Netanyahu faces stark choices

The Prime Minister has pulled off a dazzling electoral victory, but in doing so has created an international situation fraught with pitfalls for Israel

By LESLIE SUSSER
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gestures during his victory speech at Likud headquarters (photo credit: MARC ISRAEL SELLEM)
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gestures during his victory speech at Likud headquarters
(photo credit: MARC ISRAEL SELLEM)
THE WAY Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu single-handedly turned looming defeat into decisive victory in a matter of days is probably unprecedented in the annals of democratic elections. But the lengths to which he went to keep his job have seriously compromised Israel’s international standing, especially its key relationship with the United States.
Four days before the March 17 election, Netanyahu seemed down and out.
Opinion polls showed his Likud party trailing Isaac Herzog’s Zionist Union by four seats and likely to lose by more.
Inside Likud, party rivals, fearing the worst, were plotting a day after leadership coup.
Then, with the odds stacked against him, Netanyahu launched his solo election- winning blitz. He was everywhere – at election rallies, in market places, on radio, on television, giving the interviews he had refused for years. Everywhere the message was the same.
The Likud was about to be replaced by a weak center-left government, which in the chaotic jungle that is the Middle East would spell disaster for Israel. Only a massive eleventh hour right-wing rally around Likud could save the day.
Netanyahu’s strategy was twopronged: Cannibalize the votes of the Likud’s right-wing satellites and bring out the right-wing voters. To win over hard-liners from Naftali Bennett’s Bayit Yehudi, he declared that Bennett would be in his government anyway, no matter how many seats he won; and, more significantly, that Bennett’s natural settler constituency could rest assured that there would be no Palestinian state on his watch.
Under the radar, Netanyahu also raided Avigdor Liberman’s mainly Russian- speaking Yisrael Beytenu to the extent that Liberman complained of a concerted effort “to destroy” his party.
And to staunch the flow of votes away from Likud to former Likudnik Moshe Kahlon’s socioeconomic-minded Kulanu, Netanyahu promised to make Kahlon his finance minister, irrespective of the number of votes he polled. The message to right-wingers, repeated over and again, was that if they didn’t vote for the satellite parties, there would be no consequences; but if they didn’t vote Likud, the right would lose power.
On election day, to help get out the right-wing vote, Netanyahu claimed that Arab voters were descending on the polls in droves and that left-wing organizations backed by foreign money were busing them in. At a stroke Netanyahu was able to demonize the left – using foreign money and siding with Arabs – and stoke fears of the Arab other gaining inordinate influence – unless checked by a massive right-wing turnout.
Even by Israel’s roughhouse standards, Netanyahu’s electioneering was unscrupulously Machiavellian. He demeaned opponents, exploited primeval fears, aggravated ethnic divides and showed scant regard for the truth. His characterization of Israel’s Arab citizens exercising their democratic right to vote as a threat bordered on the racist; his retraction of Israel’s fundamental commitment to the two-state solution jeopardized its international standing.
But as irresponsible and manipulative as they were, Netanyahu’s tactics proved highly effective. On the day, tens of thousands of Likud-leaning voters, who might otherwise have stayed at home or voted for someone else in protest, backed Netanyahu en masse. The end result was 30 seats for the Likud and only 24 for the Zionist Union, a massive 10-seat swing achieved in just four days.
On the face of it, conditions for an opposition center-left victory had rarely been better. Netanyahu had failed to stem rising living costs, lost some of his luster as “Mr. Security,” soured relations with the US and was seemingly leading Israel to a binational dead end and international isolation.
Yet, when the chips were down, the Zionist Union failed to capitalize. This was due to a combination of campaign weaknesses, bad luck and Netanyahu’s mastery of tribal politics.
In Isaac Herzog they had a candidate well qualified for the top job but without the charisma to sway an election. With his slight figure, high-pitched voice and boyish looks, Herzog needed to build a convincing national leader image. His agreement to rotate the premiership with Hatnua leader Tzipi Livni as part of the price for her joining the Zionist Union did not help.
