Last September, the IAF Reconnaissance Unit (Shaldag) raided an underground Iranian facility in Masyaf, Syria, which was due to eventually produce long-range precision missiles for striking Israel.

Some details about the operation were leaked at the time. But in January, virtually every detail one could imagine about the operation was leaked. A few weeks ago, a key participant in the operation discussed it openly in an interview.

One of the key questions that countless commentators have asked since that operation, which successfully removed the Iranian precision-missile threat from Syria, was whether some version of it could be applied to the much more difficult but partially parallel circumstances in Fordow.

Without getting into any specific details, it is well known that Iran’s armed forces were and are stronger than Syria’s. It is also well known that Fordow was and is deeper than Masyaf. Furthermore, there are various other challenges that are worse and harder in Iran than in Syria.

Operation Heavy Roads, involving IDF special op. against Iranian missile production facility in Syria
Operation Heavy Roads, involving IDF special op. against Iranian missile production facility in Syria (credit: IDF)

Attacking Iran without targeting Fordow could provoke Iranian anger

Yet, without getting into the details in this sensitive period, Israel succeeded in “proof of concept” last September that it could raid a highly guarded underground site in a foreign country, destroy it, and get out without losing any forces.

This is important, because if neither Israel nor the US destroy Fordow one way or another, then even the destruction of the Natanz nuclear facility does not in any way end the nuclear threat posed by Iran.

In fact, International Atomic Energy Agency reports have discussed how Fordow on its own has enriched a huge amount of uranium to the 60% level and has tremendous enriching capacity.

Attacking Iran and leaving Fordow intact could risk having angered the Iranians into wanting to cross the nuclear threshold while not sufficiently removing their ability to do so.

It is unclear what Israel’s next move is. Maybe it still hopes that Iran will agree to more concessions in a nuclear deal, and various other scenarios could play out.

But it is worth remembering that Masyaf proves that one of those scenarios – which might have been disregarded as impossible before September 2024 – is, in fact, quite possible.