Reconstructing Gaza

The Korean ‘protected zones’ model could serve as a creative solution for the Gazan powder keg.

By KOBI MICHAEL
Clearing the rubble east of Gaza City (photo credit: SUHAIB SALEM / REUTERS)
Clearing the rubble east of Gaza City
(photo credit: SUHAIB SALEM / REUTERS)
THE GRIM humanitarian reality in Gaza is double-edged: The dire living conditions the Palestinians suffer pose a strategic threat to Israel. Continuing stalemate means greater likelihood of another round of violence with a higher price tag for both sides.
Paradoxically, Israel and Hamas share a common interest. Both, for different reasons, want to facilitate the reconstruction of Gaza after the fighting last summer. Egypt has scaled down its demands and Saudi Arabia is ready to contribute its share in order to weaken Qatar.
Surprisingly, the chief obstacle is the Palestinian Authority. PA President Mahmoud Abbas perceives any progress based on agreement and coordination between Israel and Hamas as a political threat. Not that he has any desire to regain control over Gaza; nor is he capable of doing so. But he does not want to see Hamas legitimized as the ruling power. Consequently, in lieu of any significant progress, the Gaza Strip is once again a powder keg.
Given this state of affairs, there is an urgent need for a creative solution that improves the chances for a significant reconstruction project while ensuring effective supervision of the use of reconstruction funds and materials.
The idea of “sanctuaries” or “neutral protected zones,” developed during the Korean War in the early 1950s, could provide a way forward.
In Korea, certain zones were defined as off limits to combat for all sides, even during battles. This idea could be adopted and adapted to facilitate Gaza reconstruction.
Schools, civilian aid installations, existing critical infrastructures (water, sewage, electricity, outdoor marketplaces and so on), as well as installations to be built as part of the reconstruction effort, such as power stations and desalinations plants, would be defined as “neutral protected zones.” This would enable an orderly, effective process of construction and reconstruction under the defensive umbrella of protected spaces.
These areas would be managed by an agreed-upon international mechanism that would include representatives from the Arab nations and major donor states. The ban on Hamas operations in these zones would make it easier for the international management mechanism to monitor and ensure the use of construction materials for civilian reconstruction only.
The protected zones could be part of a wider political-security package that includes a commitment by Hamas to a long-term period of calm to allow restoration. While Hamas would not be required to cede its control of the Gaza Strip, Israel could feel relatively secure in the knowledge that the reconstruction effort would not be exploited to strengthen terrorist and military infrastructures.
To achieve this, it is imperative to establish an effective supervisory mechanism that, in addition to supervising the protected zones, would prevent the import of weapons and dual-purpose materials overland through Egypt or by sea. Involving the pragmatic Arab states in the process would provide added impetus for Hamas to meet its obligations. Israel would be able to assist in the reconstruction effort, specifically in the production of natural gas off the Gaza shore, and in the construction of power stations and desalination plants.
The reconstruction process, which would not require Hamas to relinquish its hold on Gaza, would likely lower its motivation to embark on another round of violence. At the same time, it would weaken Hamas by highlighting the limits of its power in the eyes of the local population.
Given the protected zones, public support for violence against Israel would also presumably shrink. It would be possible to make the case to the people of Gaza that the reconstruction work is taking place not thanks to Hamas but despite it.
The reconstruction process could also help facilitate a wider Israeli- Palestinian accommodation. A possible outcome of the process could be acceleration of the idea taking shape in the Palestinian arena of establishing two autonomous regions – Gaza and the West Bank – as two distinct entities. In the future, these entities could become members of a Palestinian federation, if and when Israel and the Palestinians reach agreement on the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.
If the Palestinians themselves are not capable of reconciling their differences, perhaps an Israel-Hamas cooperative effort will help them reach a workable modus vivendi.
Dr. Kobi Michael is a senior research fellow at the Tel Aviv-based Institute for National Security Studies and a senior lecturer in political science at Ariel University in the West Bank. An earlier version of this article, written with INSS managing director Udi Dekel, appeared in the INSS Insight Series