German-Israel relations are under the spotlight as Iran races to become a nuclear power.
By AMIR MIZROCH, JPOST CORRESPONDENT IN BERLINmerkel knesset 224.88(photo credit: AP)
Sixty years after World War II and the Holocaust, and according to intelligence sources approximately 18 months until Iran can create a nuclear bomb, the diplomatic relationship between Israel and Germany is moving into high gear as Jerusalem presses Berlin to lead the EU in isolating Teheran. Jerusalem and Berlin agree that Iran is the biggest destabilizing force in the Middle East, but disagree on how to deal with that threat. Israel, working behind the scenes to isolate Iran diplomatically and financially, is frustrated at the continued trade between German industrialists and Iran.
Israel wants Germany to sever all trade and diplomatic ties with Iran [Israel is a much bigger trade partner to Germany than Iran is], and would like Berlin to implement sanctions out of the UN Security Council framework as that is being sabotaged by Russia and China.
The loss of trade between Germany, the largest economy in Europe, and Iran, would be insignificant for Germany, but would hurt Iran, especially in sensitive engineering sectors such as natural gas technologies. So why doesn't Berlin cut off trade, Israeli officials ask. Firstly, the Germans say they already have. The volume of trade between Berlin and Teheran has fallen by €5 billion in the past several years, but due to the increase in worldwide prices the value of trade has remained pretty much the same.
Secondly, Germany's trade policies are deeply fused with those of the 27-member EU. Any trade boycotts of Iran or actions on the macro level must be done within the framework of the EU, and the chances of that happening are slim indeed. One need not look far across Europe to find examples of trade with Iran: Italy's Fiat opened factories in Iran and the Swiss and Austrians have cut some very large deals with the Islamic Republic recently.
While several big German companies have left Iran, their place has been filled by smaller German firms [Iranians are buying more German cars now than ever before]. Chancellor Angela Merkel is not fond of all the trade between German firms and Iran, but she is not in a position to stop it altogether. She meets with one industrialist after another and tries to convince them to divest from Iran - sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't. But Germany is a free country, and one cannot impose nor enforce blanket trade restrictions.
One of the arguments expressed by German manufacturers to the Merkel government's pleas to stop trading with Iran is that other nations speedily fill in any trade gaps left by their absence, especially Russia, China, France, Italy [now Iran's largest trading partner in Europe] and Switzerland. In the face of such market realities, moral arguments are difficult to maintain, officials here say. German industrialists would much rather the Merkel government show them what it is doing to stop others from moving in on their absence in the Iranian market than hear another official telling them that Iran is putting Israel in mortal danger and that because of this they must withdraw their operations lock, stock and barrel.
Still, there are certain sectors in which German firms are market leaders and which Iran does not believe Russian or Chinese models can equal for quality. The threat of withdrawal of those products and services is an important "stick" the Germans wield in their negotiations with the Iranians on its nuclear drive.
In the meantime, the German government is acting. In the not to distant past, Iranians tried to buy "sensitive" [dual purpose] goods in Germany, but were stopped by the authorities.
Bilateral sanctions have been effective to a degree, especially sanctions on Iran's financial and banking sector, with several branches of Iranian banks being closed in Germany, a halt to trade in goods and services that could have dual use in the nuclear sphere and sanctions on Iran's liquefied natural gas sector [an energy embargo would be seen in the EU as punishing the population]. But the rise in the price of oil has largely counteracted this. Russia's intransigence has also taken some pressure off the Iranians. The leverage and influence of Western states on Iran is waning as China, hungry for energy, opens its markets to Teheran. Iran is increasingly looking to Asia for trade, including in goods and services that were previously only available in Germany and other European states.
The next steps by Germany, should Iran not cooperate with the E3+3 freeze-for-freeze proposal, would be harsher financial services sanctions [including insurance] that would make trade with Iran harder. Of course, the real stick is a possible military intervention by the US or Israel. The carrots are allowing Iran back into international markets and ending its diplomatic isolation.
Turning to Israel's pressure on Germany to isolate Iran, officials here would like their Israeli counterparts to keep one thing in mind: There are very frequent contacts between Berlin and Teheran on the diplomatic level, and the two countries are engaged in talks on a wide variety of subjects, including the nuclear standoff, the war in Afghanistan, trade and other issues. Germany believes it needs to be engaged with everyone, including the Iranians, Syrians, Lebanese and others. When Israel asks Germany to be tougher on Iran, it makes those diplomatic contacts harder to maintain. Officials here don't believe it is in Jerusalem's interests for Teheran to stop talking to Berlin, as the cessation of such contacts would only push Teheran further into the arms of Moscow and Beijing. This is not good for Israel, officials here, who say they have Israel's best interests at heart, say.