Moreover, for most of the time, the campaign seemed muted and it shied away from putting the consequences of Netanyahu’s inexorable march toward a single Palestinian majority state on the table. The campaign also suffered from an unscheduled address by artist Yair Garbuz to an otherwise successful center- left rally, in which he lashed out at “kissers of amulets, idol worshipers and those who prostrate themselves on the graves of the righteous.” Although Garbuz didn’t speak for anyone but himself, his comments enabled Netanyahu to accuse the left as a whole of looking down on Mizrahi culture and to reignite some of the passion of old-style Mizrahi-Likud identity politics.
The Zionist Union also failed to cannibalize votes from the centrist Yesh Atid to anything like the same extent Netanyahu did with the smaller Likud satellites. The Zionist Union and Yesh Atid started the campaign on 32 seats between them and a 24-8 split; they ended on 35, with a 24-11 split. Likud and Bayit Yehudi started with 36 seats between them and an 18-18 split; they ended on 38, with the Likud on 30 and Bayit Yehudi on 8. And that made all the difference.
Had Herzog maintained his initial four to six seat lead over Netanyahu, Kahlon, the kingmaker, could have exercised his preference and made him prime minister.
As things turned out, Kahlon had no choice but to back Netanyahu.
Netanyahu’s commanding election victory, however, could prove to be Israel’s loss.
His campaign commitment that there would be no Palestinian state on his watch, and his election day call to supporters to turn out to counter the Arab vote provoked a head-on clash with US President Barack Obama. Obama described Netanyahu’s negative singling out of Arab voters as “contrary to what is the best of Israel’s traditions” adding that it “starts to erode the meaning of democracy in the country.”
These are serious allegations. The subtext is that if Israel keeps moving in this direction, it will erode the shared values at the heart of its strategic alliance with the US. Worse, although unstated, it suggests the obvious further question: To what extent will Israel remain a democracy if the occupation continues? And if, down the road, Israel is no longer seen as a democracy, what would be the basis for continued American support? More immediately Netanyahu’s backtracking on the Palestinian state will almost certainly lead to changes in American policy. Obama has already announced an impending “reevaluation.” In the immediate aftermath of the election, Netanyahu tried to undo some of the damage, insisting that he had not repudiated his support for the two-state solution, only conditions had changed and rendered it impossible.
Saying one thing for the Israeli right and another for the international community is typical of the way Netanyahu, throughout his career, has steered between the contradictory pressures. But the Obama administration is no longer buying the Orwellian doublespeak. Given the prime minister’s settlement building, his role in the collapse last April of the latest American- led peace mission and his election campaign comments, Obama says he is convinced Netanyahu does not want a Palestinian state, whatever he may say to the contrary.
And, Obama warns, there will be consequences.
In his view, the status quo is “not a recipe for stability in the region.” In a deliberately belated phone call to congratulate Netanyahu on his election victory, Obama made it plain that if there could be no meaningful Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, he would have to consider other options.
The emerging US policy seems to be to continue full military and intelligence cooperation with Israel as part of America’s unshakeable commitment to Israel’s security and survival, but to find ways to pressure its new government into moving toward accommodation with the Palestinians, seen as a key American regional interest. In the American view, taking the sting out of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would advance two key American strategic goals: regional stability and enhanced American regional standing. In Obama’s words: The US needs to take action to prevent “a chaotic situation in the region.”
One avenue the Americans are considering is backing a UN Security Council Resolution calling for a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders with land swaps on a one-to-one basis. The resolution would be supported by the entire international community and replace resolutions 242 and 338 as the basic document for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It might also make references to other core issues, like security, Jerusalem and refugees.
Its sponsors are also considering including a timetable for implementation – but even without one, such a document would pave the way for intense international pressure on Israel to end the occupation.
Another American move under consideration is to significantly reduce diplomatic shielding of Israel in the international arena. This would mean no automatic American vetoes in the UN, less diplomatic energy expended to prevent European sanctions against Israel over settlement policy, less opposition to Palestinian efforts to discredit Israel in international forums.
