On Revolutions and Elephants

Where do the Jewish Israeli people stand? This month’s survey asked whether respondents view the social issues raised by the protest as connected to the occupation, or as a refreshing distraction from the depressing stalemate.

By DAHLIA SCHEINDLIN
palestinian flag_311 (photo credit: REUTERS/Ali Jarekji)
palestinian flag_311
(photo credit: REUTERS/Ali Jarekji)
THE LITTLE RAGTAG TWENTYSOMETHING PROTEST over high rent has blown up to include nearly everything – the high cost of living, social inequality, low salaries, inadequate education, health services, the welfare state, exploitation by tycoons.
As it becomes more all-encompassing and more grandiose, the protesters are actually calling for a “revolution,” or a “revolution of consciousness,” although it’s not clear just what this means.
So far, the J14 movement – named after the date it began – has conspicuously ignored the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Once euphemistically called “the situation,” people now speak of “the elephant” in the room that no one will discuss, to avoid being labeled “political.” (In Israel the term “political” refers to partisan politics – where the great partisan divide is based almost exclusively on Israel’s policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.)
But now that the movement has graduated into a policy- and solution-oriented phase, how long can “politics” – and specifically, the conflict – stay off the agenda? As the country re-evaluates where its money goes, questions about Israel’s management of the conflict and the settlements will inevitably arise: Can Israel rebuild its welfare state and maintain its occupation of the West Bank, huge defense spending, and the loss of revenues that could be earned through full trade with the Arab world?
In order to circumvent the elephant, can money just be squeezed from some other domestic area? Professor Avia Spivak, from the Economics Department of Ben- Gurion University of the Negev, former deputy governor of the Bank of Israel, and co-coordinator of the protest movement’s self-appointed policy committee, implied that money can be raised yet again from citizens. But can this tax-strained population really endure more?
Three main trends emerging from the protests give an indication of how its participants are thinking about the conflict: First, based on numerous conversations in the tent camps, it seems that many protesters genuinely view the conflict as a separate, perhaps even unrelated, struggle. That would be logical, considering that in the last few years the Israeli Jewish public has expressed a sort of peace fatigue.
Until recently, my own surveys have shown that a peace agreement is low on Israelis’ agenda, although this has changed just slightly as September nears. Numerous other surveys show that peace was out of sight and out of mind because people were simply convinced that an agreement is impossible – and that has not changed.
Some, mostly left-wing apologists, support the separation of the issues at present, and believe that the movement’s essential function is first to create cross-sectorial alliances; only then will the connection to the conflict become obvious to all.
Asecond trend is to connect the two, from a left-wing perspective: J14’s new policy advisory committee, for example, includes Dani Filc, who has served on the left-wing party Meretz’s steering committee and is a director of Physicians for Human Rights; and Dr.
Emily Silverman, a housing expert who works with the left-leaning Association for Civil Rights in Israel; and it is co-headed by Professor Yossi Yonah, also from Ben-Gurion University, who has a long history in left-leaning politics with regard to both domestic and conflict issues. These figures seem likely to steer toward cutbacks in the occupation, at the very least.
Certain right-wing and settler voices are also hoping to connect policy in the territories to social-economic issues, from a different angle: by arguing that the de facto freeze on settlement construction in the West Bank has squeezed the housing market in recent years, contributing to high real estate costs by creating a lack of supply.
Let Israel build freely in the West Bank, they argue, and the supply will expand, easing costs. In the process, Israelis will redeem the land this camp deems holy.
Where do the Jewish Israeli people stand? This month’s The Jerusalem Report survey asked whether respondents view the social issues raised by the protest as connected to the occupation, or as a refreshing distraction from the depressing stalemate. And if the issues are connected, do people tend towards a left-wing or a right-wing explanation of that connection? We also asked about ideological identity (left, moderate left, center, moderate right, and right) in order to see if the respondents are guided by their “political” ideology (in the Israeli sense), or if the protests are causing people to reconsider their pre-existing positions.
WE ASKED THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: “THINKING about the protests sweeping the country, some people say there is a link between the social-economic issues and the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. In your opinion, which of the following policy approaches is more important for addressing the socialeconomic issues? 1. Solve the conflict through a two-state solution to free up funds to address social issues 2. Solve the conflict through full control over Judea and Samaria, in order to expand construction 3. Focus on Israel’s internal problems for now and defer dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for a later time.”
