The questions remaining following Thursday's Ma'aleh Adumim attacks - analysis

Both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad issued press releases praising the three terrorists, but neither took credit.

 Police at the scene of a terror attack near the Jewish settlement of Ma’aleh Adumim, outside of Jerusalem, February 5, 2024.  (photo credit: Chaim Goldberg/Flash90)
Police at the scene of a terror attack near the Jewish settlement of Ma’aleh Adumim, outside of Jerusalem, February 5, 2024.
(photo credit: Chaim Goldberg/Flash90)

The terror attack near Ma'aleh Adumim left many questions unanswered.

The IDF has torn apart 18 out of 24 Hamas battalions in Gaza, with the other six basically cornered and surrounded.In the West Bank, the military has arrested a staggering 3,200 suspected terrorists since October 7, seized 230 weapons, and demolished 17 houses of terrorists.
To put those numbers in perspective, the goal of the IDF’s “massive” operation in Jenin on July 3-4, 2023, was to arrest 300 most-wanted terrorists.
In other words, the IDF’s raids these last few months have been 10 times larger than an operation that was already labeled as “massive.”
If all of that is true, how did three terrorists manage to get weapons and open fire on a large crowd of Israeli motorists near Maaleh Adumim?

 The scene of a shooting attack on Highway 1, near Ma'ale Adumin, on February 22, 2024 (credit: Chaim Goldberg/Flash90)
The scene of a shooting attack on Highway 1, near Ma'ale Adumin, on February 22, 2024 (credit: Chaim Goldberg/Flash90)
Compared to any other time in decades, shouldn’t Palestinian terrorists have their backs up against the wall?There are some tactical answers to these questions.
First of all, the part of the road where the attack took place is considered part of the West Bank, which means Palestinians are free to travel on it, unlike roads within the Green Line.
Second, the area had a traffic jam, which left Israeli motorists as sitting ducks.
Incidentally, traffic jams are the same phenomena that facilitated several terror attacks against Jews in Huwara in the last year or so.
Local Israeli officials said they have complained about the traffic issue, have asked for additional new roads to separate the populations, and have also asked for there to be additional checkpoints and security checks on the road.But these solutions will only go so far.
With the current state of affairs, Jewish settlements and Palestinian villages are so intertwined in the West Bank in so many places that separation can only go so far.
Setting up additional checkpoints and security checks temporarily provides an additional sense of security and usually does work for some period of time. But most senior defense officials say that over a period of months, new checkpoints which are perceived by Palestinians as extra create more new terrorists than they stop by humiliating normative Palestinians to a breaking point.
Another question that the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) had not yet answered at press time was whether the three were part of an organized terror group or a lone-wolf group of attackers.
It would be unusual to have three well-armed attackers completely acting alone.
But now is an unusual time, with more Palestinians in the West Bank incensed at Israel than ever due to the large number of arrests and due to the pictures they see of Israel’s invasion of Gaza.

Who took credit?

Recent polls have even suggested that Hamas is now more popular in the West Bank than in Gaza, whereas Fatah, the West Bank ruler, is normally far more popular or in a dead heat, and Hamas is more popular in Gaza.

Both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad issued press releases praising the three terrorists, but neither took credit.
Might they avoid taking credit now out of fear of reprisals at a time when the IDF has taken off the kid gloves, or was their not taking responsibility because the three really did act alone?
And if they did act alone, how did they manage to get so many weapons and organize themselves in such a sophisticated fashion to all attack simultaneously in a crowded area?
On the other hand, the fact that the terrorists shot wildly and without much focus seemed to make the casualty number lower than it would have been had they been more disciplined.
This could suggest they were moderately organized, but still amateurs.
All of these though are tactical limits.
The strategic limit is some kind of diplomatic horizon, whatever that might be.
Until this war, it could have been said that if only the IDF would take off the gloves, terrorism would be stopped.
The army did take the gloves off – and threw them out the window – but there is still terrorism, albeit probably less than there was pre-war.
A very large portion of the harder-core terrorists, probably the largest in years, have been killed or arrested.
Some terrorism, like antisemitism, may always exist. Some people just hate Jews.
But defense officials have been worried for months, since northern Gaza fell, that Israel must start giving some “carrot” and diplomatic horizon to the Palestinians, and not just using the “stick.”
Whatever that horizon might be, whatever Israel’s vision is for “The Day After” in both Gaza and the West Bank, defense officials worry that failing to start moving in that direction will lead to Israel losing ground in terms of security and safety.