That the Americans are ready to play hardball with Israel is underlined by the recent appointment of Rob Malley as the new White House coordinator for the Middle East.
Malley was the one American official involved in the 2000 Camp David proTHE JERUSALEM REPORT APRIL 6, 2015 15 cess who put most of the blame on then prime minister Ehud Barak rather than Yasser Arafat for its collapse. Malley also argues that Hamas should be part of any meaningful political negotiation with the Palestinians.
It is an extremely slippery slope. Perhaps the most worrying aspect for Israel of the new American get tough policy is the signal it sends to the rest of the international community. Without America to hold them back, European nations will feel free to take action against settlements and settlement products. In this climate, there could be wider European trade consequences. The BDS (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions) movement could make serious inroads. All that has been standing between Israel and international pressure on a grand scale is America’s diplomatic umbrella. Now, by antagonizing Obama, Netanyahu has put that strategic safeguard in jeopardy.
Not surprisingly, given the head-on clash between Netanyahu and Obama, Israel’s standing in America has been hurt by unprecedentedly harsh media criticism, with liberal-leaning columnists feeling free to move into previously unchartered territory.
Indeed, one of the more serious challenges faced by Israel in the US is the danger of its becoming a partisan issue.
Netanyahu’s early March speech to Congress criticizing Obama’s proposed Iran nuclear deal seemed like a foray into American domestic politics on the Republican side of an angry divide.
Netanyahu seems to be deliberately exploiting Republican antipathy toward the president as a key policy tool in his clash with Obama. His invitation to Republican House Speaker John Boehner to visit Israel – after his invitation to Netanyahu to address Congress – is part of an ongoing partisan tactic. It is a very dangerous game.
For their part, the Republicans are only too happy to cooperate. Senator John McCain, for example, made light of Netanyahu’s campaign comments, and urged Obama “to overcome his temper tantrum” in dealing with them. But this partisan divide is potentially disastrous for Israel. It gnaws at the heart of the consensual nature of the special relationship.
True, American popular support for Israel remains strong. But when it comes to young people, blacks and Latinos, the numbers are significantly down. This does not bode well for future ties.
Netanyahu’s election tactics also exacerbated divisions among American Jews.
Many were appalled that the race card had ostensibly been played in Israel. And many were appalled that it could work there. Indeed, there are concerns among liberal Jews in the Diaspora as a whole that it might be harder to relate to and to defend an Israel that seemingly is not interested in seeking peace and fails to uphold basic democratic principles.
For the Palestinians, all this is a bonanza.
According to lead negotiator Saeb Erekat, they intend to continue to “accelerate, continue and intensify” their efforts to mobilize international pressure on Israel.
This will include pressing for a UN Resolution recognizing a Palestinian state and demanding Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank within two or three years. With America almost on the same page, the Palestinian “internationalization of the conflict” strategy could be far more effective.
In Palestinian political discourse, other options are also being considered: ending security cooperation with Israel, which could be a prelude to a new intifada; and, given Netanyahu’s perceived opposition to Palestinian statehood, dropping the idea of two states for two peoples and, with international support, pressing instead for full civil rights in a single state.
Netanyahu has won an overwhelming election victory, but in doing so has created an international situation fraught with pitfalls for Israel. No one is more aware of what lies ahead than Netanyahu himself. Will the narrow right-wing government he seems likely to set up be able to meet the international challenges or will it exacerbate them? Much will depend on the appointments Netanyahu makes to key ministries like foreign affairs and defense. The new government’s policy guidelines will also be a telltale sign for the international community.
There is another way. Netanyahu could instead form a national unity government with Herzog, which would be far more palatable internationally. But that would entail adopting policies that would turn almost everything he said during the election campaign on its head. It is very long shot – but, in the hurly-burly of Israeli politics, not altogether impossible.
As he enters his fourth term, Netanyahu faces stark choices that will impact powerfully on Israel’s position in the world and its long-term future. He stands to overtake David Ben-Gurion as Israel’s longest-serving prime minister and, like Ben-Gurion, his decisions this time round are likely to be of historic import.


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