Three raids a day and a staggering munitions pace that shattered global standards. As pilots raced to Iran on stimulant pills, the partnership with the United States and the ingenuity of the women in the force created a single arm that choked off Tehran’s launching capabilities.
It is horrifying to recall what the IDF had to deal with ahead of this operation. The repeated attacks on Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir, appointed by this government and then abandoned to the claws of propagandists who branded him a “Kaplanist” and smeared him from morning to night. A chief of staff who has become a regional commander, not only leading the IDF to extraordinary operational achievements, but also coordinating actions with his many counterparts across the region and working closely with the American chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the commander of CENTCOM in what is described as nothing less than a masterwork.
Consider what they did to Air Force Commander Maj.-Gen. Tomer Bar during the judicial overhaul period, when he had to deal with the rising emotions of hundreds of pilots, some of them older reservists, who threatened to stop volunteering if the legislation advanced. Bar knew he did not have the luxury of dismissing so many pilots from the IDF, especially since they were not refusing orders but exercising their democratic freedom to protest and suspend what was, in effect, voluntary reserve service. He was torn between worlds, yet somehow managed to hold both ends of the stick.
He, nor anyone else, had any doubt that when the moment came, all of them would show up, far beyond the expected mobilization numbers, and that is exactly what happened. But they demanded his removal, and then raged over the excellent appointment of Maj.-Gen. Shlomi Binder as head of Military Intelligence, replacing the resigning Aharon Haliva. True, Binder bears some responsibility for October 7, though not a dominant share, but under the circumstances and reality of those days, he was the most necessary and appropriate appointment.
The man who appointed him, then-chief of staff Herzi Halevi, planned the campaign against Iran after the Mossad’s original plan had collapsed. He knew Binder was the most suitable man on the General Staff to take over Military Intelligence, rebuild the organization on the move, and prepare it for the decisive rounds ahead. These days, it is becoming clear just how right Halevi was, and how brilliant Binder is. I spoke this week with several people in the Air Force, and they did not know how to express their amazement at the quality of the intelligence fed to them in Tehran, Beirut, and everywhere else. “It’s insane work, what Military Intelligence did, pure magic. Everything starts there,” one of those who carried out the operations said.
By the time we got to the Air Force, there was already a shortage of superlatives. There is no choice but to open the emergency stockpiles: it begins with Tomer Bar’s quiet leadership. Unlike his predecessor Amikam Norkin, who was an excellent Air Force commander but also highly extroverted, Bar is quiet, keeps away from media storms — though unfortunately they pursued him — and does not engage in glorifying his own name, which has been glorified for him in his absence.
The race between launchers and bombers
The Air Force’s preparations for war were fascinating. Because the number of aircraft and pilots is fixed and known, and because it was clear a race would develop between Iran’s launch capability and the Air Force’s ability to destroy launchers and missiles, the solution devised by the Air Force was to increase the number of waves. How? Fly to Iran and back three times a day. Every pilot. And how is that done? With stimulant pills. That was the trick they planned. And it worked.
When every pilot does this three times a day instead of once or twice, the number of strikes soars, literally and figuratively, the number of strikes surges, and the ability to reduce Iran’s launch capability is dramatically strengthened. “We understood that we had to bring as many bombs as possible to the target in as little time as possible,” an IDF official said this week, “to jam them up, destroy them, and bring them down as quickly as possible, without giving them time to lift their heads.”
The Iranians are no fools. We were not the only ones preparing for the event. They were too. The previous operation taught them a few things, and they stationed large numbers of bulldozers and tractors at launch sites so they could quickly reopen bombed tunnels after each wave. They were counting on attacks frequency, but the high pace left them no chance.
A learning competition developed here between our side and the Iranians. A competition that was decided, but not without effort. And we have not yet spoken about the American aircraft that joined in. Bottom line: by Wednesday afternoon, the Air Force had dropped its 5,000th munition on targets in Iran in four days. Throughout all 12 days of the previous operation, 3,700 munitions were dropped.
The heart of the race was during the first 48 intense hours. With medical supervision, the Air Firce found the most suitable stimulant pills and trained with them to ensure there were no side effects, no damage to the pilot’s sharpness or motor skills, while also identifying the optimal nutrition for such a situation. They also learned from the Americans’ experience, since the Americans are used to long-duration flights of this kind. B-2 bombers, for example, can fly continuously for very long hours.
What happened was that the pilots and ground crews were pushed beyond anything they had ever experienced during the first three days. The only ones who pushed harder were the Iranians. They took the full blow, and the sharp decline in the pace of launches recorded in recent days is the result of that effort. As of Thursday, the assessment was that the Air Force was on the verge of breaking Iran’s launch capability. No, not reducing it to zero, but bringing it down to “manageable” dimensions that would leave the interception systems with a reasonable workload.
In wartime, the Air Force’s motto is: “Either you’re flying, or you’re sleeping, or you’re eating.” In the current war, that was shortened to: “Either you’re flying, or you’re eating.” They simply did not sleep. Throughout all this, everyone had to be kept on a tight leash, to make sure there was no hubris, no excess self-confidence, no creeping contempt. The historic downing of an Iranian aircraft by an F-35 improved morale, but did not reduce the intensity. Here and there Iranian MiGs also took off against our pilots, but quickly broke contact.
And despite the clear results, the Air Force is not getting confused. It is not underestimating the Iranians. They are fighting, someone said, they are putting up a fight, they came to wage war, they learned, they prepared, they are not giving up on anything, they still take off here and there, they continue launching even though they know that after every launch they will be hit. They are more determined in this round than they were in the previous campaign.
What kept the pilots and ground crews going at this murderous pace? Simple: in addition to the uncompromising professionalism of the force, there was also the knowledge that every sortie, every takeoff, every flight of hours out and hours back, was intended to ensure that the family of that pilot, that female pilot, that extraordinary ground crew member, would have to run to shelters fewer times.
The force multiplier
The Air Force is not only pilots. The ground crews are another unresolved wonder. During every visit by American or foreign officers to Air Force bases, the visitors try to understand how it can be that the servicing, preparation, and arming time of an Israeli fighter jet between strike waves is significantly shorter than in the United States, Britain, or anywhere else, and with less manpower, or women-power. Try explaining that to them. They won’t understand.
Speaking of women, it is an advantage. Everyone I speak to about the issue praises the extra ingenuity and intelligence of the young Israeli women who race with endless energy between the hardened shelters, bombs, and missiles, making sure as few minutes as possible pass between one takeoff and the next. Books will still be written about the cooperation with the American gorilla. It was an unprecedented event in which the naval, air, and intelligence arms of the two countries were integrated as equals and became a single arm.
Israelis suddenly understood American power. The fact that more than 100 modern refueling aircraft flooded the skies of the Middle East meant that every Israeli pilot could change course or stop for refueling almost anywhere. The dialogues between the refueling pilot and the pilot being refueled will one day be published and warm many hearts. Then there is the intensity with which the United States can strike anywhere, at any time, at any hour, with any munition, from any possible bomber. The unchallenged air superiority of the F-22s, and of course the B-2 bombers, the strategic game-changers.
But the Americans, too, got a chance to witness some extraordinary things: the professionalism, precision, and capabilities that exist only in the Israeli Air Force; intelligence so precise it is jaw-dropping, down to a hair’s breadth; and endless creativity that we will only learn about in the distant future. Interlocking American-Israeli tools that made history this week.