Analysis: Olmert's diplomatic footprints

Proving that an unpopular leader can't advance his initiatives is also a legacy of sorts.

Olmert mean 224.88 (photo credit: AP [file])
Olmert mean 224.88
(photo credit: AP [file])
When Prime Minister Ehud Olmert suddenly stepped in for his stricken successor Ariel Sharon in January 2006, he pledged to carry forward Sharon's diplomatic legacy - the disengagement from Gaza. And indeed, Olmert's own election campaign was waged on the platform of further withdrawals from the West Bank, called the rather newspeak- sounding "Convergence Plan." But what of the new Kadima party head, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni? Will she pledge to follow Olmert's diplomatic legacy? Indeed, will Olmert leave a diplomatic legacy? One thing is clear: in recent weeks Olmert has made efforts to ensure that he is remembered not only for the missed opportunity that was the Second Lebanon War, or the numerous corruption affairs that tainted his tenure and eventually drove him from office. He also wants to be remembered for processes that he helped put into motion. For this reason he apparently initiated the cabinet debate this week on the controversial evacuation-compensation plan for settlers living beyond the security barrier. For this reason, after meeting Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas on Tuesday for what most thought would be a farewell meeting, he immediately invited Abbas back for another round when the PA leader returns next week from the UN General Assembly meeting in New York. After Tuesday's meeting, Olmert's spokesman said the prime minister intended to keep negotiating with Abbas, and keep plugging away at a "shelf agreement" with the PA until the Knesset swore in a new government. It is as if someone was whistling in Olmert's ear the song based on a verse from Ethics of the Fathers: "It is not your duty to complete the work, but neither are you free to desist from it." The door to an agreement has not been closed, Olmert told Abbas. And, indeed, Olmert's non Lebanon War-related diplomatic legacy amounts essentially to helping set the Palestinian negotiation process in motion, and for going public with the indirect talks with Syria. Neither of these processes will be completed by the time his resignation goes into effect, and if any of these processes do succeed, they will likely be registered under the name of the prime minister in office at the time. Livni is certain to continue on with the negotiations with the Palestinians, since she has been heading up the Israeli delegation since the beginning of the year and genuinely seems to believe that if the Palestinians see what they have to gain from an agreement with Israel, they will modify their behavior and pursue a deal. But while her efforts on the Palestinian track will continue, she is less likely to pay attention to the Syrian track. While Olmert ensured Livni's cooperation and interest in the Palestinian track by appointing her head of Israel's negotiating team, he ensured the exact opposite regarding the Syrians by keeping her completely out of the loop. The negotiations with the Syrians are being carried out by the Prime Minister's Office, Olmert's former chief of staff Yoram Turbowicz and his foreign policy advisor Shalom Turgeman, and not by the Foreign Ministry. One result of this has been Livni's lack of enthusiasm for the project, which will likely be put on hold, at least until a new US administration comes into shape in the Spring. There is something else, however, that could also be justifiably called part of Olmert's diplomatic legacy: the fact that unpopular prime ministers cannot conclude diplomatic initiatives, while popular ones can push through even the most controversial plans. For example, Ariel Sharon was able to push through his disengagement plan over fierce objections, largely because of his own personal popularity and the belief many had that if Sharon said it was okay, then it was indeed okay. Olmert, by contrast, was no Sharon, and was faced with the opposite situation. As an unpopular prime minister, all his diplomatic steps were scrutinized for political motives. For instance, when he announced talks with Syria earlier in the year, many concluded that this was an attempt to distract the public from the Talansky Affair, and his various overtures to the Palestinians were interpreted as attempts to win over the Left in a battle to stay in office. Did Olmert leave a diplomatic doctrine? Hardly. But then again, his was a tenure rudely interrupted, and he didn't really have enough time.