Israel is not convinced, and allows itself to say things in Germany that it cannot say in other capitals. In talks between Israeli and German diplomats, the former will use German historical responsibility towards the state of Israel as a tool to move the German government into action. As it becomes increasingly obvious that diplomatic and financial sanctions are not working and that Iran is racing towards nuclear power, and when German firms continue to do business with Iran, as in the Steiner gas deal example [the German company that provided Iran with high-tech gas plants] it is not uncommon to hear Israeli officials saying to their German counterparts: "Germany, gas, Iran, Ahmadinejad - what will people think, how will it look? Are these the morals that German exports are based on? Have you already forgotten the past?"
It is not clear what kind of impact these appeals to the past have on the current German administration on the one hand, and the private sector on the other. Both countries, on the official level, will keep the Holocaust on the national agenda. Germany is not running away from its past, but for an increasing amount of Germans, the Holocaust is not as important an event when factoring in German-Israel relations.
Despite this trend, on the whole, on the government level, official Germany is moving closer to Israel. The second largest lobby group in the Bundestag is the Germany-Israel Parliamentary group, which crosses party lines and has 110 members. Israel- German relations are, however, entering a new stage. Germany has done much in the service of Israel's security, but increasingly, Israel's expectations of Berlin are seen here as unrealistic. The highest levels of government believe that Germany does have a special obligation to Israel, but as time marches on, the Holocaust is becoming less and less important a factor in that calculation. Both countries are interested in "normalizing" relations - moving away from, although never forgetting, the past - and dealing more on the basis of current and future interests. Thus, Israel's appeal to the past to influence current German policy is not a long-term strategic asset, and not in Israel's interests.
Another example of the non-viable nature of the "appeal to the past" approach is that, by and large, German policy is EU policy, and EU policy is German policy. Germany is not able to take bold, unilateral strides across the world stage without its partners and rivals within the EU raising objections. It is not in Germany's interests to act in this way, a lesson it learned when it went against the EU consensus on America's war in Iraq. Germany is not looking to divide the EU; it is looking to be the leader that unites its 27 nations. Appeals to the past, while still finding an attentive ear in Berlin, only find an attentive ear there, and not in Brussels, Paris, and Rome.
Israel, therefore, has to charter an increasingly sophisticated policy in Europe, by recognizing Germany's limitations and not putting Berlin into tight spots. It is important to remember that the EU does not act unanimously.
What's worrying for Israel is the stark disconnect between the administration's clear understanding of the Iranian threat, and the near total indifference on the part of the German public. Many Germans feel wonder why, if Germany was surrounded by nuclear-armed states during the Cold War with no major catastrophe resulting from that, Israel is worried about the same scenario in the Middle East. What makes what are seen as the paranoid Israelis think something will happen now [Ahmadinejad oft repeated vow to wipe Israel off the map is perceived as bluster]. And in any case, Iran is so far away, it couldn't possibly harm Germany. Furthermore, there is also a not-insignificant proportion of Germans who think it unfair that Iran be denied nuclear power when Israel is perceived to possess it.
Another serious factor hampering Israel's public diplomacy campaign against Iran on German soil is the perceived linkage between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iran's nuclear ambitions. On this the German government and public agree: How can Israel paint itself as the victim of Iranian aggression when it is continuing to build settlements in the West Bank? The linkage, while extremely tenuous in reality, is palpable in German public opinion: You cannot be both a victim and an aggressor, the thinking goes. Israeli settlement construction and the receding probability of a two-state solution is a serious factor hampering Israeli efforts to convince the German public that the Jewish state is facing a mortal threat, and that Germany has a moral obligation to remove that threat.
In conclusion, while Germany is Israel's closest friend in Europe, Israel is not Germany's closest friend in Europe. It is important for Israelis to understand that when the phone rings at 3 a.m. in Chancellor Angela Merkel's bedroom, it's usually a call from Paris, London, Rome or Moscow. If she needs to get up, put on her nightgown and start making some serious calls, Merkel usually only gets to dial +9722 [Jerusalem] sometime after 5 a.m. - after first calling her immediate neighbors, even though her personal commitment to Israel's security is without question.
Officials here are certain of one thing though, and it is repeated like a mantra: On the issue of Israel's security, Merkel delivers: Remember the submarines, they like to say, a reference to the two Dolphin-class submarines Germany donated to Israel and the three more Israel bought.
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