Waiting for America

Eyes are on a war-weary Washington as Moscow seems intent on propping up the embattled Damascus regime

By LESLIE SUSSER
Showing the flag: The Russian aircraft carrier Kuznetsov 521 (photo credit: Reuters)
Showing the flag: The Russian aircraft carrier Kuznetsov 521
(photo credit: Reuters)
In the early summer as the Syrian civil war threatened to boil over into regional confrontation or worse, the big question for Israel was how committed the United States remains to the region and how far the Russians are prepared to go in their efforts to fill any vacuum an America in retreat might leave.
On the one hand, the US and Russia had taken the lead in trying to organize a peace conference in Geneva. US Secretary of State John Kerry visited Moscow in early May, and declared afterwards that the once rival cold warriors could “accomplish great things together when the world needs it.”
But there was a clear asymmetry in the positions of the two powers. While Moscow continued to supply President Bashar Assad’s tottering regime with much needed weapons, Washington refrained from arming the hard-pressed rebels it supports.
The perceived American hesitancy emboldened the Russians.
In late May they announced that they would go ahead with the delivery to Syria of game-changing S-300 ground-to-air missiles.
Highly accurate and with an effective range of around 200 kilometers (125 miles), the S-300 would make it very difficult for Western powers to impose no-fly zones to nullify Assad’s airpower or to help the rebels by bombing strategic targets.
In supplying the sophisticated missiles, or at least threatening to supply them, the Russians hoped to avert a repeat of the Libya scenario, where Western airpower had been decisive in tipping the scales against Muammar Gaddafi.
But although intended to deter the West and promote stability, actually supplying the missiles would create an impossible situation for a third major player, Israel. As Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu put it in talks with world leaders: The S-300 on Syrian soil could make virtually all of Israel a no-fly zone. And if it fell into terrorist hands, civil aviation to and from Ben-Gurion Airport would be under threat.
Clearly, for Israel, deployment of the S-300 in a disintegrating Syria is intolerable. And in strong behind-the-scenes messages, Netanyahu and his confidants warned that Israel would take action to prevent the systems from becoming operational. And that could easily trigger broader conflict.
As it moved into its 27th month, the Syrian civil war seemed increasingly to reflect wider great-power rivalry in the Middle East.
For the US, the choices did not look good. If Assad survived, it might mean stability and an integral Syrian state, but it would come at the cost of a major strategic victory for the Iran-Hezbollah axis and Russia. If he fell, there was no knowing what kind of regime would emerge – moderate Sunnis, jihadists, Syria fragmented? The strategic question for the US was could it help engineer a victory for the moderate, largely Sunni Free Syria Army (FSA), disrupting the Iran-Hezbollah overland connection and boosting America’s standing in the region. For Israel there was an additional strategic conundrum: If the US was not decisive in Syria, could it be trusted to take action to stop Iran from producing a nuclear weapon? The stakes are high. Miscalculation by any of the parties could spark a major international crisis – with Russia, Shiite Iran, Hezbollah and possibly China ranged against the US, Europe, Israel and the Sunni Arab states.
In an effort to cool the situation, the US and Russia took the lead in trying to organize a peace conference scheduled to take place in Geneva in the next few weeks. It would be based on the six-point Geneva accord agreed on last June but never implemented, calling, inter alia, for a cease-fire, formation of a transitional government including rebel leaders and setting a deadline for new presidential and parliamentary elections.
The big argument was over whether or not Assad would be part of the transition. Russia insisted. The US initially said “no way” but then seemed to back down with what it called “fine-tuning” of the conference terms of reference.
There was also a problem over the makeup of the opposition’s representation. The rebel coalition council is divided along pro- and anti-Muslim Brotherhood lines. In the run-up to the conference, efforts were underway to reduce the Brotherhood’s influence by adding, with Saudi backing, 25 secular, liberal, leftist, female and minority representatives, giving the secular-liberal camp a clear majority over the Brotherhood and affiliated factions. But it was not clear whether rebels would be able to agree on a representative delegation.
Worse: Given the stalemate on the ground, most observers do not give the conference much chance.
Part of the problem is that after Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, the Russians reverted to old Soviet-style foreign policy, seeking to exploit unstable situations across the globe to gain influence at America’s expense. In the Middle East, they see a declining America they aim to oust as the leading player. The Syrian crisis is tailormade for them. By backing and arming the radical axis – Assad-Iran-Hezbollah – they hope to make major strategic gains.
Syria’s close relations with Moscow, which collapsed with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, were only revived in 2005, when Russia waived 73 percent ($9.8 billion) of Syria’s debt. It went on to support Syria over its now defunct nuclear project and its alliance with Iran, and to supply sophisticated weaponry, including Kornet-E anti-tank missiles, Pantsyr S-17 air defense systems and Yakhont P-800 shore-to-sea missiles. In return, the Syrians gave the Russians naval facilities on the Mediterranean, in Latakia and Tartus, and a strong foothold in the Arab Middle East.
But unlike its Soviet predecessor, Russia is not putting all its eggs in one basket.
