The S-300 game changer

Is the arms deal with Iran part of a strategic change in Russian policy – and its attitude to Israel – or a one-off tactical move?

By ZVI MAGEN
S-300 missles (photo credit: ALEXANDER NATRUSKIN / REUTERS)
S-300 missles
(photo credit: ALEXANDER NATRUSKIN / REUTERS)
RUSSIA’S MID-April decision to lift the ban on the supply of the sophisticated S-300 anti-aircraft missile system to Iran took the international community by surprise. The deal, signed in 2007, had been frozen since 2010, in line with Russia’s participation in the international sanctions regime against Iran. There were also quiet understandings with Israel. During this period, these systems were not transferred to Syria or Egypt either.
Therefore, on the face of it, there seems to have been a major policy shift in Moscow.
The key question is whether it is part of a strategic change in Russia’s regional policy and its attitude to Israel – or whether it is a one-off tactical move. It is essential to understand which in order to fashion an effective Israeli response.
It is clear that the Russian move will alter the regional military balance. The S-300 is a game-changer. It will make it far more difficult for Israeli or American aircraft to operate in Iranian airspace.
This could be extremely significant if the Iranians fail to dismantle or reduce their military nuclear program, as stipulated in the emerging nuclear deal with the major international powers. In this context, the Russian move is a very clear and blunt statement.
It also seems to indicate a change in attitude toward Israel. Despite the strategic ramifications, there was no prior coordination with Jerusalem. All this leaves Israeli decision-makers with an acute dilemma and an urgent need for a close analysis of Russian thinking.
So what lies behind the Russian move? Moscow’s most immediate consideration was, of course, the question of its future relationship with Iran. Over the past year, Iran left the Russian camp to which it had been exclusively bound and entered into dialogue with the West. For the Russians, the very dialogue itself constituted something of a betrayal. And the fact that it seems to be leading to a nuclear deal means that Iran will soon open up to the West economically, which could hurt Russian interests.
Russia is therefore trying to minimize the potential damage through the S-300 sale and a string of attractive economic offers designed to lure Iran back into something approaching the close, preferential relationship of the past.
Moscow also has wider global considerations in light of its ongoing rivalry with the West. The Russians maintain that the West consistently operates against their interests. In the Russian view, the most serious manifestation of this hostile conduct is the continuing NATO and EU “expansion to the East,” towards the countries of the former Soviet Union.
The most recent example of perceived Western encroachment was in Ukraine.
Russia retaliated with force, overrunning Crimea and backing Ukrainian secessionist forces. This, in turn, drew a sharp Western response in the form of economic sanctions against Russia.
Russia is now desperately trying to escape the effects of a sanctions regime that is stifling its economy – so much so that there are fears in Moscow that it could destabilize the regime and undermine its very foundations.
The S-300 deal with Iran, worth around $800 million and already paid for, saves Russia’s ailing economy huge breach of contract fines. More importantly, it enables Russia to respond to Western pressure by exerting indirect pressure of its own. One of the Russian levers is accelerated action in the Middle East – partly to distract attention from the immediate Russian front and partly to exert pressure in other areas as a counterweight to Western pressure in Eastern Europe.
Significantly, the Americans did not jump out of their skins at the lifting of the S-300 ban. There are even commentators who claim the Obama administration was at least privy to the decision and sees it as a move that could increase Iran’s incentive to cut a deal on its nuclear program.
Israel is not really a factor in all this.
True, the fact that Russia decided to go through with the S-300 deal shows it is ready to sacrifice its ties with Israel, if need be. On the other hand, Israel is seen by the Russians as a very important regional player, along with Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. It is not a Russian target. On the contrary, the Russians are anxious to avoid confrontation with Israel. Their policy in recent years has been to seek common ground and develop areas of mutually beneficial cooperation.
Consequently, on the bilateral level, Russo-Israeli ties have flourished. Indeed, the two countries have been able to achieve several significant tacit understandings.
For example, Israel avoided criticizing Russia during the war in Ukraine and did not join the Western sanctions regime, despite strong pressure from the US and Europe. For its part, Russia did not join in the chorus of criticism of Israel during last summer’s Operation Protective Edge in Gaza.
Russia has been very active in the Middle East recently, promoting its position wherever possible, not only in Iran. The Russians back the Iranian-led Sh’ite axis, which includes Syria and Hezbollah, and also has branches in Yemen and Iraq. But, in parallel, they have also been working with moderate Sunni countries like Egypt, which Russian President Vladimir Putin visited in mid-February, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
Indeed, the Russians are not spoiling for a fight with either side on the Sunni-Shi’ite divide. On the contrary, they want to be on good terms with everyone.
In this regional context, Israel is the last country Russia wants to confront.
In my view, in going ahead with the S-300 sale, the Russians were looking to further their own global, regional and domestic interests, but with no intention of souring ties with Israel. This is the message they are sending to Jerusalem.
Nevertheless, the Russian move has sparked deep disappointment and concern in Israel. It constitutes a serious security and strategic blow. Moreover, it raised fears over the whole gamut of Russian conduct in the region.
There are voices in Israel calling for a harsh response. Some even go as far as to suggest subverting Russia’s interests in other parts of the world, for example by supplying weapons to its rivals, like Ukraine. Such a course would mean getting into a confrontational situation with Russia, well beyond the S-300 issue.
This would be a serious mistake. It is clear Russia does not want a confrontation and Israel should not seek one either.
Israel, however, cannot simply stand idly by in the face of the S-300 sale. It should send sharp diplomatic messages, demanding that Russia modify or cancel the sale, or at least compensate Israel in the diplomatic and economic spheres – for example, in the UN and in Palestinian affairs to take the Israeli position into account and not to side against it in a crude knee-jerk fashion; and, in the economic sphere, to look to Israel for large joint projects.
On the other hand, each side recognizes that the other is a significant regional player with the power to harm its interests.
For Israel, given the overarching regional tensions, good relations with Russia could prove hugely beneficial and vice versa. For their part, the Russians see in Israel a player, which could cause them problems given its capacity to alter regional power balances. So the Russians tend to tread very carefully.
In any case, it seems, it will take them quite some time to actually deliver the missiles to Iran.
Therefore, despite the S-300 deal, both Israel and Russia have very good reasons not to rock the diplomatic boat. 
Zvi Magen, a senior research fellow at the Tel Aviv-based Institute for National Security Studies, is a former Israeli ambassador to Russia