Fatah moving closer to Hamas

This is one of the worst periods in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship.

By DANNY RUBINSTEIN
Hamas Abroad 521 (photo credit: MOHAMED ABD EL-GHANY / REUTERS)
Hamas Abroad 521
(photo credit: MOHAMED ABD EL-GHANY / REUTERS)
Since the IDF’s Cast Lead Operation against the Gaza rocket launchers, there has been a three-year lull in major terrorist activity and bloody armed confrontations between Israel and the Palestinians.
True, here and there, Palestinians lob missiles from Gaza at the towns and cities of southern Israel and then the IDF retaliates. And similarly, there are instances of murderous terrorist activity against Israeli settlers in the West Bank as well as stone-throwing, along with ongoing confrontations between the Palestinians and settlers. But these levels of violence cannot be compared to the previous bloodletting. It’s much more quiet now.
Yet, on a political level, this is one of the worst periods in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. One sign of this is the developing process of reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas.
Changes in the positions taken by Hamas provide the context for this process of reconciliation between the rival movements. When Hamas lost the diplomatic and fiscal support that had been previously provided by Syria and, to a lesser extent, Iran and when Hamas came to realize that its parent movement, the muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, had ceased being a strong opposition party and was likely to become part of the government in cairo – at that point, the leaders in Gaza also realized that they had to change the way in which they were dealing with Israel.
No more “armed resistance” (that is, terror) but rather “popular resistance” through peaceful means. “In principle,” says Hamas political chief Khaled mashaal, “Hamas has the right to use all means to struggle, including the use of arms.” But only in principle. As then-prime minister Levi Eshkol once said, “If someone tells me that he agrees with me in principle on something, I know that he is fully opposed.”
The events of the “Arab Spring” form the rungs of the ladder that Hamas is using to climb down from the tall tree of armed resistance. The mass demonstrations in the Arab states have proven that military units are not essential to political revolutions or to bringing down a regime. In the new world of mass communications, with hundreds of Arabic-language television channels, a revolution can be fomented with the information that reaches each and every Arab household.
NOT ONLY HAS HAMAS BECOME more moderate and moved closer to Fatah. Fatah under the leadership of Palestinian Authority President mahmoud Abbas has also undergone changes, becoming more strident and moving closer to Hamas. Abbas’s refusal to sit at the discussion table with Israel unless Israel puts a total stop to construction in the settlements and in the Jewish neighborhoods of East Jerusalem is one such example of the manner in which Fatah is moving closer to Hamas.
The second-tier talks between Israel and the PA that have been taking place in Amman are simply a fig leaf, designed to placate the international Quartet (consisting of the US, the EU, the UN and Russia) which has been pressuring the sides to get together.
Arafat and Fatah negotiated with Israel as leaders of the PLO, which is the umbrella organization for the Palestinian movements and parties. The negotiations have been dragging on ever since the madrid conference in 1991. And all the while, successive Israeli governments have continued construction in the settlements and East Jerusalem.So what is happening now? Why are the Palestinians suddenly insisting that this is an impossible situation?
The answer is that now Abbas and the leadership in Ramallah have recognized that they have an opportunity to reconcile with Hamas, and it will be impossible for Abbas and mashaal to reconcile as long as negotiations are taking place in the context of the continued “theft of land and the Judaization of Jerusalem,” to use the phrase favored by Palestinian officials.
Nor is the cessation of the negotiations with Israel the only thing going on in Ramallah.The tone has changed. For example, at a conference of the Orthodox club in Beit Jalla, just outside of Bethlehem, which took place in the middle of December, Nabil Shaath, a member of the Fatah central committee, was asked if Fatah would demand that Hamas recognize Israel as part of the reconciliation process. Once regarded as one of the Palestinian moderates, Shaath responded, “Absolutely not! Why would we ask Hamas to recognize Israel if Israel isn’t even willing to recognize the Palestinian state and the rights of the Palestinians?”
The question of recognition of Israel is a central part of the reconciliation process.Formally, in the Oslo Accords, it was the PLO as an organization, and not the Palestinian movements of which it is composed, that recognized Israel. At the same time, the government of Israel headed by prime minister Yitzhak Rabin recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. But just as the various parties in Israel were never called upon to recognize the PLO, or the Palestinians as a people, there is no need to demand that the various Palestinian parties recognize Israel.
This, of course, is a formal argument, to be accepted or rejected. Deeds are much more important. In Jerusalem, Fatah has recently embarked on a widespread campaign of opposition to meetings between Israelis and Palestinians. It wasn’t like this in the past. But now there are numerous examples of this opposition.
