"Throughout Lebanon's history," says the Florida Atlantic University professor, "you didn't have so many different people, from all the factions, sitting together and discussing serious issues from a Lebanese point of view. The Taif Accords were brokered in Saudi Arabia."

Opposition protesters wave Lebanese flags during a demonstration against Syria in the Martyrs square in Beirut, March 7, 2005.
Photo: AP

The meetings have broached sensitive issues, such as the demarcation of borders between Lebanon and Syria (which is a roundabout way to decide who really owns, and therefore should fight for, the Shabaa Farms) and the fate of militias meant to disarm according to UN Security Council Resolution 1559. But the question remains as to whether the Lebanese can solve these issues without sparking a civil war.

On a positive note, Berri, the Parliament speaker, has already told reporters that Lebanese leaders have agreed to disarm Palestinian groups outside the confines of the country's dozen refugee camps. Then again, the Palestinians are hardly a major political-military force on the scene.

"They are an easy target, a few hundred at most scattered in remote camps mainly along the Lebanese-Syrian border," says the source in Lebanon. "I have visited several of these camps, and apart from the PFLP-GC which are a fairly tough bunch and have the potential for mischief, the rest resemble retirement homes for grey-haired veterans of the Palestinian revolution."

Getting Hizbullah to surrender its weapons will be trickier. The party uses its role as a "resistance movement" to keep the loyalty of the Shi'ites and a central role in Lebanese politics, but it also knows the country wants the militia disarmed.

"They are looking for a face-saving solution, perhaps to serve as an auxiliary of the Lebanese army," says Marius Deeb of Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

It's a position also floated by UN special envoy Terje-Roed Larsen. But its success depends on a delicate balance of not cornering Hizbullah while, at the same time, not losing the March 14 majority of Druse, Christian and Sunni constituents.

Choosing paralysis

In a similar vein, Deeb has suggested that, as a consensus position, the Lebanese might accept the legal fiction that Shabaa Farms is Lebanese while leaving its "liberation" to diplomacy rather than guerrilla warfare. But again, this is avoiding the heart of the matter.

Shehadi, from Chatham House, says no one has the stomach for more fighting, which is what would occur if the Lebanese army tried to forcibly shut down Hizbullah or go into the refugee camps.

"In a nutshell, national reconciliation offers two choices: internal confrontation or paralysis," he says. "I think the Lebanese will choose paralysis."

Whatever the hopes of the Cedar Revolutionaries and the intentions of the politicians, Syria and Iran still hold the keys to Lebanon's domestic tranquility. And just as Syria has been ducking the UN investigation into the Hariri murder, it - along with Iran - will continue to make trouble with Hizbullah and the Palestinian rejectionists.

"Nothing good will come of the national reconciliation meetings," says Zisser. "The Lebanese may get rid of Lahoud, but he only has a year left to his term anyway."