This is due to the country’s decentralized system of governance, which empowers the extremes. A commission of inquiry with the appropriate gravitas and wide public backing should restore governance to the state, and affirm that authority and responsibility are both in the hands of the state. This will spare us further tragedies.
Yedidia Stern is president of the Jewish People Policy Institute and a professor of law at Bar-Ilan University. Dr. Haim Zicherman teaches law at Ono Academic College.