The challenge: Getting the US back in Israel's corner

Washington is signaling that it is looking for ways to circumvent the Obama-Netanyahu glitch.

By LESLIE SUSSER
US President Barack Obama (L) and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (photo credit: REUTERS)
US President Barack Obama (L) and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
(photo credit: REUTERS)
IT IS no secret that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sees ensuring Israel’s long-term survival as his sacred historic mission: doing whatever needs to be done to guarantee that the heroic story of Jewish rebirth in a modern nation state does not, in his words, prove to be a “fleeting episode.”
With this in mind, one of his new government’s top priorities will be to mend broken fences with its superpower ally, the United States – a strategic relationship which holds the key to Israel’s longterm future.
In over nine years at the helm, Netanyahu has not been able to crack the great Israeli security paradox: The more emphasis it puts on militarily induced security – maintaining the occupation, launching periodic military strikes – the less international sympathy it receives; but diminishing international support – because of overreliance on military power – undermines the very security Netanyahu seeks to protect.
To meet the full range of endemic, interrelated challenges it faces – military, diplomatic and economic – Israel needs the US in its corner. That was the essence of an internal memo in mid-April by Foreign Ministry Director General Nissim Ben-Sheetrit recommending “urgent action” to restore the intimate working relationship with the Obama administration badly bruised by the periodic public clashes between Netanyahu and US President Barack Obama.
In the memo, addressed to Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman, Ben-Sheetrit lists a string of upcoming foreign policy challenges where close coordination with the US will be essential: the Frenchled UN Security Council initiative for recognition of Palestine as a full-fledged UN member state; possible Palestinian lawsuits against Israeli political and military leaders at the International Criminal Court which the Palestinians joined on April 1; the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, which opens at UN Headquarters in New York on April 27; influencing the terms of the nuclear deal between Iran and the international powers due to be signed by June 30; and the need for diplomatic support if military operations by Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Lebanese Shi’ite militia, near the Golan Heights border with Syria, trigger another large-scale Hezbollah-Israel showdown.
Other challenges have emerged since: a call by EU foreign ministers to label Israeli goods made in the West Bank; and a planned Russian supply of sophisticated S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Iran.
The French UN initiative is both a challenge and an opportunity. Either way, Israel will need America’s help. Alongside the call for Palestinian recognition, the French draft will include parameters for an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal. If Israel decides to oppose the effort, it will need an American veto; if it decides to go along with it, it will need America’s help in drafting parameters it can accept.
Chances are the new Netanyahu government will reject the French approach out of hand, leading to strong international pressure on Israel. What the Americans decide to do, if and when that happens, will be crucial.
Palestinian appeals to the International Criminal Court could be discouraged by coordinated Israeli-American action – for example, if the US warns that representations to the ICC will lead to a cutting off of US funding to the Palestinian Authority (PA). Congressional legislation to this effect has already been passed.
Palestinian legal moves could also be preempted by renewed Israeli-Palestinian dialogue facilitated by the US.
The chances for a new round of American- led negotiations are not high, although both sides have been making conciliatory noises. PA President Mahmoud Abbas has called for reengagement with the new Israeli government, but it is not yet clear whether this reflects a genuine desire to talk peace or merely an attempt to win diplomatic brownie points before pressing ahead with anti-Israel moves in the various international forums.
For its part, Israel agreed to release Palestinian tax revenues withheld since December as a punitive measure after the Palestinian request to join the ICC. The move followed strong pressure from the Americans, who feared the imminent collapse of the PA. The 1.85 billion shekels (about $470 million) transfer will enable the payment of salaries to the PA’s 150,000 employees.
In another goodwill gesture, Israel has also allowed armed Palestinian police to deploy for the first time in Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem. This is already impacting on the quality of life and some see in it a hint at some form of future shared sovereignty.
More than reengaging, however, both sides seem to be positioning themselves for a future blame game. But should these conciliatory moves, against all the odds, lead to reengagement, or conversely, if the Palestinians are able to drum up a critical mass of international pressure on Israel, the role America chooses to play could be decisive.
Another arena where Israel will need America’s diplomatic umbrella is at the latest five-yearly Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is scheduled to take place at UN Headquarters in New York from April 27 to May 22, under the presidency of Algeria’s UN ambassador Taous Feroukhi.