For example, towards the end of 2011, veteran peace activists formed a movement to create a joint Israeli-Palestinian confederation. Their platform calls for the establishment of a parliament and even a joint government between Israel and the Palestinians. On the Israeli side, prominent activists include Shlomo Ben-Ami, who was foreign minister in Ehud Barak’s government, and longtime peace activists Uri Avnery and Ruth Dayan. On the Palestinian side, Sari Nusseibeh, president of al-Quds University, is the leading figure. In December, they attempted to convene a conference in the Ambassador Hotel in East Jerusalem. But Fatah activists blocking the entrance to the hotel prevented them from convening. And there have been other, similar, incidents.
Khatem al-Kader, a member of the Fatah revolutionary committee, who also holds the Jerusalem portfolio, is the leading figure in the attempt to prevent such meetings. In a series of interviews in the media, Al- Khader explained that these meetings create the impression of normalization of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship, and that this impression weakens Abbas’s position of opposition to negotiations as long as the construction in the settlements continues. He also implied that his activities have the approval of the leadership in Ramallah and declared that he and his fellow activists will not permit any Palestinian to participate in any such meeting anywhere – not in Ramallah, not in Jerusalem and not in Tel Aviv. This is of great concern to joint Palestinian-Israeli organizations, including many human rights organizations, academic research teams, and economic ventures.
And what about the security cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians? Al- Khader provided an evasive response, according to which Abbas will decide when it is permissible, and when it is forbidden, to meet with Israelis.
The inclusion of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in the framework of the PLO is progressing, albeit slowly. The sides are discussing the processes of elections and the appointment of new representatives to the Palestinian National Council (PNC), which is the parliament of the PLO. The PNC has more than 700 representatives from the various Palestinian organizations; the parties, unions and other such organizations are supposed to represent the entire Palestinian Diaspora throughout the world. The PNC elects an executive council, which is essentially the government, to handle the negotiations with Israel.
Despite the general impression that the reconciliation process between Fatah in Ramallah and Hamas in Gaza is progressing, there’s still a long way to go. Examining the two sides, the problems become clear. First is the issue of the release of political prisoners. In the West Bank, the Palestinian security forces have arrested hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of Hamas activists, and in Gaza, the Hamas government has arrested hundreds of Fatah activists. A decision has been made, in principle, to release the prisoners, but neither side has done so. Furthermore, in the East Jerusalem “Al-Quds” newspaper December 30, readers were informed that the Hamas police force in Khan Yunis in the Gaza Strip had recently arrested dozens of Fatah activists. The paper also published some of the names of the prisoners, all of whom are well-known members of Fatah.
Even if the prisoners are released, the question of care for family members of activists killed during the violent confrontations still hangs over their heads. Will compensation be paid to the families?
And what about the return of the hundreds of Fatah activists who fled Gaza and are currently living in Ramallah? Many of them want to return to their homes and families. Who will guarantee their safety? Abbas himself had a beautiful home in a suburb of Gaza. The house was damaged in the fighting between Hamas and Fatah in 2007. When will Abbas be permitted to return to see his home? In the past, there has been speculation that he would visit Gaza, but this has never happened, because Hamas has not been able to arrange security.
Abbas has not visited Gaza since Hamas took over, but billionaire businessman Munib al-Masri has. He has an elegant home on the hills on Mt. Gerizim, outside of Nablus, and he is one of the candidates for prime minister in a future Palestinian unity government. He was in Gaza to make arrangements for the parliamentary and presidential elections, which are supposed to take place four months from now, in May 2012.
By the time of the elections, the Palestinians must set up joint supervisory governmental and security agencies for both the West Bank and Gaza. It’s hard to imagine how this will happen. Each side remains very suspicious of the other.
There is definitely a possibility that Abbas and Mashaal will be able to create an illusion of reconciliation. That is, they will come to an agreement about political principles regarding continued diplomatic efforts throughout the world to obtain recognition of the Palestinian state together with condemnation of and sanctions against Israel.
They will agree on an intensification of the popular struggle, which will now consist of demonstrations and vigils rather than violence and terror. They will agree about the effort to establish a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and a resolution of the problem of the refugees. (Hamas has already agreed to a cease-fire, or hudna, with Israel rather than recognition.) And in the meanwhile, they’ll postpone the elections and the unification of the security apparatus and government offices in the West Bank and Gaza.
This type of a partial reconciliation will gain recognition throughout the world – and will pose a difficult challenge to the government of Israel. It will force the Israeli government and public to ask itself how it should respond to the new Palestinian entity. •