What can we take away from The Washington Post's Hamas article?
Those are the two main takeaways from a Washington Post piece Sunday about what Hamas hoped to accomplish on October 7, and how the terrorist organization was able to lull Israel to sleep.
By HERB KEINONUpdated: NOVEMBER 13, 2023 21:34 The remains of a family home in Kibbutz Be'eri following the deadly infiltration by Hamas gunmen from the Gaza Strip(photo credit: RONEN ZVULUN/REUTERS)
It could have been worse, and we really messed up.Those are the two main takeaways from a Washington Post piece Sunday about what Hamas hoped to accomplish on October 7, and how the terrorist organization was able to lull Israel to sleep and deceive it.First, regarding how it could have been worse.Children's toys and personal items lie on the bloodstained floor of a child's bedroom, following a deadly infiltration by Hamas gunmen from the Gaza Strip, in Kibbutz Beeri in southern Israel October 17, 2023. (credit: RONEN ZVULUN/REUTERS)
Despite various reports that Hamas was surprised by its “success” – murdering 1,200 people, raping, kidnapping 240 men, women, and children, including babies and the elderly, and burning and ransacking like fifth-century Huns – the Post report said Hamas actually intended to push much farther into Israel.According to the report, based on current and former intelligence and security officials from Western and Mideast countries, Hamas had hoped to push into large Israeli cities and even to the West Bank. Although the report did not say where Hamas hoped to attack in Judea and Samaria, the southern Hebron Hills settlement of Sansana is just some 30 km. east of Ofakim, which itself is some 25 km. from Gaza and the farthest the terrorists penetrated to the east.Had Hamas pushed that far, they also would have gone through or near to a number of other communities, such as Lehavim and Meitar.How ironic that once there was serious talk about linking Gaza to the West Bank via a safe passage that would have run a similar route.“New evidence suggests that they were prepared to go even further,” the Post report read. “Some militants carried enough food, ammunition, and equipment to last several days, officials said, and bore instructions to continue deeper into Israel if the first wave of attacks succeeded, potentially striking larger Israeli cities.”According to the report, one terrorist unit carried reconnaissance information and maps suggesting an intention to continue the assault up to the border of the West Bank. “Hamas had been increasing its outreach to West Bank militants in recent months, although the group says it did not notify its West Bank allies of its October 7 plans in advance,” the report said.According to a senior Israeli official quoted in the story, “They planned a second phase, including in major Israeli cities and military bases.” Had Hamas reached the West Bank, the paper quoted a former US official as saying, “it would have been a huge propaganda win – a symbolic blow not only against Israel but also against the Palestinian Authority.”The report dedicated two paragraphs to descriptions about the atrocities Hamas committed. In the original version of the story online, a third paragraph quoted Defense Minister Yoav Gallant as saying, “We know from interrogations that Hamas came in with detailed plans of their attack, including which commander should rape which soldiers in different places.”That paragraph, however, was later edited out of the story.According to the story, Hamas did not only want to murder, rape, and pillage. Rather, its ultimate goal was to provoke an Israeli response – one they knew would cause heavy casualties in Gaza – to trigger a major regional war. In this way, according to one expert cited in the story, they took a page out of al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden’s playbook, since Bin Laden’s expectation was that the 9/11 attacks would lead to a fierce US response that would trigger a violent confrontation between the Muslim world and the West.Citing current and former intelligence officials and counterterrorism experts, the report said: “Hamas expected an Israeli response and was willing to accept such sacrifices as the price for kick-starting a new wave of violent Palestinian resistance in the region and scuttling efforts at normalizing relations between Israel and Arab states.”So, as horrific as the events of October 7 were, Hamas had hoped – and had planned – for far worse.
How did Israel mess up?
Now, regarding how Israel messed up.The story paints a picture of Hamas conducting above- and below-ground military exercises while planning the attack for more than a year.The terrorists trained and collected intelligence on their targets by using “cheap surveillance drones to generate maps” and Palestinian workers allowed into Israel to work, “often in the same farming communities that were in Hamas’s crosshairs.” Though not sophisticated, the intelligence gathering was methodical and thorough, the report said.The precise plans for the attack were restricted to a tiny cadre of military leaders. The Post took at face value Iranian and Hezbollah claims that they did not have advance knowledge of the attack.And then there was the deception. The story retells how Hamas lulled Israel to sleep, hinting at newfound moderation and pragmatism – something Israel desperately wanted to believe.“To buttress that perception of moderation, clashes between Hamas and Israel ceased after 2021,” the report said. “The group notably refrained from jumping in on several occasions when its Gaza ally, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, or PIJ, fired rockets or engaged militarily with Israel. To many in Israel, it was further evidence that Hamas had changed and no longer sought a bloody conflict. Some reports suggested that Hamas officials even passed along intelligence about PIJ to the Israelis to reinforce the impression that they were being cooperative.”And then, of course, Israel was off focus. It concentrated on an upsurge of violence in Judea and Samaria and was concerned with a flare-up in the North, as well as being preoccupied with the whole judicial reform.“The distractions and ruses worked,” the report said. “In Gaza, less than 50 miles from the West Bank, the arming and training of Hamas assault teams were largely ignored or dismissed.”Since the war began following the massacres on October 7, Israel has rightfully been focused more on fighting the war and destroying Hamas than on trying to figure out what went wrong and where it failed. Once the war is over, those questions will dominate the national agenda. The Post story gave a general outline of what happened. Answers to the question of how it happened – how Israel allowed it to happen – will be taken up by the various military and political committees and commissions that will be set up soon after the war ends.