(The responses were rotated to ensure that the results wouldn’t be biased by their order.) We do wish to draw attention to the fact that this survey was conducted over the Internet. While the sample reflects the general demographic breakdowns of the Jewish population, it probably resembles the Internet-savvy protesters more than a typical phone sample and lacks full representation of Haredim, many of whom have less Internet access or choose not to use the Internet for ideological and theological reasons. Further, the responses would clearly have been different from Arab respondents, who are not sampled here.
The results show that the strong plurality of the Jewish public expresses what the majority of the protesters have been saying: Some 41% of those surveyed responded that Israel should put the conflict off and deal with it some other time. Nearly half of all those who called themselves “center” or “right-wing” – but also over one-third of the left-wingers – said that the country should separate the issues.
Less than one-fifth of the sample, 16%, said that a two-state solution would best help Israel address its own social problems – this is actually one percentage point fewer than those who chose to expand construction in the West Bank (17%). This means, notably, that the left and right approaches are tied.
As in most of the other surveys The Report has conducted, the youngest respondents (18-29) are the least likely to choose the “leftwing” option – that the two-state solution is the best means of addressing social issues: just 11% – fewer than all other age groups – choose this, compared to 24% among the oldest respondents (with 15% among the 30-50 group). Fully 26% of the youngsters, just like the right-wing respondents, would prefer to extend Israeli control over the entire West Bank as a solution.
To drive this point home, we recall that 60% of the young people in this survey, as in other surveys, call themselves right-wing. The left amounted to 11%, even fewer than in most surveys, and 23% of respondents said they were centrist. This implies that if the protest policy advisory committee were to suggest that Israel move towards a two-state solution to ease its domestic problems, it could meet some resistance from a large portion of the young Jewish population.
Not surprisingly, left-wing respondents were the only group among whom the plurality felt that a two-state solution is the best approach for working on social-economic issues: 44% chose this option, compared to the 36% who view the issues as separate.
Interestingly, however, among the moderate-right respondents, twice as many chose the two-state response as among the right-wing respondents (12% and 6%, respectively).
The right made up about half of this sample, divided almost evenly into right and moderate right. Thirty-one percent of the right, and onefifth of the moderate right believed that expanded construction in the settlements was the best way to ease social issues, showing significant divisions in that community.
Demographic breakdowns revealed some interesting trends, but none that differ significantly from Israeli trends regarding the conflict seen in surveys and election results over the years.
Education and income, or class indicators, were only somewhat related to the responses: The highest earners were slightly more likely to choose the two-state response.
However, the high-earners were also tied between the leftand right-leaning policy options, just like the general population (21% of them chose one or the other, and 34% said that the country should focus on social issues first, and defer the conflict for later). University-educated respondents were no more likely to choose the two-state solution – the left-wing response – than others (17%).
More men than women chose the two-state option – 19% compared to 14%, respectively. However, twice as many women volunteered that they just don’t know – 20%, compared to only 10% of the men. Asimilar trend appeared regarding political self-definition: 12% of men did not identify themselves, while 23% of women did not.
Women, it seems, either feel themselves less knowledgeable or less politically committed. Thus, the high visibility of women at the forefront of the struggle indicates some diverging trends between the movement and the actual population.
The findings most consistent with past trends related to political ideology were the responses based on religious observance: like the whole population, over 40% of secular and traditional respondents chose the option of deferring the conflict and focusing on the social issues alone – 35% of the religious chose this. Among secular respondents, 22% chose the two-state option and just 7 percent chose to expand construction in the territories. Among the religious, only 2% are prepared to reach a two-state solution as a means of freeing up funds; while the plurality – 43% – would prefer to expand construction over the Green Line.
Overall, the data shows much more continuity than change with typical Israeli political breakdowns affirmed repeatedly through surveys and electoral trends: the self-identified secular left and the religious right are more likely to make a connection between the conflict and the protest issues, while each would address social-economic issues in the ideologically preferred manner. Given the relative strength of these groups, if the movement goes too far in linking the occupation to economic problems, people might question whether it truly reflects the population.
Further, the strong plurality of Israeli Jews either wishes or believes that the country must improve its lot by walking around the elephant.
The question remains whether such an approach is feasible. On the ground, events are heating up. September is expected to bring a Palestinian declaration of independence; and while it’s possible that little may change, the mid-August terrorism has set a gloomy stage. If violence erupts, Israel may go back to its familiar path of deferring social ills to focus on the conflict. In that case, it’s hard to see how anything will genuinely change.