Along with North Korea, India and Pakistan, Israel is one of four presumed nuclear countries that refuse to join the NPT. At each of the five-yearly review conferences, which began in 1995, Israel has come under intense pressure to sign the treaty. The last review conference in 2010 specifically called on Israel to accede to the NPT “without further delay and without any conditions” and it reaffirmed “the importance of Israel’s accession to the treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.”
Needless to say that would mean the end of Israel’s policy of “nuclear ambiguity,” which over the years has enabled nuclear deterrence without international inspection or demands for nuclear dismantlement.
The “nuclear ambiguity” policy stemmed from a tacit agreement between US president Richard Nixon and prime minister Golda Meir in 1969. Israel would not acknowledge its nuclear capabilities and the US would not press it to sign the NPT. The policy depended then on a strong American diplomatic shield and, as the NPT Review Conference will show, still does.
As for the Iranian nuclear program, Israeli leaders are resigned to the fact that there will be a deal between Iran and the powers. The question is what Israel can do to ensure better terms. One avenue, which Netanyahu has favored, is working with the Republic majority in Congress to pressure the Democratic administration.
In his paper, Ben-Sheetrit is critical of the public criticism of the president this approach entails, precisely because of its negative impact on the overarching strategic relationship. He proposes working quietly with the administration to inject critical amendments. Equally important, Israel and the US need to be on the same page should Iran violate the agreement.
For now, by far the biggest military threat to Israel comes from Iran’s Shi’ite proxy, Hezbollah, with an estimated 100,000 rockets and missiles capable of reaching any point in Israel from Metulla to Eilat. Hezbollah’s embroilment in the Syrian civil war, close to the border with Israel, has exacerbated the danger of a flare-up. In late April, Israeli planes reportedly attacked Syrian army rocket stores transferred to Hezbollah and a Hezbollah weapons’ convoy, highlighting the fragile nature of the current cease-fire. The situation could become even more precarious, if Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missiles supplied to Iran find their way to the Lebanese theater.
In any event, if a new round of hostilities erupts, Israel will want to keep it as short as possible because of Hezbollah’s huge firepower. That means a need for overwhelming Israeli retaliation. And, again, Israel would need American support in the international arena to make that possible.
That Israel also faces grave diplomatic and economic threats was underlined in mid-April when 16 of the 28 EU foreign ministers signed a letter to the EU’s foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini demanding clearer labeling of products from the West Bank. The signatories included France, Britain, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Sweden, Malta, Austria, Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia, Hungary, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.
Germany was the only one of the European “big five” not to sign.
The rationale behind the labelling demand was that it could pressure Israel into moving toward a two-state solution with the Palestinians. The Israeli fear is that it could lead to a wider boycott of Israeli goods and play into the hands of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement. Former finance minister Yair Lapid called Mogherini to protest, denouncing the move as a potential “disaster” for the Israeli economy as a whole. How all this plays out depends to a large extent on the signals European countries receive from the US.
Paradoxically, the tension in the Israel- US relationship provides an opportunity for positive redefinition and even upgrading.
Washington is signaling to Israel that it is looking to for ways to circumvent the Obama-Netanyahu glitch and to allay Israeli fears over the Iranian nuclear program. Indeed, the Americans seem to be offering Israel a security package vis-àvis Iran. It would include early supply of a first shipment of state-of-the-art F-35 stealth fighters and refueling planes to enable long-range operations, as well as an American commitment to provide a defense umbrella against Iran. This has even resuscitated dormant thoughts of a possible Israel-US defense treaty.
More ambitiously Israel could use the goodwill in Washington to go for a grand bargain with America: Israel and the US working in tandem for a new Middle Eastern order that suits both their interests. This would include plans for a two-state solution with the Palestinians, reconstruction in Gaza in return for demilitarization, a better deal on Iran’s nuclear program, and ways of enhancing Israeli cooperation with the moderate Sunni world for its own sake and for the good of a settlement with the Palestinians.
This would be by far the best way for Netanyahu to secure Israel’s future. Ironically, precisely because of the profound existential fears he entertains, it probably won’t happen.