New approaches to halt Iran's nuclear program

The West cannot buy the mullahs off. The time has come to explore another approach.

Ahmadinejad 224.88 (photo credit: AP [file])
Ahmadinejad 224.88
(photo credit: AP [file])
Halting Iran's nuclear program: It is deja vu all over again, but arguably worse. The Security Council's recent reiteration of lame sanctions against Teheran, coupled to the mullahs rejection of the West's July incentives package, leaves the diplomatic effort to halt the enrichment program in tatters. But this should come as no surprise. The roots lay in a simple point: The West cannot buy the mullahs off. The time has come to explore another approach, one that challenges the values that sustain Iran's atomic ambitions. The aspiration that negotiated incentives could stem Iran's atomic fuel cycle efforts goes back to fall 2003. At the time, and repeatedly since, the International Atomic Energy Agency revealed Teheran persistently violated nuclear safeguards. Washington took a hard line. It called upon the IAEA Board of Governors to refer the matter to the UN Security Council for the application of sanctions. Britain, France and Germany demurred. The Europeans saw a chance not only to resolve the stalemate through negotiation but - in the case of Berlin and Paris - to upstage Washington while generating economic benefits for themselves. The result: In October 2003, the three European powers sent their foreign ministers to Iran with economic, nuclear and political incentives in hand hoping to buy Teheran off. At first blush, the EU-3 scored. On October 21, 2003, Iran agreed "to suspend all uranium enrichment and processing activities as defined by the IAEA." Headlines declared, "Iranian deal a victory for European diplomacy." The adulation proved short-lived. Although it would not be until June 2004 when Teheran bolted from the agreement, the signs already were present on October 22, 2003 when then president Mohamed Khatami declared, "Iran will never give up this [enrichment] program." When Iran's enrichment activities resumed in summer 2004, European pride would not allow failure. The EU-3 promised yet more bountiful economic and nuclear carrots. Negotiations proved difficult. By early November, the parties struck a new deal - or so it seemed. Iran would "suspend" - again - enrichment activities. Europe would have additional time to put an effective incentives package together. All that remained was the blessing of the IAEA Board of Governors. However, back in Teheran, decision makers balked as they have ever since. Washington's recent participation in the Geneva talks made no difference. One critical reason then and no. The West failed to attack the "values" that underpin Iran's ambition. For the mullahs, one value dominates - preservation of the theocratic regime. In this view a nuclear Iran provides security, international influence, self-confidence, prestige, scientific infrastructure, economic modernization and energy diversity while buttressing popular support. Iran's values, however, can become the West's sword. Consider a kaleidoscope of alternatives: • Co-opt Iran's nuclear enrichment program. Teheran repeatedly declares that nuclear enrichment promotes the value of energy security. Test the contention by adopting the mullahs call for international "co-management" and link fidelity to automatic harsh and certain penalties if Iran balks. • Sow nuclear fear. Iran, obviously, resides in a dangerous neighborhood. Use public diplomacy to cultivate popular fear that nuclear plants are radiological hostages to terrorist malevolence, military attacks and accidents. Reiterate this question: Do nuclear values outweigh multiple nuclear risks and economic costs for a country with abundant oil, natural gas and solar energy resources? • Promote national security foreboding. The mullahs appear to believe that nuclear weapons, or the breakout capacity to develop them, advance national security. Impress upon them that the tack will make the regime less secure. Iran will become an American and Israeli nuclear bulls-eye in this era of preemption. Reinforce this point with a US/NATO security guarantee to Israel: A nuclear attack on the Jewish state will result in Iran's extinction. • Squeeze Iran's economy. The Iranian revolution promised a prosperity that never matured. Runaway inflation and high unemployment is impacting the population. Enforced economic isolation (e.g., a cutoff of refined gasoline which fuels 40 percent of the country's needs) will make these costs worse thereby undermining the regime's legitimacy. • Support Iran's democratic opposition. Expand covert assistance to responsible Iranian dissident groups that seek to contest the clerics' authority. • Use Baghdad to challenge Teheran. Should Iraq stabilize, use this Shi'ite-dominated state to challenge Iran's model of political and economic development to promote regime change. • Educate Iranians about the Libyan case. Use public diplomacy to repeatedly remind the Iranian people about Libya's beneficial disavowal of its nuclear ambitions. Each measure tests values that sustain the Islamic regime. In different combinations they provide the means to avoid the most draconian military steps to halt the nuclear program that lurk in the background. The writer served in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the State Department in the George H.W. Bush administration.