In what it calls a “multidirectional” foreign policy, it also maintains close ties with Israel. In 1998, 2000, 2003 and 2011, Israel launched intelligence-gathering satellites in Russia and, in September 2008, the two countries mutually waived the need for tourist visas. And after their gas finds in the Mediterranean, Russia is reportedly showing interest in a four-way economic pact with Israel, Greece and Cyprus – without impinging on its support for the radical Iran- Syria axis.
In mid-May Netanyahu traveled to Russia hoping to use these good ties to persuade Putin not to supply the S-300s. Four years earlier, Israel had been able to reach a deal with the Russians under which they would defer the supply of S-300s to Iran, and Israel would stop transferring sophisticated weapons to Georgia, following the Russian invasion in 2008.
This time Netanyahu did not have the same kind of leverage. His meeting with Putin at the Black Sea resort of Sochi failed to produce results. Nine days later, National Security Adviser Yaakov Amidror, who The Syrian civil war increasingly reflects wider great-power rivalry in the Middle East had accompanied Netanyahu, told European ambassadors that while Israel could not stop delivery of the systems, it would not allow them to become operational. Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon warned bluntly that if shipments of S-300s reached Syria, “we will know what to do.”
According to Yiftah Shapir, an arms balance expert at the Tel Aviv-based Institute for National Security Studies, the initial Russia-Syria S-300 deal was for six mobile launchers and 144 missiles. But he doubts whether the Syrian army will be able to integrate them on its own. Because of the complexity of the system, the Russians may be asked to send in “advisers,” the way they did to help with Egypt’s air defenses in the early 1970s.
However, given Israel’s warnings about attacking the S-300s, the Russians may not want to go that far. In any event, it would take the Syrian army an estimated three to six months to integrate the systems. And, if they are delivered, this is the vulnerable period Israeli military planners presumably intend to exploit.
Russia, Iran and Hezbollah are well aware of the far-reaching strategic implications of the outcome in Syria. That is why the Russians may be ready to risk supplying the S-300s and why Hezbollah has sent in thousands of its fighters to confront the FSA around the strategic town of Qusayr, despite the risk of compromising its position in Lebanon and taking rocket and mortar hits in its Lebanese strongholds in Baalbek and the Dahyeh suburb of southern Beirut. “The resistance cannot stand if Syria is broken,” Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah declared in late May.
On the other hand, America has been reluctant to get more deeply involved. Even after the Syrians crossed an American red line by using chemical weapons, Obama fudged his promise to take action by claiming there was no clear evidence that it was the regime that had used them. In Washington, Republicans had a field day criticizing the Administration’s hesitancy.
Obama’s most vociferous critic, Republican Senator John McCain, is urging the president to supply the FSA with the heavy weapons it says it needs. He insists that this can be done without weapons falling into the wrong hands.
“There’s plenty of people that we can work with and set up a legitimate government, and to say that we can’t is just baloney,” he told reporters in Washington. “It’s another copout and so is this quote ‘conference’ a cop-out because we are not going to do anything until we have the conference… Meanwhile people are being slaughtered. Meanwhile Assad is gaining the initiative.”
In late May, McCain made a lightning visit to Syria to see the rebel situation at first hand. He crossed into Syria from Turkey to meet leaders of the Free Syria Army, including Gen. Salim Idris, head of the Supreme Military Council. “Their message was… They do not understand. They do not understand why we won’t help them,” he declared afterwards.
The American position becomes even more difficult to understand given the fact that the CIA has reportedly been involved in helping Sunni Arab countries like Qatar and Saudi Arabia airlift arms to the rebels through Turkey’s Esenboga airport and from there overland across the Turkey-Syria border.
It also reportedly oversaw a large arms shipment from Croatia through Jordan. In other words, the Administration is well aware of tried and tested procedures for successfully getting arms through to the FSA and vetting who receives them. So far the US has only supplied non-lethal equipment, like night vision goggles, and intelligence support.
There are, however, early signs that the US and some of its European allies may be gearing up for a major policy shift that would entail supplying the rebels with heavy arms.
In late May the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted overwhelmingly in favor of arming the FSA and the European Union lifted its ban on the supply of lethal munitions.
Still, the overriding impression is of an America wary of further involvement in the Middle East, fatigued by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and contemplating a pivot away from the region to Asia. And the fact that Obama failed to take military action even after the Syrians crossed his chemical weapons red line has led some in Israel to question whether, despite his promises, he will act any differently if and when Iran crosses a nuclear weapons threshold. These skeptics point to voices in Washington already looking ahead to ways of containing a nuclear Iran because, for whatever reason, prevention failed.
But there is a counter-argument: That, on the contrary, Obama does not want to get bogged down in Syria, precisely because he is saving American military power for the more crucial Iranian target.
What is clear is that, for better or for worse, the region is in the throes of major historical change. The implications for Israel and the West are huge. And the key question is: Does America have the stomach for the fight to create a new Middle Eastern architecture in which it remains the dominant player? 